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From: Colonel D Strudley OBE



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Bm

September 1989

DO/ACOS G3

Mrs Christine Collins
SPOB
NIO
Stormont House Annexe



Dear Christine,

Herewith the brief as promised. I hope it answers your questions. Please don't hesitate to call; I am on Brinton 5287 at home or 5249 in the office.

*I am aye,
David*

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1321 G3(Ops)

25 Sep 89

Security Policy and Operations Branch, NIO

UDR POLICY AND RELATED SECURITY MATTERS

GENERAL

1. Following the questions raised by the Irish Government at the last IGC a number of matters concerning the UDR and related security matters have been investigated.

2. The recommendations made as a result of these enquiries have been endorsed by the Chief of the General Staff (CGS) but are subject to agreement by the Secretary of State for Defence.

AIM

3. The aim of this paper is to explain what can be achieved for the UDR as a result of recent inquiries.

UDR SCREENING

4. A synopsis paper on Personnel Security within the UDR is attached at.....Flag A

5. In summary the recommendations are as follows:

a. The requirement for an enlarged dedicated UDR screening detachment.

b. All transferees from the Regular Army to the UDR to be fully screened.

c. All applicants, including transferees, to sign a security declaration after a formal security interview.

d. A formal aftercare system to be introduced by extending a formal system of reviews.

f. Soldiers to be re-screened on promotion to Cpl and/or on a regular basis.

TRAINING AND PROFESSIONALISM

6. Two aspects of training and professionalism in the UDR were examined:

a. Increasing the Regular Army attachments to the UDR. Details are at.....Flag B

b. Increasing the number of Regular Army courses available to the UDR. Details are at.....Flag C

16 March 91

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7. Further staffing is required to determine the requirement more precisely but, in summary, there will be an increase in regular Army attachments to the UDR and UDR officers and SNCOs will attend more and more varied training courses in order to increase their professionalism.

BALANCE BETWEEN PC AND PT ELEMENTS OF THE UDR

8. Based on historical information, details of the projected strengths of both the PC and PT elements of the UDR are at.....Flag D

CONTROL OF RECOGNITION DOCUMENTS

9. Our review of Recognition Aids is at.....Flag E

10. The 1988 rules will be rigorously applied and we are conducting a review of the policy for the distribution and accountability of recognition aids.

RIOT GUNS FOR THE UDR

11. The matter of riot guns for the UDR is examined atFlag F


12. The HQNI recommendation, which has been agreed by CGS, is that there is to be no change at all to the deployment or rules of engagement.

ACCOMPANIMENT

13. A review of the RUC accompaniment policy is at.....Flag G
This paper provides more detail than asked for but provides an analysis of UDR patrol activity throughout the Province for a typical month. Although not clear in the Review, a significant percentage of time is spent on static duties and training. It has been recommended that RUC accompaniment of all Army patrols should continue to be a highly desirable aspiration.

SUMMARY

16. A copy of the letter by GOC to SSNI is attached at.....Flag H
This letter has been approved by the CGS and a copy has been passed to the Secretary of State for Defence.


D STRUDLEY
Col
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Ext 5249

List of Flags:

A. Annex A to ACOS G3 11 dated 20 Sep 89.

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- B. Annex C to ACOS G3 11 dated 20 Sep 89.
- C. Annex D to ACOS G3 11 dated 20 sep 89.
- D. Annex I to ACOS G3 11 dated 20 Sep 89.
- E. Annex H to ACOS G3 11 dated 20 Sep 89.
- F. Annex F to ACOS G3 11 dated 20 Sep 89.
- G. Annex G to ACOS G3 11 dated 20 Sep 89.
- H. GOC 19 Draft Letter dated Sep 89.

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PERSONNEL SECURITY WITHIN THE UDR - SYNOPSIS PAPER

INTRODUCTION

1. This synopsis paper outlines the current system of UDR Personnel security, its weaknesses and makes recommendations. The full paper is at enclosure 1 to this annex.
2. The possibility of rescreening every member of the UDR was examined. Given current resources this is impossible and because the present system of screening relies in the main on RUC and military records no more information on personnel would be gained than is already available. This option is therefore not considered further.

THE CURRENT SYSTEM

3. Screening. All applicants to the UDR are screened against military records (120 Sy Sect HQNI) and by the RUC against CIO and SB records. Any trace is examined by HQNI G2 Counter Intelligence (CI) who have this year turned down 95 out of 1081 applicants.
4. Persons of Security Interest (POSI) List. The POSI list (held at HQNI G2) records UDR personnel who have a trace which is not sufficient to warrant dismissal but which requires a watching brief. COMD UDR and his COs review this list biannually. This year seven UDR members have been dismissed as a result of this review.
5. CI Casework Review. A CI casework review chaired by Chief G2 HQNI examines monthly all cases in NI and makes recommendations. This has resulted in the discharge of eight UDR members this year.
6. Potential for Improvement. Given existing resources the current system for dealing with personnel security within the UDR cannot be significantly improved.

