



# An Chartlann Náisiúnta National Archives

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18 December 1995

INTERNATIONAL BODY

Submission of the Irish Government

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**1. Introduction**

*Opening Comments*

- 1.1 The Irish Government welcomes the establishment of the International Body to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue. The Government is greatly appreciative of the positive response of the Members of the Body to the invitation to serve and of the support being provided to them by their own Governments in carrying forward the task which the Body has been assigned. It is also grateful to the Chairman and Members of the Body for being willing to put their time, and political and personal skills so generously at the service of peace, at what is a time of historic opportunity for Ireland.
- 1.2 "Decommissioning" is a term which neither Government has sought to define precisely. The term is intended to create the potential for exploring the question of how arms held by paramilitary groups could be put beyond use without any implication or connotation of surrender.

*Government's general stance on Decommissioning*

- 1.3 The Irish Government considers it crucially important that the decommissioning of arms held illegally in this State and in Northern Ireland be secured. It welcomes the fact that this view is shared by other parties including parties who have influence with those in possession of these arms and recognises that this represents a potentially valuable common point of departure.

- 1.4 Decommissioning is important in its own right as it would remove a potential physical threat which the arms in question represent for the State, its citizens and the people of Northern Ireland. Possession of arms without lawful authority is itself an offence under the criminal law which the agencies of the State are committed to prevent. The Irish security forces continue unremittingly their efforts to detect and seize those arms and bring prosecutions against those found in possession of them. Apart from these considerations, the process of decommissioning would underpin the Peace Process in a way that would be both real - in terms of providing reassurance - and symbolic - in terms of demonstrating longer-term intent to resolve political differences by peaceful, democratic means.
- 1.5 The Irish Government's approach has been informed by its unwavering position that a resolution to the Northern Ireland problem must be sought and established exclusively by peaceful and democratic means. We wish to see new agreed political structures within Northern Ireland, between North and South, and between the two islands, so that both communities in Northern Ireland can share fully in the ownership of, and freely give their allegiance to the structures by which they are governed.
- 1.6 The Government is, of course, acutely aware of the fact that the decommissioning of arms cannot, of itself, guarantee peace. The paramilitary organisations, especially the Provisional IRA, have, (as will be explained later in this submission) acquired the capacity to manufacture lethal explosives from commonly-used materials. Over the years, they have also established contacts through which they have obtained supplies of arms from other countries. It is essential to bear these factors in mind in looking at the likely importance and contribution of arms decommissioning generally to longer-term peace and stability in Northern Ireland.
- 1.7 Decommissioning, in isolation, amounts only to a decision or guarantee in relation to current arms holdings and, however desirable in itself, would not

be decisive in preventing a future terrorist campaign, The broader guarantee that the peace process is irreversible must come from the political process and, ultimately the underpinning of a negotiated settlement. That in turn requires the building of trust and confidence. Parties must be confident that the commitment to the democratic process by those who resorted to violence is genuine and irreversible, and that the process of negotiation and agreement will be conducted free of the threat or use of force. Former paramilitaries need to be reassured that a genuine and meaningful political process is open to them and that the interests and aspirations of their community will be given no less attention and priority within that process while they are observing peace. The decommissioning issue has become the symbolic focus of that debate and of the suspicions felt on both sides. It is important that it should be addressed in a way which increases rather than reduces trust and builds confidence all round in the prospect of an agreed, peaceful future through a negotiated settlement.

Pre-ceasefire contacts

- 1.8 In the contacts leading up to the IRA ceasefire in August 1994, the then Irish Government concentrated on a total cessation of violence as the key dividing line and enabling condition for political dialogue. Many other issues, of great importance to one side or another, for example arms and prison issues, were left as "downstream issues", to be settled in what it was hoped would be a positive dynamic of negotiations in the wake of total cessation of violence.

