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FROM: D BROOKER
CPL DIVISION
29 NOVEMBER 1991

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cc. PS/PUS (B)
Mr Bell
Mr Hamilton
Mr Cooke
Mr Leach
Mr D J R Hill

ASST/
SEC 40/12
-5 DEC 1991
C.C.R.U.

PS/PUS (L)

ARMY STUDY DAY: 5 DECEMBER

I attach a draft speech on which PUS may care to draw for his address to the Army next week. It draws on contributions from SPOB, SIL and Mr Hamilton although we have done a certain amount of re-working of the material provided by them.

2. SPOB have also provided additional lines to take and background briefing on individual topics which might be raised during a question and answer session and these are likewise attached.

SIGNED

D BROOKER

Constitutional and Political Division
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1. MR Maxwell 5/12
2. MR Walker 10/12
3. MR Mc Daniel 10/12
To see

Return pl.

MA
3/12

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PUS'S ADDRESS AT THE ARMY STUDY DAY

Introduction

1. GOC, (CLF) and other officers, it is a very great pleasure for me to have been invited to your Study Day today. I know that the Army has something of a tradition of asking the NIO to speak at these Study Days and I am very happy to have been asked to continue that tradition. As an aside, perhaps I could also say that it does the army immense credit that, amongst all the other pressures, you take the time to stop and think about the important issues you are considering today. It would be very easy to argue that there is never quite enough time for occasions like today's.

2. When you wrote to me GOC, to invite me to speak today, you suggested that I might give an assessment of the complete spectrum of Government policy, within the context of defeating terrorism in Northern Ireland. That is precisely what I would like to do. I should like to say a fair bit about security and , in particular, what the Government's policy is and how it is arrived at. I should like to focus on security policy because the determination of the overall strategy is, of course, primarily the responsibility of Government. The operational discharge of that policy on the other hand is essentially for the RUC and the armed forces. I make that distinction very conscious of the company I am in and of the fact that the Chief Constable is sitting just over my shoulder!

Aim

3. The aim of my address is therefore to explain to you the principles underlining the Government's approach to the problems of terrorism and, as part of that explanation, to try to set the Government's security policy in the wider context of its policies for the Province as a whole, including the relevance of political, social and economic issues to the defeat of terrorism.

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Security Background

4. But first, security. What is the current scene? The bloody and indiscriminate killings and violence of the early and mid-1970s, and the instability associated with the hunger strikes at the beginning of the 1980s, have given way to a lower, but still unacceptable, and continuing, high level of terrorism, with between 60 and 100 people killed each year, 400 - 1,600 shootings and 200 - 300 bombings. As all of us here know however, that such figures do not accurately reflect the overall level of PIRA's activities which, if they were not constrained by intensive and effective security force activity, would lead to significantly more casualties and destruction. The nature and method behind terrorist attacks has changed over the years. Increasingly PIRA are mounting major sophisticated attacks and their targets, while continuing to include security force personnel, have extended more and more in recent years to businessmen supplying and undertaking contracts for the security forces. Terrorists are increasingly using racketeering to obtain money by extortion and fraud. I know that the GOC is particularly concerned about the way that the terrorists have deployed more men on individual operations, dating back to the appalling attack on the Derryard PVCP.

5. Recent months have seen terrorist activity reaching markedly higher levels, in particular with the introduction of new and potentially more effective improvised weaponry. The recent attack at Musgrave Park Hospital speaks for itself as a grim reminder, if one were needed, of the IRA's callous, calculated approach. In addition, Loyalist violence has reached new levels, with 31 murders this year compared to 16 last year. As you will know this problem is receiving special attention from the security forces.

Security System

6. Before explaining how the Government approaches the problem of terrorism, there is one further piece to fit into the jigsaw - the respective roles of the "key players". Constitutionally, the

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Secretary of State for Northern Ireland is responsible for law and order and for security policy. His role is to ensure that the police and armed forces have the resources they need to do the job efficiently, not only in terms of the overall finance and manpower resources, but the legal resources as well. In practice, he decides policy in the light of advice from the Chief Constable of the RUC and the General Officer Commanding, and from his own officials. He is answerable to Parliament for that policy. Once that policy is decided it is for the Royal Ulster Constabulary to carry the main burden of implementing it, under the direction and control of the Chief Constable. He is of course, "operationally" independent of Government. Finally, the armed forces, under the direction and control of the GOC, act in support, and at the request, of the RUC, from the resources allocated by the Government through the Ministry of Defence.

