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1. Sir Guard, 2 SEC/1
PRISONS

MAZE CELLULAR - MAJOR FIND OF PIRA INTELLIGENCE AND SECURITY DOCUMENT CACHE

1. On 14 September a major series of PIRA documents was uncovered in the ablutions area of H7A, Maze Cellular. All were printed by hand on toilet roll and were hidden at the back of a toilet seat; the authors are unknown. In all 6 documents were uncovered. Four relate to PIRA's concerns about security including a short assessment of the Hennessy Report and our responses to it. These are considered below. Two much shorter letters were also found; these seem to be from the Block Information Officer and are of little significance.

DOCUMENT 'A' - "SECURITY IN PRISON"

- 2.1 Rather difficult to read, this paper rehearses the command structure's concerns about security in the prison. Evidently intended as an exhortation to the troops, it attempts strongly to inculcate an awareness of being prisoners of war whose first concern should be with security. This security was compromised by the excessive introspection of the blanket period when there was a widespread tendency for loose talk which has not yet ceased; these failings are contrasted with the security success of the Ealu Mor (the Great Escape). A tantalising reference is made to operations having been cancelled or transferred during the segregation campaign, but no details are given. Leaks by volunteers seem to have seriously compromised activity during this period. It is evident that a paper exists covering the 1983 Escape but most unfortunately was not found in this cache!

- 2.2 The tenor of the paper is best summarised by its conclusion -

"The Administration have learn't from their mistakes of Ealu Mor, they are now engaged in a major security drive following the Hennessy Report, we must do likewise or we will fall victim to our enemies. Another factor in the success of our security is for us to create a healthy Republican environment in wings and blocks in which we can educate, politicise, and make men generally aware of the rules of Guerilla Warefare."

DOCUMENT B - GENERAL SECURITY (PAGE ONE)

3. This document is identical to one found several months ago and given wide circulation at the time. It constitutes a major review of security and the means from the PIRA viewpoint of maintaining it. It is interesting to note that more than one copy has evidently been in circulation. The original assessment is attached again for ease of reference.

DOCUMENT C - [UNTITLED]

- 4.1 This paper covers similar ground to the two preceding and is equally revealing. It too stresses the paramount importance of security and this means: no visits by volunteers to imprisoned comrades; no loose talk anywhere because of 'bugs'; variation of routine if important matters are to be discussed within the wing; no 'pumping' other volunteers for information; no discussion even of apparently legitimate public activity; viewing the impact of the post-Hennessy Security Department as a major threat.

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- 4.2 Perhaps the most illustrative section covering PIRA's security drive and near paranoia is given by the opening paragraph -

"We have been fortunate in the past as we got away with a great deal of complacency before the Ealu Mor. This was due to the fact that both Admin and Screws were lacking in Security and awareness. But things are different now because they have tightened up a great deal. Although we see little physical evidence of it. But behind the scenes an intense program is in progress, organising depts, floating Security Screws in that Regulars who have lost a lot of autonomy while Security Screws have more authority. All Screws are briefed to watch out for manipulation of them by POW's, as we have also seen they have tested new metal detectors on visits, installed new in all blocks to cater for new exchange procedures. The signs are all there for us to see. They have tried to cover up their general drive and hive of activity to a large extent. But we see enough to know that they are well into this type of security and attitude demanded by Hennessy. This is only the tip of the iceberg. We can only see the surface of it, as will always be the case it's what we don't know which is dangerous."

DOCUMENT D - THE HENNESSY REPORT

- 5.1 This is the most important of the finds. It is reasonably well written and is intended to be a guideline for a full PIRA analysis. The Report is to be studied "by all Vols, either by taking advantage of prison facilities or by acquiring a stage by stage, if need be an analysing it". This note has evidently been around for some time since it refers to Mr Hilditch as the Governor; this would date it to the spring of this year.
- 5.2 The main concern here is again the revamped Prison Security Department which is seen as the most important actual and potential threat to PIRA activity within the prison. Allied to this is recognition of the role of the ordinary Prison Officer in defeating them. There is clear concern that better training and motivation of prison staff will give PIRA considerable trouble. The fact that more is attributed to us in this direction than has yet been achieved is notable; it is a feature of the other papers.
- 5.3 This note also contains what purports to be an extract from an internal prison notice to which prisoners do not have access. Parts are certainly authentic and have most likely been obtained through some type of collusion by a member of staff.
- 5.4 Attached to this note was a full transcript of the Hennessy Report summary. All it lacked was a circulation list!