Decommissioning difficult to achieve

- 1.9 The Irish Government has recognised from the beginning that the task of attaining the objective of decommissioning would be one of considerable difficulty. Not only does it require the full and voluntary cooperation of those holding the arms, it runs contrary to the known tradition and practice of those who have held and used arms, in the past, to advance political objectives in Ireland.

- 1.10 The Government's understanding of the ethos of republican paramilitary groups concerned would lead us to believe that they see themselves as the heirs of a long and, *in their view*, justified tradition of struggle. They therefore see decommissioning as a symbolic defining point and are anxious that it should occur only in a context which offers them and their supporters an "honourable" exit from the armed strategy. Decommissioning therefore is likely to be most difficult in response to a peremptory precondition, and most achievable as part of a general movement of the two traditions in Ireland towards agreement on their relationships, and as a contribution towards a better and safer future. Given their awareness of tradition, it is an added difficulty that there are few if any precedents for decommissioning of arms. On the other hand it can also be argued that a proposal for fully inclusive talks involving both Governments and all the parties aimed at a new political framework founded on consent and encompassing arrangements within Northern Ireland, for the whole island, and between these islands is also without precedent, and deserves a correspondingly forthcoming response.
- 1.11 It is against this general background that decommissioning is seen by those now in possession of arms as an act of profound *political* significance. They have justified the use of arms in support of political objectives. To persuade them to decommission, prior to the *attainment* of those objectives will be difficult - to persuade them to do so as a *precondition for entry to political negotiations* (the so-called "Washington Three" test) would, in the Government's view, be impossible.
- 1.12 The Irish Government's understanding is that the "Washington Three" requirement is regarded by those who hold the arms as something tantamount to *surrender*, against a background where there was neither military defeat nor (*in their view*) any worthwhile political progress. They would see any decommissioning prior to all-party negotiations as an act of betrayal against those who, in their view, have made great sacrifices in pursuit of political objectives.

- 1.13 The Irish Government, therefore, has been forced to conclude, albeit reluctantly, that if the "Washington Three" requirement stands, the overwhelming likelihood is that there will neither be voluntary decommissioning in any form nor progress towards a lasting political settlement in Northern Ireland, thus defeating two basic aims of both Governments. The Government is also forced to conclude, given especially the consideration adverted to at paragraph 1.6 above, that the most fundamental requirement is to decommission longstanding *attitudes* and that the only way to do this is by means of inclusive political dialogue.
- 1.14 While stressing the difficulty of securing the agreement of the paramilitary organisations to decommissioning their arms and (in the Government's view) the impossibility of persuading them to do so in advance of all party negotiations, the Government wishes to stress also that the current debate on decommissioning, and the engagement of the International Body, has nothing to do with tolerating the possession of illegal arms. Rather it has to do with efforts, building on the ceasefires and the climate of peace, to persuade those possessing arms which have so far eluded detection in either jurisdiction, to decommission them voluntarily. Because such voluntary decommissioning requires the willing cooperation of the paramilitary organisations, the focus of enquiry is not primarily whether decommissioning should be achieved, but rather how to create the necessary process of trust and cooperation which will make it possible in practice.

## 2. Decommissioning - Recent historical experience

### Ending of IRA campaign in 1962

- 2.1 There are two recent historical precedents for attempting to secure a process of voluntary decommissioning in Ireland. The first such attempt coincided with the ending of the IRA Border campaign in 1962. The then Minister for Justice, prior to the formal statement announcing the ending of that campaign, on 26 February 1962, and in response to enquiries as to the attitude that would be adopted if persons in control of arms, ammunition or explosives were to hand them up to the police, gave a public assurance that no proceedings would be taken and no enquiries made in respect of such *material* surrendered between 2 February and 31 March 1962.
- 2.2 The initiative resulted in the recovery of approximately 12 shotguns, 20 rifles, 150 handguns, 4,400 rounds of ammunition and 3 grenades.