WEAKNESSES IN CURRENT SYSTEM

7. Screening is heavily reliant upon accurate RUC information (an area outside HQNI control). The RUC manual card system can be slow and less than completely efficient. There is a lack of a single computerized data-base to speed passage of information.
8. There is no security interview of potential applicants and no security declaration is required.
9. The UDR Selection Board lacks a dedicated officer and therefore cannot pay sufficient attention to detail during the recruitment process.
10. Soldiers with no Irish connection transferring from the Regular Army to the UDR are not fully screened.

11. There is no formal system of systematic rescreening 'after-care' once individuals have joined the UDR.
12. The POSI list system does not go far enough. The UDR are reluctant to submit new individuals for inclusion.

13. The current warning system for officers in the UDR and for part-time soldiers operating in the UDR has security weaknesses. Officers from the same area as their soldiers can have divided loyalties. There is a lack of control over the part-time element.

RECOMMENDATIONS

14. A dedicated security detachment of officers and WO OR's, should be formed within 120 Sy Sect to screen the UDR. 120 Sy Sect should be enhanced to form the Detachment and to enable it to carry out additional tasks.
15. The RUC should be approached to consider how they can improve their screening service. This should include consideration of computerizing and networking their screening records on CUCIBIS.
16. Applicants for the UDR should be subject to a security interview as part of the screening process and should sign a security declaration.
17. A dedicated post should be established in GI to strengthen the UDR selection board procedure.
18. All transferees to the UDR should be rescreened including interview by 120 Sy Sect and signature of the security declaration.
19. Aftercare should be introduced by extending a formal system of reviews, six monthly by Commanding Officers and quarterly by Company Commanders. This would in turn make the existing POSI system more effective.
20. Consideration be given to employing UDR officers outside their traditional geographical areas.
21. Consideration be given to removing the part-time element from the UDR.

ENCLOSURE I - PERSONNEL SECURITY WITHIN THE UDR 8600 (CI) dated 20 Sep 89.
ENCLOSURE II - PERSONNEL SECURITY WITHIN THE UDR (Speaking Notes) 8600 (CI) dated 20 Sep 89

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ANNEX C TO
ACOS G3 11
DATED 22 SEP 89

INCREASE IN REGULAR ARMY ATTACHMENTS
TO THE UDR

CURRENT SITUATION

1. Each UDR battalion has attached to it the following Regular Army officers/WOs/SNCOs:

- a. Lt Col - CO
- b. Maj - TISO
- c. Maj/Capt - QM
- d. WO1 - RSM
- e. WO2/SNCO - Asst IO/Int WO
- f. WO2 - Trg WO
- g. 3 SNCOs - Trg PSIs

2. None of these posts is established to provide supervision at company level. Additionally, the UDR PC is understrength at company level in captains as 2ICs, and in subaltern platoon commanders. The breakdown by battalion is as follows: (No officers in brackets)

a. Cpts.

- (1) 2 UDR - 1
- (2) 5 UDR - 1
- (3) 7/10 UDR - 2

b. Subalterns.

- (1) 1/9 UDR - 3
- (2) 3 UDR - 3
- (3) 4 UDR - 1
- (4) 5 UDR - 1
- (5) 6 UDR - 2
- (6) 7/10 UDR - 3
- (7) 11 UDR - 3

PROPOSALS

3. In order to provide an increase in supervision at company level until the measures described in the UDR Concept Paper can be introduced and to fill existing PC vacancies in UDR battalions the following short to medium term attachments are needed:

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- a. Up to 4 x Cpts as company ZICs.
- b. Up to 15 x subalterns as platoon commanders.

Each attachment should be of 6 months duration (on emergency tour).

- 5. Consideration should also be given to the provision of up to 16 x WO2 attachments as PO Company administrative Warrant Officers.

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ANNEX D TO
ACOS G3 11
DATED 20 SEP 89

INCREASE IN REGULAR ARMY COURSES AVAILABLE TO THE UDF

CURRENT SITUATION

1. Officers are allocated vacancies on the following Regular Army Courses:

a. Career Courses.

- (1) Pre RMAS.
- (2) RMAS (SMC/SGC).
- (3) Platoon Commanders Battle Course (but only on a reserve basis).
- (4) JCSC (a limited allocation below requirement, and only JCSC Phase 3 JCSC).
- (5) NI Intelligence Courses.

b. TA.

- (1) Commissioning Course TA.
- (2) All Arms Tactics.
- (3) Command and Staff.

2. NCOs are trained on the following specialist courses (there are no career courses or professional training courses available):

- a. All Arms Drill TA Instr.
- b. Field Firing.
- c. CQMS/RCMS.
- d. TA Section Commanders.
- e. TA Platoon Sergeant.
- f. TA Signals courses.
- g. NI Intelligence courses.
- h. Security courses.

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- j. Clerk courses.
- k. Search courses.
- l. Photographic courses.
- m. Environmental Health and Medical courses.
- n. Training Support courses.
- o. Video Projectionists courses.
- p. Service Fund Accounting courses.
- q. PT Instructors courses.
- r. MT courses.
- s. Cockery and Messing.
- t. Dog Handling courses.
- u. Recruit courses.

3. Future Officer Course Requirements.

- a. The following Regular Army courses should be made available to all OFP PO. officers:

(1) School of Infantry:

- a. Platoon Commanders Battle Course (6-8 per year).
- b. All Arms Tactics Course (5-6 per year).

(2) Staff College.