ASSESSMENT

- 6.1 Although most of these documents are at least several months old, their loss will be significant to the PIRA command structure. Evidently all is not going exactly according to the leadership's wishes within the prison. We now have a comprehensive confirmation of their major concerns within Maze and of their initial perception of our response to Hennessy. It is perhaps ironic that with the clear obsession which PIRA has about security of prison messages and loose talk, this find should substantially justify their concern.

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- 6.2 The consistent over-estimation of our response - particularly as the notes relate to a period earlier this year - is curious. How far it represents a mistaken assessment of what was happening as opposed to a more subtle attempt to heighten the security awareness of the average volunteer in the wing by exaggerating our capability is not clear. On the positive side, it is obvious that the security department has made significant inroads into PIRA thinking.
- 6.3 In these notes PIRA has characteristically gone straight to the heart of the matter. The Security Department and intelligence gathering give them the greatest concern and we must therefore be on course in strengthening these elements as we are continuing to do. The importance of basic grade officers' morale and training is given particular emphasis by these finds - if Sir James' recommendations and PIRA's concerns converge we can be fairly sure that correct conclusions have indeed been drawn.
- 6.4 The fact that a major PIRA security drive has been in progress this year does point to their lessons learned in 1983 and to the fact that further major activity was afoot. It would not be mere speculation to tie this type of message in with the escape plans revealed by Officer Barr.
- 6.5 On a more prosaic level, the finds show the continued importance of thorough cell and wing searching. The high level throughout the prison system in the last year has made an important contribution to security and control, as well as here to intelligence gathering. There is evidence through this find and others that the standard of searching has improved significantly, most notably as a result of the lead given by the Central Search Team.

A K Templeton

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Prison Information Unit

24 September 1984

cc
*with only Document D

PS/Secretary of State (L&B)*
PS/Mr Scott (L&B)
PS/PUS (L&B)
PS/Sir Ewart Bell*
Sir James Hennessy*
Mr Bourn
Mr Brennan
Mr Palmer
Mr Doyne Ditmas
Mr Merifield*
Mr Gilliland*
Mr Burns*
Mr Jackson
Mr Kerr
Mr D McNeill
Mr Hilditch
Mr Lyon
Mr S McNeill
Mr A Brown
Mr N Cornick*

Chief Insp McClure
Capt Kendell

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HM THE HENNESSY REPORT

This part of the draft is not intended as a substitute for the report itself, or even a summary of it, all we can hope to do here is show how important a document it is, not only to our security but to our very existence, its professionalism, thoroughness and wide ranging recommendations necessitate our immediate attention. A critical analysis of the report, should be undertaken as a matter of priority. Hopefully this will act as a guideline to those who would formulate such a response. As will be obvious from the above report itself should be studied by all Vols, either by taking advantage of prison facilities or by acquiring a copy stage by stage, if need be and analysing it. The Hennessy Team consisted of Hennessy, his Deputy, two former Senior Governors, former admin. Officer, two former Chiefs - all members of Prison Inspectorate at Home Office.

Contributions - To the report were made by Secretary of State - Minister of Prisons - Permanent Under Secretary of State. GOC of NI. C/O of 39th Infantry Brigade (PGF), Chief Constable, RUC, Chief Probation Officer and Staff (Welfare), BOV, POA, BO Governors, 28 prisoners gave written evidence.

Consulted - Embassies in France, Germany, Holland, Spain to ascertain different methods of dealing with captured 'Terrorists'. Many documents of Treatment of Offender Code (ECHR).