### 1972 Firearms Order

- 2.3 At a relatively early stage in the latest IRA campaign, the Government decided, "in the interests of the public safety" that it should require persons residing in the State to surrender all legally held weapons over a certain calibre.\*
- 2.4 On that occasion (4 August, 1972), the then Minister for Justice announced that, during a limited period, no action would be taken by the Garda Síochána against persons handing in unlicensed weapons in compliance with the Order. The response in relation to illegally-held weapons was approximately 33 shotguns, 60 rifles, 167 handguns, 1 sub-machinegun and 2,100 rounds of ammunition.

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\* Firearms (Temporary Custody) Order, 1972.

### 3. Current Illegal Arms Holdings

#### Gardai to provide details

- 3.1 The Garda Siochana will be in a position to provide, on a confidential basis, a detailed briefing to the Body on the estimated quantities and nature of armaments currently believed to be held by the relevant paramilitary organisations.

#### Overall quantity not as large as commonly believed

- 3.2 The overall quantity of arms involved is not as large as appears to be commonly supposed. The Provisional IRA holds the largest quantity and variety of paramilitary arms. Much of these derive from illegal shipments of arms from Libya in 1985/86. It is believed that the greater proportion of these arms are secreted in purpose-built bunkers at unknown locations mainly in this State. The arms held by other republican and loyalist paramilitary organisations comprise, for the most part, long and short firearms. The continuation of a situation in which arms are illegally held remains, of course, unacceptable to the Government.

#### Improvised Explosive Devices ("home-made bombs")

- 3.3 The Provisional IRA, in addition to its acquired stocks of arms, has also developed, over the years, the capability to manufacture improvised explosive devices (IEDs) from materials which are readily available (e.g. ammonium nitrate-based agricultural fertilizer). It is these devices, some quite sophisticated in design and lethal in effect, which have been used most frequently in attacks carried out by the Provisional IRA in the years preceding the "complete cessation of military operations" announced on 31 August, 1994.
- 3.4 Of the other paramilitary organisations, the Ulster Volunteer Force (prior to the cessation announced by the Combined Loyalist Military Command in

October, 1994) and the military wing of Republican Sinn Fein (which remains opposed to the Peace Process) have demonstrated that they, too, hold explosives supplies and are capable of manufacturing IEDs to a degree of sophistication which may not (as yet) match that of the Provisional IRA.

Purchase of arms

- 3.5 The paramilitary organisations have also, over the years, established contacts in other countries through which they have purchased arms. Given the increasing availability of such materials, internationally, and the fact that paramilitary organisations retain the capacity to purchase the material, it clearly cannot be said that decommissioning - even if it involved the full decommissioning of all existing stocks - would eliminate the lethal capabilities/threat of the organisations concerned. The Garda authorities will provide more detailed assessments on these matters.

Arms Finds

- 3.6 The Irish Government has, over the years, pursued a vigorous policy of arms searches throughout the State. This has resulted in very considerable finds, the undoubted saving of many lives that would otherwise have been lost and the arrest, conviction and imprisonment of many individuals in possession of arms. The Gardai will be in a position to provide details in this regard.

#### 4. Work on decommissioning by the Dalton/Chilcot Group

##### Background

- 4.1 Work has already been undertaken by the two Governments on the decommissioning issue, primarily within the framework of the Group of officials jointly chaired by the Permanent Head of the Northern Ireland Office and the Secretary of the Department of Justice (the "Dalton/Chilcot" Group). That work was initiated following the meeting of the then Taoiseach and Prime Minister on 24 October, 1994.
- 4.2 The focus of the initial work undertaken by the Group was an assessment of a scheme for the decommissioning of arms leading to the preparation of a joint report for the Taoiseach and Prime Minister in February, 1995. That Report sought to set out a strategy for decommissioning and to identify a framework within which decommissioning might take place.