- (a) Junior Command and Staff Course all phases (6-8 per year).
- (b) Army Command Staff Course (as selected).

- b. Security Staff Courses. 10 per year.

4. Future NCO Course Requirements:

- a. General. EPC and EPC(A).

- b. School of Infantry:

- (1) Skill at Arms.
- (2) Senior NCOs Battle Course.

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c. Detailed Training Requirements.

(1) EPC. The promotion rate from Cpl to Sgt is currently 35 a year. This will require about 20 vacancies on EPC/A courses.

(2) EPC/A1. The promotion rate from CSgt to WO2 is currently 15 a year. This will require about 20 vacancies on EPC/A1 courses.

(3) Skill at Arms. Every Cpl requires training now; the requirement per year would be 30.


(4) Senior NCOs Battle Course. It is not essential that all senior NCOs attend this course, however all Platoon Sergeants should attend; the requirement is 18 per year.


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ANNEX I TO
HQNI ACOS G3 11
DATED 10 SEP 89

UDR PROJECTED STRENGTH

1. In early 1989, studies began into the balance between the Permanent Cadre (PC) and Part Time (PT) strengths of the UDR.
2. This study is still underway. It assumes that the historical decline in PT membership will continue. The feasibility of increasing the PC element to compensate for this is still under examination by HQNI. The outline proposals have yet to be endorsed or funded.
3. In graphical form the projected strengths are as follows:





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ANNEX H 10
TO ACOS G3 11
DATED SEP 89SECURITY OF RECOGNITION INFORMATIONINTRODUCTION

1. As a result of the current enquiries into the alleged passing of photomontages by members of the Security Forces to protestant paramilitary groups, it was directed that the system and procedures involving recognition information (RI) be examined.
2. RI is vital to the effective fight against terrorism. Such information needs to be disseminated. There will always be a risk of such information getting into the wrong hands. No system or policy can guarantee to protect such information from an individual with authorised access who has the intention to steal or copy a photomontage or a video. However, security procedures should make it as difficult as possible for an individual to carry out such an action.
3. RI is usually visual and for the most part is covered by photographs and videos.

AIM

4. The aim of this paper is to examine the current system and procedures involving RI.

OUTLINE

5. The paper will cover the following areas:
 - a. The operational requirement for RI.
 - b. The production system.
 - c. Security procedures.
 - d. Improvements.

OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENT

6. There is a considerable operational requirement for RI at all levels:
 - a. Headquarters Northern Ireland (HQNI). Intelligence cells within the HQ involved in analysis.
 - b. Brigade Intelligence Cells. Brigade Intelligence Cells carry out analysis and recognition training for units.
 - c. Unit Intelligence Cells. Unit Intelligence Cells train the unit's soldiers in terrorist recognition.
 - d. Unit Patrols. Unit patrols carry RI in order to make an accurate and fast identification of a suspected terrorist. This is essential to monitor terrorist movement, and to distinguish the terrorist or terrorist suspect from the remainder of the population.
 - e. Specialist Intelligence Units. Specialist Intelligence Units engaged in surveillance operations or research duties.
 - f. The RUC. The RUC require recognition aids for their operational and training commitments. The Army give considerable support to the RUC in the production of such information.

SECURITY PROCEDURES

Regulations for the control of such information are as follows:

- a. Manual of Army Security (MAS). MAS contains the overall procedures for the Army. It lays down regulations for the control of classified information. Photomontages are generally classified RESTRICTED. There is no specific overall requirement to account for such information. However, special rules apply in Northern Ireland.
 - b. G2 HQNI Directives. As a result of a number of losses of montages in 1988, a policy document was issued by HQNI G2(CI), laying down minimum security standards for control of both photographic and video recognition material. This policy letter is at Appendix 1 to this Annex. However, it should be noted that there was no HQNI requirement prior to this to account for such material. It is therefore probable that considerable recognition material exists of which there is no formal record.
 - c. Brigade Directives. Brigades issue their own detailed security policy directives which complement G2 HQNI policy.
 - d. Unit Security Standing Orders (USSO). Units are required to produce their own USSO which must include clear instructions on the control of their photomontages. These must incorporate the requirements of MAS, G2 HQNI policy, and Brigade policy.
9. In addition the chain of command exercises supervision at every level over subordinates to ensure that the rules are followed.

IMPROVEMENTS

10. There are two ways of improving the security of RI:
- a. Lessen the Operational Requirement. To lessen the operational requirement would require a critical examination of who has a genuine need for recognition aids either for operations, or training for operations. However, it should be made clear that such information is essential for both overt and covert forces to operate effectively against terrorism.
 - b. Tighten the Security Procedures. To tighten the security procedures will require a complete review of the process of production, accounting, and destruction of RI. Such a review should consider:
 - (1) Central control over the distribution of RI.
 - (2) A standard system of accounting for such material.
 - (3) A re-write of the current directive. This would incorporate such areas as the control of negatives and darkroom procedures.
 - (4) Inclusion of examination of procedures in routine Protective Surveys and Inspections by 120 Sy Sect.
 - (5) Enhancing security of personnel measures to complement the security of information measures. This has been covered in a separate paper.
 - (6) The requirement to reconcile historic RI material which in all probability has neither been formally accounted for, nor held under secure arrangements.