Since the findings of the Hennessy Report, were published (and excepted) many changes have taken place in the jail. Personnel have been removed and been replaced. New physical structures are being erected or modified and no doubt this process will continue until all Hennessy recommendations have been implemented. (Brief copy enclosed), but we want to concentrate on the security implications to us and the lessons we can learn from the Hennessy Report." We recommend, therefore, that a system for the collection and analysis of information in the prison be established urgently. It should come under the day to day control of security and staff should be carefully selected for the job and receive thorough training. The operation of such a system will, of course, only be effective if information is fed in. It is vital, therefore, that members of staff are carefully instructed in its importance of providing information and encouraged to contribute 'Hennessy Report the quotation above is part of a recommendation made in the report it spells out in glaring fashion a counter security network to be used against us. Its name - security information centre - this SIC has always been in existence within the jail but its role then was swamped by RUC, themselves overshadowing internal jail matters. Hennessy states - it existed before the 25th but failed to function properly due to bad management. We can be sure that this new revamped SIC will not neglect its duties and is a major threat to our security system. Security Information Centre - Its role has been outlined above - Personnel Pre 25th A RO directed by an Assistant Governor (Pepper) with Number 2 Governor having overall responsibility for its functions. This whole team came under criticism with A/Governor

Pepper being replaced and daily control being upgraded to a Chief instead of a PO. On No. 2 Governor, Hennessy Report laid blame for some of the security lapses at his door, although the Report went on to describe him as very capable and overworked. Chief Armour is now the Security Chief, replacing PO. He is also in charge of SIC. PO Stewart is Security PO, also member of SIC. He believes that as this team develops and are trained that they will pose a danger and should not be underestimated. All POWs should be very much aware of this Centre and its role. It should be borne in mind by all that the recommendations of Hennessy Report were accepted and many have already been acted upon, ie, the waiting huts for prisoners are insecure. This was followed up right away by prison administration. The objective to break down our communications systems which revolves around Comms. This method of communication is cape-wide used by all prisoners, and well known to the enemy. Recently all Block POs were issued with visit dates and times for other Blocks for them to stagger visit runs and avoid contact with other Blocks or as little as possible.

New Psychology Drive:

The POA came in for heavy criticism in the Report. Their laxness, complacency and lack of moral fibre was well documented. As a result of this a series of measures were taken to redress the problem. The appointment of S Hilditch as new Prison Governor was quite deliberate. His past history is well known to all Republicans. He reigned during the blanket days, allowed screw brutality, played a key role in formulating Brit Policy during the hunger strike and is known as a Screws Man. It is said he is here for a short spell to restore discipline and morale to prison staff, along with him Chief I McCone was retained with the task of instilling professionalism to the staff. The appointments were the first in a series of measures which have been implemented to encourage more from the average screw in the jail.

POA

Their role has been transformed from a traditional one of jailer to one of greater importance, ie, they are now an integral part of the war effort. Their duty not only to secure but to defeat dangerous terrorists who are a threat to their country - so they are told. This type of pep talk is now being given to screws, they have been made aware that they are part of the Brit Security Forces.

Training

A new training procedure has been introduced following a recommendation from Hennessy. The training is geared to psychology to prepare screws to deal with terrorists who are always up to something. Hennessy Report states that such information that the pattern of prisoners behaviour, their groupings and confederates and the identity of their visitors should be regularly collected and assessed. Procedure notices have been posted up in all Blocks and Messes to constantly make screws more aware of the security danger. The page in dealing with R POWs one such notice is entitled for proper maintenance of grilles -

1. Be aware of number of prisoners at all times.
2. If any escapee is on Wings be familiar with him. Know him (his face) when escapee is out on visit, Hospital, etc., write him in book in extra heavy writing.
Control of prisoners coming out between grilles. Prisoners have to be in good order - know who they are, bear in mind that you could be called on to give evidence in court some day.
3. Watch out for anyone/thing suspicious in Wing Canteen, Washrooms, etc.
4. If a Wing Orderly is going out to Store, C/O escorts him. Don't let another orderly out until the other returns.
5. Let Stores Orderly between grilles but not on the Wing.

You can immediately see the psychology involved from the terminology of these notices. The objective being to shake the screws into performing their role and also to point out the personal dangers involved should they fall down on the job, ie, write him into the book in extra heavy writing, also bear in mind you could be called to give evidence in court. We can clearly see from these remarkable statements how the onus and burden or responsibility has been placed on the individual screw. It is vitally important that everyone recognises the significance of these and similar statements.