##### Agreed considerations

- 4.3 The strategy under consideration at that time took account of a number of "considerations" which influenced the Group's approach. These were intended to place decommissioning in the wider context of the cessations of the campaigns announced by the Provisional IRA and the Combined Loyalist Military Command and *the need for progress towards a comprehensive political solution*. The agreed considerations included, for example
- the vital importance of maintaining the ceasefires and keeping the guns silent
  - the fact that decommissioning of terrorist arms could not, of itself, guarantee peace as the paramilitaries would retain the capability to replace existing stockpiles

- acknowledgement that peace could ultimately *only be guaranteed by progress towards a comprehensive political solution*
- acknowledgement that the maintenance of peace *required continuing political momentum* both in response to the cessation of paramilitary violence and as a clear signal to paramilitaries that their interests are - and are likely to be - best served through continuing peace.

4.4 With regard to the potential impact of decommissioning, the Group recognised that decommissioning would provide strong further reassurance of the permanent end to paramilitary violence and an exclusive commitment to peace and that *progress on the arms issue, while not a precondition for political progress*, was likely to be necessary as a matter of political reality.

Arms "Amnesty"

4.5 The Group also recognised that movement towards decommissioning was likely to involve a series of steps, commencing with discussions with the relevant parties and culminating, possibly, in a formal arrangement such as an arms amnesty. The framework put forward in the report was intended, in the first instance, to inform discussions with the relevant parties and focussed, therefore, on the parameters within which those discussions might be conducted on a basis acceptable to both Governments.

Need for flexibility

4.6 Flexibility was a key element of the framework outlined by the Dalton/Chilcot Group as it was recognised that any decommissioning scheme which depended on the voluntary cooperation of the groups in possession of arms would need to be such as to win the confidence, active participation and cooperation of those groups to be productive.

- 4.7 A copy of the February 1995 joint report of the Dalton/Chilcot Group is attached to this submission (Annex A).
- 4.8 More recently the Dalton/Chilcot Group has been involved with officials from the Departments of the Taoiseach and Foreign Affairs in Dublin and the Cabinet Office in London in looking at the scope for international involvement as a means of securing development in the decommissioning issue.

## 5. The Role of the International Body

### Role of Body

- 5.1 The agreement of the two Governments to establish an International Body represents a shared willingness to consider carefully an independent assessment of the difficulties which surround the decommissioning issue with a view to overcoming those difficulties.
- 5.2 The Irish Government is conscious of the wideranging nature of the task entrusted to the International Body and is anxious to facilitate its work in every way it can. The Government considers that it would be useful to comment on the tasks which the Body has been set in the Joint Communique.
- 5.3 Before commenting further, however, the Government considers it important to emphasise the importance of bearing in mind the relationship between the two tracks of the twin-track process. The work of the Body has to be seen against the background of that relationship.

### Relationship between the two tracks

- 5.4 The two Governments are committed to the firm aim of launching all-party talks by the end of February 1996 by means of the twin tracks of intensive preparatory talks on the political front and the work of the Body. The creation of the confidence and trust which is essential for successful political dialogue is crucially dependent on parallel progress in both tracks. If the report of the Body, which is due in mid-January, can offer enhanced reassurance on the commitment of all the relevant parties to exclusively peaceful methods and the democratic process, then the prospects both for a successful launch of

all-party negotiations and an ultimate agreement on a satisfactory process of decommissioning will be correspondingly strengthened.'

Independent assessment of Decommissioning Issue

5.5 Both Governments, in the Joint Communiqué (Annex B), request the Body -

"to provide an independent assessment of the decommissioning issue"  
(Paragraph 5 of the Communiqué)

The Government urges the Body to approach this task from the broadest possible perspective, consistent with the terms of the Joint Communiqué and conscious of the relationship between the two elements of the twin track process. It will be crucially important that the Body listen to all viewpoints. The Government believes that such an approach will be vital in enabling the Body to progress the decommissioning issue and in securing the engagement of all parties on the widest possible basis.