Security Policy

7. I should like now to turn to the matter of security policy itself. It will be evident to you all that the Secretary of State, when reflecting on what the strategy should be, is subject to a wide range of influences. Firstly there are his own opinions and intuitions. On a formal level he then obviously relies heavily on the advice of the Chief Constable, the GOC and his other security advisers like myself. He also has the benefit of the views of his Ministerial colleagues. Terrorism is one of those subjects which, not surprisingly, provokes a reaction in most people and the press, media, human rights' organisations, Church leaders, MPs in the House of Commons and others who otherwise show little interest in Northern Ireland often have views on terrorism, views which are invariably held with conviction. If I may say so I regard this as a healthy reaction; as a bureaucrat I could say that it is inconvenient for Government to have to defend itself against a wide range of opinion. But the up-side of that is that the Government can never be complacent about its policy because while there are so many people arguing for different approaches, it obliges the Government to justify its belief that its policy is the right one.

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8. The options therefore cover a very wide range. There are those who understandably argue for a tougher, more direct approach - "taking the gloves off". At the other end of the spectrum there is a body of opinion - and excuse me if I speak frankly - who genuinely believe that the the Army is part of the problem, not the solution, and that terrorism would reduce if the Army were withdrawn. Others seek the repeal of the Emergency provisions Act and Prevention of Terrorism Act, again in the genuine belief that this would increase public confidence in the institutions of the State and make it easier to bring terrorism to an end.

9. The question then arises as to where, along the spectrum of opinion, Government should pitch its policy. At the most fundamental level there is a stark choice to be made. Should terrorism be tackled within the constraints of the criminal law or should a more dramatic, "direct" approach be taken. To put it another way, do we commit ourselves to the proper standards of the law or do we take short cuts? These two approaches come clearly into focus in the arguments for and against the re-introduction of internment. But that is not the only "short cut" suggested to Government: another suggestion that is regularly canvassed is that the police and armed forces should be given greater dispensation than other citizens on the use of force.

Having posed a question about whether terrorism should be tackled from within, or outside the accepted standards of the criminal law there can, I believe, be only one answer. Short cuts might offer a temporary expedient but they cannot, on any objective analysis, provide a basis for long term peace and stability in Northern Ireland. In moral terms there is also a clear presumption that the Government and the institutions of the state will act according to proper standards. Having said that you will all know that the Government does not rule out such measures as the re-introduction of interment should the circumstances so require. But it is quite clear that this type of measure does not provide a long time basis for tackling terrorism.

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Having explained that part of the Governments philosophy I can now go on to say that the approach of tackling terrorism within recognised standards opens up a wide range of possibilities for the Government. It allows it to harness and bring to bear on the terrorists a broad range of policies in a way which would not otherwise be possible. I shall, in a moment, say more about what the Government is doing on the political side, and in terms of social and economical issues but before I do that I would like to come back again to the question of security. There are, in effect, four main aims behind the Government's policy. They are to maintain the rule of law; to ensure that all the people of Northern Ireland are free to express their political opinions without inhibition, fear of discrimination or reprisal; to defend the democratically expressed wishes of the people of Northern Ireland against those who try to promote political objectives, including a change in the status of Northern Ireland, by violence or the threat of violence; and to create in Northern Ireland the conditions for a just, peaceful and prosperous society.

10. In the Government's view these aims provide a firm basis for bringing terrorism to an end. It will not have escaped your attention that some leading members of the Provisionals - including Gerry Adams - have begun to question whether their dual "Armalite" and Ballot Box strategy can work. The Government believes that by pursuing the aims that I have just mentioned it can bring the Provisionals to the point where they will lose the nerve and motivation to pursue the armed struggle.