- (7) Consideration of security procedures for other classified material held in Northern Ireland. This could include consideration of a separate security classification for the Province.

CONCLUSIONS

11. The dissemination of recognition material is considerable. Wide dissemination is essential if the operational requirements of the Army and RUC are to be met.
12. The production of such material throughout the Province is prolific.
13. Regulations already exist for the accounting and protection of such information.
14. There may be historic material which was not previously accounted for and may be widely distributed throughout the Services.

RECOMMENDATIONS

15. In order to improve the security of the system still further, the following recommendations are made:
 - a. A G3 review is carried out of the operational requirement of RI with a view to reducing the amount which needs to be disseminated.
 - b. A G2 review is carried out of the procedures and regulations governing the collection, production and dissemination of recognition material. This in turn may need to be widened to incorporate other classified material.
 - c. There is a need for a Service-wide reconciliation of recognition information.

ANNEX F TO
HCNI ACOS G3 11
DATED 20 SEP 89

BATON ROUND GUNS

BACKGROUND

1. The UDR are precluded from employment on crowd control or riot control duties in cities in the Province. This policy was laid down in UDR Regulations (1980).
2. The UDR have operational command of 75% of the Province. There are regular troops under command of UDR battalions and UDR personnel under command of regular Army battalions. It is important operationally that both the UDR and the regular Army have access to the same weapons and equipment.

REQUIREMENT

3. Last year a case was submitted for authority to issue the UDR with baton guns to enable them to protect themselves without recourse to lethal force. There have been numerous occasions where UDR patrols have found themselves being subjected to severe harassment by terrorist sympathizers in unforeseen circumstances; stones and petrol bombs have been thrown at them and attempts made to remove weapons and items of equipment. Under such circumstances, a UDR patrol that is not accompanied by the RUC with baton guns, is faced with only 2 options:

- a. It can run away from the problem. Quite apart from the morale aspects, this may not always be desirable or even practicable, particularly in a situation where an attempt has been made to seize a weapon or piece of equipment.

- b. The use of lethal force (live rounds). Such an extreme measure would have to be within the restrictions laid down in the Yellow Card. It might be difficult to defend such an occurrence both publically and legally when the regular Army and RUC in similar situations might be able to extricate themselves without having to resort to the use of lethal force.

4. The proposal by the GOC was endorsed by the Chief Constable and supported by both the Secretary of State for Defence and the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.

PRINCIPLES OF DEPLOYMENT

5. The following principles were agreed prior to authority being given to issue baton guns to the UDR:

- a. There was to be no modification to the role of the Regiment as laid down in the UDR Regulations.

- b. Riot guns would be issued to both the Permanent Cadre and Part Time elements of the UDR.

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- c. All members of the UDR would be fully trained in the use of the weapons.
- d. The UDR would abide by the same Rules of Engagement as the Regular Army.
- e. Riot guns were not to be deployed as a matter of routine with all UDR patrols. Commanding Officers were charged to authorise deployment according to the operational tasking of patrols.
- f. Whenever possible, RUC officers were to accompany UDR patrols equipped with baton guns.

AUTHORIZATION

- 6. The UDR were authorised to begin training with riot guns on 1 Jun 89. Operational deployment was authorised from 6 Jul 89 but no such deployment has taken place to date.

SCALE OF ISSUE

- 7. The scale of issue of the riot guns is at Appendix 1.

SUMMARY

- 8. There is a clear requirement for the UDR to have access to an effective non-lethal weapon for use in unplanned and unforeseen contact with hostile crowds. The deployment of such a weapon with the UDR is entirely consistent with the requirement to use minimum force.

Appendix:

- 1. Scale of Issue of Riot Guns to the UDR.
- 2. FRG for the UDR.

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APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX F TO
HQNI ACCS G3 11
DATED 20 SEP 89

SCALE OF ISSUE OF RIOT GUNS TO THE UDR

1/9 UDR	-	10
2 UDR	-	10
3 UDR	-	12
4 UDR	-	16
5 UDR	-	18
6 UDR	-	30
7/10 UDR	-	20
8 UDR	-	28
11 UDR	-	20
Depot	-	6
Total	-	170

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FRG FOR THE UDR

1. 13 Dec 87. A UDR patrol in Cappagh encountered a hostile crowd. The crowd closed in on the patrol throwing missiles and inflicting injuries. Despite the best efforts of the patrol to get away, they were surrounded by the crowd. Fearing for their lives they had no option but to fire 2 live rounds over the heads of the crowd in order to extricate themselves. This practice is contrary to their training, but their only alternative was to fire aimed shots at the crowd.
2. 10 Mar 88. A few youths stoned a UDR patrol in Belfast. The patrol stopped to apprehend the youths and call for the RUC. The crowd grew rapidly and the patrol found itself under increasing pressure from stones and other missiles. The UDR began to take casualties and had to withdraw to their vehicles. The crowd continued to advance. Eventually the patrol was forced to withdraw before it was surrounded, leaving the arrested youths behind.
3. 15 May 88. The RUC mounted an operation to clear some barricades in Belfast. The UDR were tasked to provide outer protection for the RUC. This outer cordon collapsed when a small crowd of petrol bombers attacked a UDR foot patrol, forcing it to withdraw. The RUC were fully occupied elsewhere on the operation and were unable to assist immediately. The situation was eventually restored with RUC assistance but only after the UDR had suffered considerable indignity without the proper means to respond.
4. 7 Jun 88. Regular troops manning one of a series of VCPs near Pomeroy fired a considerable number of baton rounds when suddenly attacked by a crowd returning from the funeral of Seamus WOODS. The UDR were manning 4 VCPs locations within a few kilometres of this incident and could have easily have been involved.
5. 29 Oct 88. A UDR patrol, operating at night, was involved in some minor aggro in Cappagh following the exodus of exuberant youths from a public house. During the disturbance, an item of ECM equipment was seized by a member of the crowd. The patrol was unable to arrest the person and he escaped into the crowd who continued to stone the patrol. In order to recover the sensitive piece of equipment it was necessary to mount a battalion sized operation.

