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## THE SECURITY SITUATION

The Secretary of State said that although consultations over the political future were vital it was important to deal with the current security situation. He was gravely disturbed by a recent development which could inhibit successes against the Provisional IRA - successes which were now very considerable. The results of the recent spate of sectarian murders were that support for the IRA would be encouraged in some areas and there would be renewed demands for more troops to be diverted from hard Roman Catholic areas to other areas, with a consequent risk of a resurgence of IRA activities. It was wrongly alleged that all these murders were the work of Protestant extremists; but he believed that some of them were and it was his feeling that the attack the previous night at the Rolls Royce factory had been the work of Protestants. The security forces would do their best to track down the perpetrators of such crimes but they frequently encountered a wall of silence, although changes had been made in recent months in the arrangements in respect of intelligence and information. The Orange Lodge said that in the view of the majority of their members - and they believed in the view of the majority of the loyalist community - the White Paper would be irrelevant as long as the security situation stayed as it was. They accepted that a good deal of the recent murders were the work of Protestants. But this was not so in every case and furthermore they had warned three years previously that, if the security situation were to drift, murders on this scale would be a natural consequence. As far as the Rolls Royce attack was concerned, it should be realised that whereas the Communist cell in West Belfast was pro-Republican, the Communist cell in East Belfast was pro-Protestant. The Secretary of State said that he would take note of this point. He believed it was important to distinguish between those who organised and those who carried out acts of violence. Furthermore, he had never equated the UDA with the IRA in the level of viciousness of their activities. He believed that many members of the UDA would shrink from the kind of murders which were now being committed. The Orange Lodge believed that the security forces could not be impartial when confronted with nominal Roman Catholics who were members of the Official and Provisional IRA although there was a case for saying that Protestants should have been taken when internment was



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introduced. But there was a duality of attitudes, as had been shown by the involvement of the paratroopers in the Shankill tragedy where it was widely believed that the Army had attempted to cause tension. But they believed there was benefit for the British Army in being faced with situations such as this. It brought home to people the fear of the ordinary Protestant community. These fears were never represented or understood by political correspondents at Westminster, who tended to portray a situation of two warring tribes. As far as intelligence and information were concerned, it was important to get people's confidence. This was not being done because in the rural areas there was not sufficient contact between the security forces and the people nor was there sufficient liaison between the intelligence services of the Army and the Police. The RUC Reserve were not properly organised and used - one of the difficulties being that they were only armed with pistols. The Secretary of State said he believed that the recent incident in the Shankill Road had been an ambush deliberately set up to provoke the paratroops. This had been done deliberately by misguided people whose names were known to him. The Government did not want to provoke anybody. They would not threaten anybody and it was counter-productive to attempt to threaten either the British Government or the British Parliament, who would only become more intransigent if threatened. He was well aware of all the points being made in respect of intelligence and information.

#### DEVELOPMENT OF EFFECTIVE SECURITY FORCES

The Orange Lodge expressed the view that for the previous three years the security policy in Northern Ireland had been organised and directed from a higher level with political views in mind. What was needed was clear political action spelling out the lesson to terrorists. It should be made clear that political terrorism would never produce concessions. The political vacuum should be removed. People would not come forward and join the security forces as long as they believed that there was a basic plan that Northern Ireland should gradually drift into a Republic. Ordinary people were placed between loyalty to organisations such as the UDR, which might be participants in their surrender, and loyalty to Ulster as they understood it. The White Paper would indicate

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that the British Government were neutral on the subject of union. There were fears amongst the RUC that they would be devalued and demoralised in the way that the RIC had been. Police morale was weakened by the increasing presence of Military Police. It was important that ordinary people should be involved in the campaign against terrorists. This had been the great value of the 'B' Specials, who provided local intelligence. With the destruction of the 'B' Specials, and their replacement by the ineffective UDR, this valuable intelligence had been lost. The RUC Reserve should be enlarged and given more to do. They should be armed if necessary. In the Police generally a different officer approach should be used; there was not the same IQ testing to find "officer types" as the Army used; and the skills of man management were not used as they should be. The RUC Reserve should have its own officers since people were not willing to come under the RUC officers when members of the Reserve.

The Secretary of State said that as far as the disbandment of the 'B' Specials was concerned, this was water under the bridge. It was not possible to legislate to bring back the 'B' Specials. The UDR and the RUC Reserve had not taken their place even though former 'B' Specials had found a role in the UDR. He would like to produce an outlet for ordinary people's feelings and energies but he did not believe he could introduce any new armed force without legislation. The basis for such activities should be the UDR and the RUC Reserve. The height standards had been lowered in the RUC Reserve, and the educational standards had been lowered as far as possible, but the Police Authority was very cautious on this point. Recruitment to the RUC Reserve was very good and was especially good for recruitment to the Women's Reserve. He was constantly trying to get the position where the Police took the lead and the Army acted in support - in aid of the civil power, which had been their original remit in 1969. He had shown his willingness to detain the first woman for 50 years and this was clear evidence of his determination. He took note of the points which had been made about the Police. These had to be seen in the wider context of the whole structure of the RUC. It had to be faced that there was a total refusal to accept the RUC in large areas of the country. At the time of 'Motorman' there had been no delay before the RUC were introduced to the former 'no go' areas, but the situation was still

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very difficult and even the Army was accepted with reluctance in hard Roman Catholic areas.