11. Within these aims there are a number of specific areas on which the Government is concentrating. Resources. I have touched on this already. The Government will ensure that as far as reasonably possible the security forces have the resources they need to tackle terrorism effectively. There are always conflicting demands within government, for greater expenditure on different programmes, and the books have to be balanced. The recent increases in both RUC and Army manpower are evidence of the Government's commitment although I would also understand if you argued that there was always room for more.

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12. Also, the Government wants to achieve closer co-operation on security with the Government of the Republic of Ireland. Although progress has been made, the level of cross-border terrorist activity remains high, and further improved co-operation is needed, and is essential. The Government is always looking at new ways in which further progress can be made and this is an area, like all aspects of the fight against terrorism, where continuing effort will be necessary. It is no doubt a subject on which you all have views.

13. The law must also be enforced energetically, but always correctly, fairly and in an evenhanded way. No Government can condone departures from the law by whomsoever they are committed. There are two strands to this: the Government will, and has, provided the police and Army with additional powers as necessary: the new Emergency Provisions Act is an obvious example. Having provided those extra powers, however, the Government must look to the police and armed forces to apply them properly, fairly and only when they are genuinely needed. In particular you will not mind me saying that the police and armed forces have a special duty of care over the use of force, especially lethal force. I am sure that this is a subject which causes great internal debate within the police and army and I have no hesitation in saying that the Government is very aware of the heavy responsibility which is placed on individual police officers and soldiers with regard to the use of force. Society looks to the security forces to protect them; equally you look to the law to provide you with proper protection when legitimate force is used. As you may be aware the law on the use of force is currently being reviewed.

14. The Government, and I know the security force commanders, also recognise the crucial importance of securing, then maintaining the confidence and support of the community for their actions. Clearly, some sections of the community withhold their support or do not feel able to give it as freely and fully as we would wish. I see this as a key challenge: the security forces, through their professionalism

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and operational effectiveness, must win as many as possible of the fundamentally law abiding and decent people over, no matter what their political opinions may be.

Link Passage/Political Development

15. GOC, I have explained something of the background to the Government's security policy. If I have to sum up that approach it might be in the short phrase "a robust determination to tackle terrorism within the criminal law". But if terrorism is to be tackled effectively there must, in the Government's view, be more than just a simple reliance on the police and armed forces. Tackling terrorism of course means dealing with criminals; but it also goes beyond that. We also have to tackle the attitudes, political, social and economic circumstances that help to create or sustain terrorism. The formidable commitment and determination of the police and armed forces therefore needs to be complemented by a range of measures, across Government, properly co-ordinated to help under-cut the causes of terrorism.

16. One of those causes is political division. I hardly need tell anyone in this room that Northern Ireland is a divided society. I do not need to tell you because, together with the RUC you are asked to shoulder in a very stark way the consequences of that division. The division between the two sides of the community creates a lack of cohesion in Northern Ireland society which the terrorists are only too keen to exploit. Of course the Provisional IRA and other republican paramilitaries have their own agenda which they might well seek to pursue even if there were harmony between the two sides of the community in Northern Ireland, but the absence of that harmony gives them greater room for manoeuvre.

17. A key priority on the Government's part is therefore to reduce that space available to the terrorists. One way of achieving that is to try to bring the two sides of the community together at a political level. If there could be political reconciliation between

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the two sides of the community this would remove the republican terrorists' right to claim that they represented a section of the community whose wishes they say are being ignored. The Government therefore regards it as vital to try to bring about the creation of political arrangements within Northern Ireland which would attract the support of both sides of the community and, at the same time, would accommodate the Republic of Ireland's legitimate interest in Northern Ireland as well as Northern Ireland's relationships with the rest of the United Kingdom.

18. I do not propose to go into detail about what Mr Brooke has been trying to achieve with the political parties and with the Irish Government over the past two years. I am sure you are all pretty aware that, after some fifteen months of painstaking negotiations, he succeeded in producing an agreement which brought the four main Northern parties to the same table at Stormont for the first time in sixteen years. It is on the public record that after some fairly unseemly wranglings about procedural issues about where the phase of talks involving the Irish Government should take place, who should chair those discussions, and other issues, there were only a couple of weeks left at the end of June and beginning of July, for the real talking to begin. As things worked out there was very little time to get into proper discussion of the meat of the issues.