ANNEX G TO
ACOS G3 11
DATED SEP 89

REVIEW OF RUC ACCOMPANIMENT POLICY

HISTORICAL REVIEW

GENERAL

1. The matter of RUC accompaniment of Army patrols was first raised by the NIO. It was seen as a method of improving the acceptability of Army patrols and it became a central element of the Anglo-Irish Agreement.

POLICY STATEMENTS

2. Policy statements have been made as follows:

a. NIO Security Policy Review 1984. The Review strongly supported the view that the RUC should accompany all Army patrols that were likely to come into contact with the public where practicable.

b. Anglo-Irish Communique (Hillsborough) 15 Nov 85. The joint Communique which accompanied the signing of the Anglo-Irish Accord stated that "In addressing the improvement of relations between the security forces and the minority Community, the [Inter Governmental] Conference at its first meeting will consider:

(1) The application of the principle that the Armed Forces (which include the Ulster Defence Regiment) operate only in Support of the civil powers, with the particular objective of ensuring as rapidly as possible that, save in the most exceptional circumstances, there is a police presence in all operations which involve direct contact with the community.

c. NIO Security Policy Review - Progress Report (1987). The report noted difficulties associated with accompaniment but commented that there were few grounds for public complaint. The report also identified that particular effort had been made in sensitive areas where military patrols, (especially the UDR), might come into contact with the minority community.

d. NIO Paper on Accompaniment - Jan 89. The draft report by the NIO made 3 recommendations:

(1) "All Army VCPs on main access routes to Belfast should always have a police presence". This was accepted by CLF in principle but with the strict caveat that the absence of RUC with a patrol should not preclude it from carrying out VCPs.

(2) "Where security considerations allowed it, PVCPs in or near Nationalist areas should always have an RUC presence". This is not always appropriate but most PVCPs have either RUC or RMP. The Secretariat accepted this.

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(3) "A consistent system of producing annual statistics on the proportion of Army patrols accompanied by the RUC should be instituted". This was dismissed as a timewasting and fruitless exercise.

CURRENT PRACTICE

3. The RUC accompany military patrols where possible. Police accompaniment is essential at:

- a. Occupied House searches.
- b. VCPs on main arterial routes with Belfast.
- c. P/CPs (either RUC or RMP are present).

4. However, when considering the requirement to consider accompaniment as described in the original Communique, the following points should be taken into account:

- a. The increase level of violence since the Anglo-Irish Agreement and the resultant increase in the intensity of anti terrorist operations have a direct impact on the ability of the police to accompany patrols in any particular area.
- b. A 'police presence' in an area or on an operation should not be construed as an obligation for every patrol to be accompanied by a policeman. It is the normal practice for an Army patrol to summon a constable when there is friction with a member of the public. It is very rare indeed for a soldier to make an arrest.
- c. In some areas, West Belfast and much of the border region for example, the terrorist threat prevents the RUC from patrolling without Army support. In these circumstances, it is the Army or UDR who accompany the police and not the other way around. In such areas, it is necessary for the Army and the UDR to carry out specifically military patrols, particularly by night, to deter and counter terrorist attack. Such patrols are often not accompanied by a constable. The majority of patrols in many rural areas are unaccompanied by police, reflecting the limited availability of RUC manpower. Nevertheless, they execute tasks defined by the RUC and are essential to deter terrorist activity.
- d. In Southern Ireland the Irish Army deploys only when accompanied by a constable. The terrorist threat there, however, is of a different magnitude to that in Northern Ireland and a direct comparison between the two is unrealistic.

5. In short therefore, while RUC accompaniment is in the long term desirable it is not at present a practical reality. If this premise is accepted for the Army, but not for the UDR we would make the following additional points:

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- a. As can be seen from the map at Appendix 2 to this Annex, the extent to which the UDP currently patrol in Nationalist areas is significant.
 - b. For some battalions over 50% of their patrol effort is in Nationalist areas, and outside 1/9 UDP and 7/10 UDP TACRs, over half their patrols are at the moment unaccompanied.
6. The requirement for the UDP to be accompanied in nationalist areas or to be redeployed into purely loyalist areas would have the following possible effects:
- a. A 24% increase in RUC effort across the Province.
 - b. A 24% reduction in UDP activity in nationalist areas.
 - c. The need to redeploy the equivalent of 9 PC UDP Coys away from their current patrol areas.
7. Option 'a' could be partially achieved by the RUC at an additional cost of £0.5M per annum. This will be examined in detail by the RUC.
8. Option 'b' could theoretically be achieved simply by reducing the level of tasking of UDP patrols in nationalist areas. However, the figure of 24% across the Province conceals the true position in the mainly rural TACRs. For the reasons given in paragraph 4, all patrols in 1/9 UDP and 7/10 UDP, and most in 11 UDP are already accompanied. In the TACRs of 2, 3, 4, 6 and 8 UDP in particular, an average approximately 50% of all patrols in nominally nationalist areas are at present unaccompanied. As an example, in 2 and 3 UDP's area up to 7 patrols per day fall into this category. In these areas therefore, there would be a significant drop in SF activity, which would allow PIRA and their sympathizers to tighten their grip.
9. Experience has shown, and there is G2 collateral to support this view, that where attempts have been made to allow areas to be free of patrolling, a vacuum develops which is then exploited by terrorist groups. Examples of this may be found in:
- a. Belfast - Poleglass, Liganil estates and the markets.
 - b. Londonderry - Creggan, Bogside, and Shantallow estates.
10. Option c would require at least 4 battalions of Regular Army. The task could not be taken on by in Province troops except as an emergency requirement. The Army's commitments world wide make it impossible to deploy a further 4 battalions to Northern Ireland.
11. In Summary, we already seek to ensure that police accompany as many patrols as possible, both Army and UDP, in Nationalist urban areas. For certain operations, such as occupied house searches, accompaniment is essential to the completion of the task. However, current operational realities, and police manning levels, make it impossible to achieve accompaniment for all patrols. In the case of the UDP alone, 100% accompaniment would need a 24% increase in RUC effort. The RUC can partially achieve this at an additional cost of £½M. This is being investigated in detail by the RUC. A reduction in UDP patrol activity,

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although superficially attractive, would render large areas of the mainly rural TAFs open to exploitation by PIPA. The replacement of the UDP by at least 3 battalions of Regular Army is outside the Army's capabilities.

12. It is therefore recommended that 100% accompaniment be regarded as 'an aspiration which we shall all continue to work towards.

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APPENDIX 1 TO
ANNEX G TO
ACOF G3 11
DATE: SEP 89

SUMMARY OF ACCOMPLISHMENT OF PATROLS - AUG 89

TAOR	Total Files	Accomp by PUC	Unaccomp by PUC %		Unaccomp by PUC in Green Areas %		Unaccomp by PUC in Orange Areas %	
(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)	(e)	(f)	(g)	(h)	(i)
<u>UDP</u>								
1/9 UDP	438	256	182	42	0	0	153	35
2 UDP	368	22	346	94	213	58	95	26
3 UDP	339	124	215	63	215	63	0	-
4 UDP	226	102	124	55	100	44	0	-
5 UDR	492	201	291	59	176	36	24	58
6 UDP	142	89	53	37	53	37	0	-
7/10 UDP	802	390	412	51	0	0	79	10
8 UDP	164	75	89	54	89	54	0	-
11 UDP	519	43	476	92	32	0.06	342	66
AIB	60	28	32	53	9	15	0	-
LIRB	86	7	79	92	25	30	0	-
Omagh	65	6	59	91	11	17	0	-
TOTALS	3701	1342	2358		921		598	
%	100	36	64			24		39

Regular Army

BFB	2444	2429	15	15
- %	100	99	1	1
ARB	419	186	233	233
- %	100	44	56	56

Note:

1. Only UDR patrols are detailed under each UDP or Regular Bn TAOR. Patrols by regular toops are only shown for the BFB and ARB for comparison.
2. 3, 4, 6, 8 UDR have no predominantly Protestant areas to patrol.
3. Figures do not cover patrols in mixed areas only in predominantly green or orange areas (90%).

G1-1
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Lieutenant General Sir John KCB CBE



Headquarters
Northern Ireland
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GOC 19

The Right Honourable Peter Brooke MP
Secretary of State for Northern Ireland
Northern Ireland Office
Stormont Castle
BELFAST
BT4 3ST

24 September 1989

CO3

I thought that it might be useful if, in advance of SPM, I outlined where I think we have got to in answering the Irish concerns which you expressed to me when we spoke on the telephone on Monday, following your meeting in Dublin. The business of a detailed reply and firm proposals is of course a MOD matter and I understand that you are meeting the Secretary of State for Defence at a Bilateral on the 28th for this purpose.

I am clear, after speaking to you and recognizing the thrust of subsequent events, that you would welcome a positive response to Irish concerns - more what we can achieve rather than a reiteration of what cannot be done. However I am sure that we should not, by attempting to be reasonable, offer anything that is a hostage to fortune. There is a delicate balance to be struck between positive proposals and going too far by raising unrealistic expectations.