#### INVOLVEMENT OF THE MINORITY COMMUNITY

The Orange Lodge suggested that the Roman Catholic population had acquiesced in terrorism. The Catholics hoped that a Republic would be brought about, and the Roman Catholic leadership had therefore been ambiguous in its condemnation of violence. The Cardinal, for example, was unrelenting about the integration of schools. Nationalists in the past had frequently abstained and it was to be hoped that only accredited Roman Catholics would be selected to take part in government. The line which was increasingly taken by Mr John Hume and others was that with the abolition of Stormont the Catholic population should work for their ultimate objective. The Secretary of State said that he believed that the Cardinal was unrelenting about schools but he was not certain whether this was a personal matter or one in which the Roman Catholic hierarchy as a whole was involved. It was a problem which pertained to the whole of the United Kingdom to some extent. He believed that many members of the Roman Catholic community did want to take part and should be given a chance to share responsibility. But it was difficult to persuade them of this. There had been notable examples, such as Dr Newe, of those who were willing to take responsibility, but he believed that there was almost a case for forcing them to take responsibility since they would otherwise be permanent critics of the Government and remain in a totally hopeless frame of mind.

#### ADMINISTRATION OF THE LAW

The Orange Lodge said that in some courts it appeared that the RUC officers were the people on trial. Protection should be given to the integrity of the evidence of RUC witnesses. The Secretary of State said that he hoped his recent statements following the publication of the Diplock Report would be helpful. The Detention of Terrorists Order had been a success and if it continued to succeed there would be a strong case for retaining it. Other reforms would help and powers would be taken where necessary. There was a major problem on prison accommodation because of the right of those now being held to be treated as remand prisoners. There was also the constant



fear of escapes, but what the Diplock Report said about bail would be helpful.

GENERAL POSITION OF THE ORANGE LODGE  
ON PROPOSALS FOR THE FUTURE

The Orange Lodge suggested that they generally supported the Unionist position but did not follow it in detail. For example, they included members of the NILP amongst their number. They could not accept tinkering with the institutions of Northern Ireland. Direct rule had produced no response from the Roman Catholics although the Royal Black Institution had made approaches to Roman Catholics in the past. The Orange Order was less likely than the Unionist Party to accept a non-viable Stormont. If no strong structure could be restored they would accept integration because of their British loyalties. The major issues were the control of security and the structure of the Executive. A coalition might work in England but would never work in Northern Ireland because one-third of the people would always be trying to undermine and destroy. They could not therefore be given any powers of veto. The real danger was that if the proposals were unacceptable to the majority then the situation would be created when the Orange Order would be unable to exercise any control despite its helpful contributions at the present time. Many Westminster MPs did not realise the situation in Northern Ireland and would be prepared to go back on the union. The Orange Order would only accept integration with reluctance and only if no strong Stormont were to be restored. They wondered what the effects would be of introducing the hurly-burly of Irish politics into Westminster. As far as the position of an Executive was concerned, it would be quite wrong if people such as Mr Devlin who were elected on a NILP ticket but were really life-long Republicans could be brought into power merely because they had used a convenient ticket for election. If there were integration, the number of Westminster Northern Ireland MPs should be increased on the Scottish model, possibly to about 22 Members. It would help if proportional representation could be dropped. They did not fear for the results but they felt it would come to grief. It was a departure from British standards and would only be acceptable if it were applied to the whole of the United Kingdom. The Secretary of State stressed that the Government



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were in no sense neutral on the union. They did not wish to be accused of interfering in advance of the Border Poll, but there would be no doubt about the result and it would be a disaster of the first magnitude for any British Government to attempt to force the majority of people in Northern Ireland into a united Ireland. A pledge had been given about the status of Northern Ireland as part of the United Kingdom which would be defended with troops and money as necessary. There would be great difficulty over the structure of an Executive but there should not be excluded from it people representing such interests as those of the NILP and the Alliance Party. Basic to any concept of integration was an increased representation of Members at Westminster. Scotland was grossly over-represented but one might think in terms of 18 Westminster MPs for Northern Ireland, of whom six or seven might be Republicans. In the formulation of the settlement it was important to maintain a bipartisan policy so that any settlement evolved now would have a greater chance of success should a Labour Government be returned to power. As far as the Westminster elections were concerned, these would have to be all on the one method; it would be unacceptable if Westminster Northern Ireland MPs were to be elected by a different method from Westminster MPs in the rest of the United Kingdom.

#### SPECIFIC PROPOSALS

The Orange Lodge put forward specific proposals as follows:

1. A fault of the 1920 Act had been that financial control had not been extended to the Northern Ireland authorities. There should be more liberty in financial administration.
2. Security on the 1972 standard, ie before direct rule, should not be restored. It was not sufficient to give the name of control without the power.
3. In the Council of Ireland it would be wrong to put in representatives of an inferior Parliament to discuss with the leaders of a foreign Government. The Northern representatives should have standing.
4. There was a failure of the Foreign Office to explain the

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position of Northern Ireland abroad. There was a case for all the major Embassies having a Third Clerk, or someone of equivalent rank, designated to keep abreast of Northern Ireland affairs.

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3 January 1973

Copies to:

Lord Windlesham ✓  
Mr Howell ✓  
Mr van Straubenzee ✓  
Mr Mills ✓  
Sir William Nield ✓  
Mr Woodfield ✓  
Sir David Holden ✓  
Sir Harold Black ✓  
Mr Howard-Drake ✓  
Mr Rowley ✓  
Mr Bloomfield ✓  
Mr Steele ✓  
Sir Graham Shillington ✓  
Mr Flanagan ✓  
Lt Gen Sir Harry Tuzo (2) ✓  
Mr Hughes ✓  
Mr Williams ✓  
Mr McDowall ✓  
Mr Roberts ✓  
Mr Imrie ✓  
Mr Stevens (2) ✓  
Mr Jordan ✓  
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