19. Nevertheless, there were many good things that came out of even that brief period of collective talks. As some one who took part in the talks it was noticeable just how much the mood began to change between the parties as they faced each other across the table. I do not wish to exaggerate but it was pretty clear that suspicion began to turn to trust, confrontation to understanding. That was a very real prize and, in years to come, might just turn out to have been something of a turning point. As I say, I make no exaggerated claims about what happened earlier this year because its obvious to us all that, as yet, there is nothing firm on the table to show from that process. But it might just have signalled a change in the

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climate and it is encouraging that, in the Department's continuing contacts with the parties, they continue to show what appears to be a genuine commitment to the process. Mr Brooke is talking to them at the moment, and to the Irish Government to see whether they can agree a basis for new talks. I will not make any guesses about that although, as I say, there is certainly a collective willingness to make progress. The prospect of the British General Election complicates the picture.

Social and Economic Issues and Community Relations

20. Having spoken about the political side I should now like to say something about another element in the process of removing the ground from under the terrorists' feet - policies to address the social and economic problems of the Province. It is axiomatic that, in any civilised society, every individual should have equal access to good housing, jobs, and an equal opportunity to make the most of themselves. These principles underpin any society but, in Northern Ireland, they have a special relevance because they can also undermine the basis for terrorism. I thought that I would therefore tell you some of the things that the Government is doing on the social and economic front, to give you a picture of the broad canvas. Those of you who have been on a number of tours of Northern Ireland might well have your own experiences of how the infrastructure has improved in Northern Ireland during the last twenty years

21. As many of you will be aware, Northern Ireland's geographical position on the periphery of the United Kingdom and also of Europe, and its lack of basic natural resources, has produced a somewhat fragile economy which is heavily dependent on the public sector. Its traditional manufacturing base in ship-building, engineering, and the clothing and Irish linen industries has seen significant contraction. There has also been a drop in the number of people employed in agriculture in the rural areas, and these trends have resulted in continuing high levels of unemployment, a long standing

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feature of the local economy. This has resulted in a pattern in places such as the West Bank of Derry, Strabane, East Tyrone and West and North Belfast, of substantial areas of social and economic deprivation, not to mention alienation from the structures and institutions of Government.

22. How then is Government addressing these problems and how best can the security and non-security interests work together in a way which is naturally reinforcing? Firstly, we have made major efforts to improve the physical infrastructure of Northern Ireland. In housing, for example, as a result of Government policies, levels of unfitness in housing have fallen from 25% in 1974 to approximately 6% today. We have some of the best inner-city housing in Western Europe in places such as Shantallow, Short Strand, Poleglass and Shankill. Even the infamous blocks at Divis will be demolished during the next year and replaced with traditional terrace housing. The Rossville flats in Londonderry have already gone. In many cases the views of the security forces have been sought about housing design, estate layout and road lines. There has also been substantial investment in the road network to make access easier throughout the Province.

23. Secondly, we have sought to rejuvenate the city and town centres. It is plain to see that there has been a remarkable turn-around in Belfast and Londonderry compared with 15 years ago. Both city centres have thriving shops, new office blocks - there are 5 new office blocks under construction in Great Victoria Street; evening entertainment is vibrant ; in Belfast there are some 300 new eating places; and within recent years the market leaders have been attracted to Belfast-Debenhams, Principles, Laura Ashley, and Next. McDonald Hamburgers arrived last month! These city centre areas are important because they are politically neutral places where both sections of the community can shop together, work together and be entertained together. That is important for the normality of the Province.