The first issue of concern and perhaps fundamental is UDR screening. The distinction between screening for the majority and vetting for those in sensitive posts (armoury storemen, intelligence personnel etc) is important and should be established. We can, and will subject to MOD approval, improve screening procedures. Firstly a new detachment based at HQNI is to be raised, tasked solely with screening the UDR. They will work closely with the RUC and the Chief Constable has offered his full support. Secondly, all UDR candidates will now be interviewed individually not only by the battalion to which they initially apply to join, but also by a security screening expert from HQNI. There will be a facility for follow-up family and contact visits in cases of doubt as part of the screening process. Third, all Regular Army transferees will be subject to full screening in the same way as initial applicants. The last major measure will be a significant enhancement of UDR internal security measures based on regular and repeated individual checks and reviews at unit (battalion) and sub unit (company) level. This system is already successful (the POSI list), but will be expanded to encompass more soldiers of potential security interest and amount to more effective internal 'policing'.

These measures are positive steps and will be a marked improvement on the present system. However, as we have discussed before, no screening or vetting system can be fool-proof, particularly in Northern Ireland where community loyalties play such a significant role in all aspects of life. There is a solution to this. It lies in striving to increase the professionalism of the UDR to a point where regimental loyalties and respect for the law transcend the inclinations and ethos of birthright. The French Foreign Legion is a parallel example of the effect we seek to achieve. I think that at this stage we should be very careful in not raising Irish expectations too high. We may of course offer some immediate improvements to the UDR. There are more mainstream Regular Army career courses which the UDR, both officers and men, can do to ensure greater professionalism. I also think that we can attach more Regulars to the UDR in posts to supplement shortages in junior command and also to bolster their administrative support - allowing commanders to command rather than administer. These will be effective but essentially stop gap measures. In the longer term the UDR must be better commanded at a junior level. This key can only be turned by a host of improvements, the principal effect being to offer a worthwhile professional career.

I outlined our proposed solution to you when you came on your initial visit to HQNI. The staff work for this initiative started last year, but because of complexity and cost the process will take time to be agreed and implemented. It would I believe, be unwise to telegraph the overall concept at this stage to the Irish as they could use it as a public check list of progress in the future. You may also remember that in tandem with more professionalism and enhanced career prospects we intend to increase significantly the Permanent Cadre (PC) element of the UDR at the expense of the Part Timers (PT), who are a steadily reducing element anyway. I have no doubt that the Irish would love to hear this, but I am certain that they would use it as a rod to beat us with, point by point, over the years that it will take to achieve. It will also cause uproar amongst the Protestants if our intentions are revealed prematurely, particularly if perceived as being in response to Nationalist pressure. In summary, some improvements in training - yes. More Regular attachments - yes. More PC and less PT, reflects an already natural trend that we are seeking to capitalise on and is, on that basis, uncontentious. I think that a response along these lines is truthful and not a hostage to fortune in any way.

The next area, 'leaks', has attracted the most media attention but has at its roots faulty perceptions. I of course am not minimising the harm that these montages can do in wrong hands, nor indeed condoning their illegal dissemination. However I think that the correct perspectives should be applied. Firstly there is no question that 'information' leaks per se are under scrutiny. The problem has been confined to leaked or stolen photographs. These losses are under investigation by DCC Stephens and so cannot reasonably be discussed yet. The problem is of course where to draw the line. Until July 1988

recognition packs were not accountable in the same way that classified documents are. Over the course of this campaign there have been literally tens of thousands of photographs produced and many will remain in the bottom of soldiers' kitbags, with no sinister purpose, from Derby to Dungannon to Dusseldorf. I think however that we can offer something. We will ensure that the 1988 rules are scrupulously applied. Displays on walls, which might be seen more publicly than we would wish, will be reviewed and altered if necessary. Work is going on, on a tri-Service basis, to retrieve old photographs to ensure that this source dries up. We are also looking at different ways of recognition training, but at its root I am sure that the Irish accept the need to identify terrorists and their associates. In essence we are, with MOD and the RUC, getting on positively with the control of recognition aids - but I am still nervous about the word 'information' which, if mischievously broadened, could be a running sore unless confined to the area of recognition aids. I hope that you agree.

An emotive issue, again attracting faulty and inaccurate perceptions, has been the Plastic Baton Round (PBR) for the UDR. The semantics of non lethal force or crowd control or revised Rules of Engagement (ROE) are all I think subordinate to the fact that the UDR has had occasion to need PBRs. This has been either to save life by non-lethal means or to safeguard highly sensitive electronic equipment - the loss of which would set us back years. I attach at Annex A some examples of those occasions. I do not dispute that the UDR may only infrequently need to use PBRs and that some at a local level do not feel strongly about their use. I also accept the Irish argument you put to me about the conundrum of 'prediction'. I can also see that increased RUC accompaniment would apparently solve the problem - but more of that later. I think that we are faced with a matter of principle in which we should stand firm.

The situation, as you know, concerning the PBRs is that every UDR deployment with PBR has to have the personal authority of the commanding officer - who is always a Regular. He will only release PBR if he can reasonably anticipate that there is a valid reason to do so. This condition is not public knowledge and the Irish might be happier if they knew that UDR PBR are never carried routinely or indiscriminately. I am fundamentally opposed to any prospect of separate Rules of Engagement for the UDR compared to the rest of the Security Forces. There is a very real danger that crowds will form, by accident or design, which require different rules to be applied at the same time by groups of policemen and soldiers at the same incident. The confusion in command and control that would arise from this is obvious. But even more damaging would be the scope this offered after the incident for mischievous interpretation and apportionment of blame. This would be an avoidable folly and a prospect which I could not endorse under any circumstances.

The most intractable area clearly is in accompaniment. We are bound here by an undertaking that cannot be met - at least not without significant consequences. The Policy Review in 1984 put the requirement quite reasonably in the executive phrase "where practicable". However the Hillsborough communique of November 1985 is where we are now being held to task - accompaniment in all cases "save in the most exceptional circumstances".

We have discussed before the impracticability of achieving this aim and it is a line that I have taken with the RUC throughout my tour as GOC. You will see when you are briefed fully that something like a quarter of all UDR patrols are unaccompanied - always in mixed or nationalist areas. This is not a conscious or deliberate disregard of the Agreement - there are simply not enough police to go round. Nor do the RUC have the capacity, due to training and overtime restrictions, to accompany all types of military patrols. The problem varies from area to area and you might find the breakdown at Annex B useful. Put starkly the options are limited. Either increase RUC accompaniment effort by some 24% or reduce the UDR patrol effort by the same - but of course it would vary dramatically in some areas as you can see in the Annex. You will be supplied with more collateral in your main brief, but this snapshot makes the point. Lest the Irish think that we can simply redirect UDR effort away from nationalist areas, this 'bill' to fill the gap in military terms is 9 companies - four Regular battalions at least. They are clearly not available.

I think that presentation of these factors is incomplete without mentioning that where we can predict nationalist confrontation ie pub closing time, rallies etc, the police always accompany the UDR (and Regular Army). Similarly, occasions like house searches, PVCs and main arterial road VCPs are always accompanied by the police without exception. The crux of the matter is that the UDR patrol over 70% of the Province and meet the public, of all types, on thousands of occasions a day. I feel that I must re-state the overall military complaints statistics (which include UDR). Of these tens of thousands of contacts, there are 250 civil complaints a year throughout Northern Ireland. Only 10% or so are actually found against us. These are verifiable official figures and compared to the deaths, injury and intimidation caused by Republican terrorism are, although not beyond reproach, very modest under the circumstances. You asked specifically about the consequences of not patrolling, or patrolling less frequently, in nationalist areas. Although by inference I have covered this in the preceding paragraph, we have unfortunate experience of laying off apparently 'quiet' areas in Belfast and Londonderry where the pause has been exploited, without fail, to terrorist ends.

I have been almost entirely negative in my comments about accompaniment because I do not think that the Irish should be left with any firm expectations, because they cannot be delivered in the way they anticipate. We can of course continue to improve the situation slowly. I understand that the police are perhaps looking at some redeployments and

possibly extra resources to increase accompaniment, but that is the Chief Constable's business. We can also reduce the number of routine framework patrols and concentrate more on larger 'surge' operations which have been deployed to such good effect in 8 Brigade area in particular. But these are measures which we cannot be committed to, nor indeed monitored. We accept the principle unreservedly, but the 'where practicable' caveat is I believe the furthest we can go.

I hope that I have provided a reasonable basis for our discussion at the SPM from an HQNI point of view. I have discussed the terms of this letter with Hugh Annesley and CGS and you will of course be briefed in much greater detail by your own officials and MOD in due course.

h

Silent Copy:

Chief of the General Staff
Director of Military Operations
Chief Constable
Chief of Staff - HQNI

ANNEX A TO

GOC 19

DATED 24 SEP 89

FRG FOR THE UDR

1. 13 Dec 87. A UDR patrol in Cappagh encountered a hostile crowd. The crowd closed in on the patrol, throwing missiles and inflicting injuries. Despite the best efforts of the patrol to get away, they were surrounded by the crowd. Fearing for their lives they had no option but to fire 2 live rounds over the heads of the crowd in order to extricate themselves. This practice is contrary to their training, but their only alternative was to fire aimed shots at the crowd.
2. 10 Mar 88. A few youths stoned a UDR mobile patrol in Belfast. The patrol stopped to apprehend the youths and call for the RUC. The crowd grew rapidly and the patrol found itself under increasing pressure from stones and other missiles. The UDR began to take casualties and had to withdraw to their vehicles. The crowd continued to advance. Eventually the patrol was forced to withdraw before it was surrounded, leaving the arrested youths behind.
3. 15 May 88. The RUC mounted an operation to clear some barricades in Belfast. The UDR were tasked to provide outer protection for the RUC. This outer cordon collapsed when a small crowd of petrol bombers attacked a UDR foot patrol, forcing it to withdraw. The RUC were fully occupied elsewhere on the operation and were unable to assist immediately. The situation was eventually restored with RUC assistance but only after the UDR had suffered considerable indignity without the proper means to respond.
4. 7 Jun 88. Regular troops manning one of a series of VCPs near Pomeroy fired a considerable number of baton rounds when suddenly attacked by a crowd returning from the funeral of Seamus Woods. The UDR were manning 4 VCPs locations within a few kilometres of this incident and could easily have been involved.
5. 29 Oct 88. A UDR patrol, operating at night, was involved in some minor aggro in Cappagh following the exodus of exuberant youths from a public house. During the disturbance, an item of ECM equipment was seized by a member of the crowd. The patrol was unable to arrest the person and he escaped into the crowd who continued to stone the patrol. In order to recover the sensitive piece of equipment it was necessary to mount a battalion sized operation.