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24. The development of the physical fabric is also under way in the rural towns and villages. With the help of Government grants, there has been significant improvement in town centres such as Dungannon and Strabane. Schemes to improve the environment and help facilitate economic development are under way in places such as Castlederg, Belleek and Pettigo. All these places have experienced major security incidents over the years. The encouraging aspect is that a growing number of local businessmen and community workers are becoming directly involved in the rejuvenation of these places. It is important however that the security forces on the ground are fully aware of proposals for development and so arrangements are made for both the police and the army to be briefed on these developments. Not only will this provide additional helpful information, but, I suggest, it gives greater opportunity for the security forces and the local community to talk together about positive developments in the area.

25. We do not kid ourselves however that there are not still major problems in areas such as West and North Belfast. These areas show continuing very high levels of unemployment, poor educational achievement, major social problems (with, for example, a high incidence of family debt problems and family breakdown), a weak private sector and low self-esteem and confidence. There are a number of special programmes targetted specially at these areas. Again it is encouraging to see how the local community leaders are responding and taking direct responsibility for a number of key local projects. Perhaps I could best illustrate this by simply listing a number of recent initiatives in the Lower Falls area of West Belfast, an area made famous for all the wrong reasons. There are already 2 locally run Job Clubs to help the unemployed find work; 2 major Enterprise Centres offering workspace for small businesses, and the professional advice necessary to help those set up and develop their businesses; a Further Education Outreach Centre; a drug-abuse centre; 2 new Job Training Programmes; and, about to be completed, an extensive new shopping complex opposite

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Divis to introduce much needed retail facilities into the area. All of these are being run by the local community, with substantial help and grant aid from public funds. I mention these projects specifically to show the breadth of the Government's policies targeted to local needs. I think it is important that the security forces on the ground are fully aware of all these facilities, and again there are arrangements for local commanders to be fully briefed about these projects. For our part, we encourage suggestions from the security forces on other possible projects which might be considered.

26. Time does not permit me to spell out our policies in education (where we have both the best and the worst in the United Kingdom), health, agriculture (where we have recently launched a Rural Development Initiative), and other areas of the economy (where we must work hard to improve competitiveness). I would however want to mention 2 other important areas which the Government is also addressing at present. One of these is the continuing series of differentials between the Protestant and Catholic communities in Northern Ireland where, on a number of important indicators (such as levels of unemployment, and access to grammar schools) Protestants fare better than Catholics. We have a number of important policy initiatives already in hand including very strong Fair Employment legislation, and others being prepared, to address these community differentials so that we can eventually achieve a "level playing field". The second area is the work we have undertaken with the past 3 years to improve community relations at different levels. There is a growing number of community relations organisations seeking to break down divisions, again with help and financial support from Government. Many of these people are working courageously in difficult areas but we are convinced that, in the longer term, this is an area of Government policy which must be intensified. In many areas of Northern Ireland there are local people willing to stand up against the paramilitaries, willing to work across the divide, and willing to do what is right for the whole community. These are key players and I think it is important that local security force commanders and, Government officials identify and work with these people. It must be in everyone's

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interest to give them as much - sensitive - encouragement and support in what they, and we are both trying to do.

Conclusion

27. I will now draw my remarks to a close. I have tried, in this presentation, to get across the message that the Government's first priority remains the defeat of terrorism and that it has a set of co-ordinated policies, right across the board, dovetailed together to meet that objective. Some of you might feel that I have said too much about the political, social and economic aspects and that the Government should devote more of its energy just to the security issues. I hope that the Chief Constable and GOC would testify that we do, in fact, do that. It is impossible for the NIO as a department, both at Ministerial level and amongst officials, not to face up to the reality of terrorism. The Government does not avoid the issues or try to hide from them. It must, however, confront the problems through the rule of law, not by following the terrorists' rule book, and follow policies which it believes will contribute to the goal of bring about lasting peace. The approach which I have outlined to you today is followed absolutely with that purpose in mind.

If the Government felt that the proscription of any organisation was likely to materially assist in bringing terrorism to an end, it would not hesitate to proscribe it.

Non-proscription does not imply free permission for substantive attempts at violence.

The Government will not proscribe organisations which are actively and primarily engaged in the commission of terrorist acts.

This policy accords with the Government's view that people should be prosecuted for actions rather than beliefs.

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