5.6 The Government also believes that anything other than a broadly based approach of this kind would be inconsistent with Paragraph 8 of the Joint Communiqué, whereby the two Government have indicated that they expect the Body

- "to consult widely and invite relevant parties to submit *their analysis of matters relevant to the decommissioning issue* (emphasis added) and to consider such evidence on its merits in reaching conclusions within its remit."

5.7 The Government considers it particularly important to draw attention to the fact that the Body is asked to give an assessment, not simply of possible decommissioning mechanisms, or the likely attitudes of paramilitary organisations to decommissioning, but of the decommissioning *issue*. The Government considers that while a study of the technical aspects of the

decommissioning issue is clearly part of the Body's mandate, the obstacles to decommissioning lies not so much in the technical or legal issues to be resolved, as in the creation of the context which would make decommissioning achievable in practice. The *issue*, as public debate to date has shown, is primarily one which is within and inseparable from the *political* domain. The fact, therefore, that a particular submission (or submissions) might be regarded as being driven more by political considerations than anything else would certainly not constitute a basis for rejecting it or refusing to consider it on its merits. The expectation of both Governments is that such submissions will be received and considered on their merits, within the Body's (very broad) remit.

5.8 The Body is also asked to report on the arrangements

- "for the removal from the *political equation* of arms silenced by the virtue of the welcome decisions taken last Summer and Autumn by those organisations that previously supported the use of arms for political purposes". (emphasis added)

The Irish Government wishes to highlight the fact that what is recognised is the need to remove arms from the *political* equation. This, again, underlines the crucial importance of seeing decommissioning within its *political* context. The first and most fundamental requirement is to ensure that arms remain silent. The only way of guaranteeing this, in the longer term, is by means of a political settlement. Decommissioning is an element of political progress, not a substitute for it.

5.9 The Body has also been requested by two Governments to:

- "identify and advise on a suitable and acceptable method for full and verifiable decommissioning"; and

- "report whether there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve that."

With regard to the first of these requests, the Irish Government would again draw the attention of the International Body to the Joint report of the Dalton/Chilcot Group of February 1995 (Annex A) which has already been referred to in Chapter 4. The Government believes that the framework set out in that Report continues to represent a useful basis on which to approach this issue.

- 5.10 The Government also recognises that legal and other issues may well arise in the context of any detailed arrangements which the International Body may wish to consider in the context of any particular scheme in the light of its contacts with the relevant parties. The Government will therefore be willing to discuss any issues arising in the context of the framework put forward in the February Joint Paper with the International Body, once the Body has formed its own views on the matter.
- 5.11 The Government would also wish to make it clear that it remains ready to be flexible in relation to the details of any scheme subject to examination of the legal aspects, the duty imposed on it to protect public safety and to the overriding requirement that whatever is recommended by the Body must be such as to advance the prospects that all parties will feel able to come to the table for the planned all party talks. The Government is conscious in this regard in particular of the need to avoid any connotation of "surrender" in the context of any scheme which the Body may wish to consider.
- 5.12 The Government is conscious that the value of any scheme will depend to a great extent on the International Body's success in establishing and reporting on whether there is a clear commitment on the part of those in possession of such arms to work constructively to achieve full and verifiable decommissioning in accordance with the second requirement set down by

paragraph 7 of the Joint Communiqué. The Irish Government believes that commitments already in place contribute in a significant way towards this objective notably in the expressed willingness of political parties to engage constructively with the International Body.

## 6. Decommissioning - a Possible Way Forward

### General approach

- 6.1 The manner in which the International Body approaches its task will obviously depend in part on the level of engagement it secures from the parties generally and from the parties who have influence with the paramilitary groupings in particular. As already indicated, the Irish Government believes that this progress would be greatly assisted if the Body adopts a broadly based approach to the task it has been given. The Government would equally urge the Body as a result of its process of consultations to form its own judgment on the overall context and conditions within which progress towards decommissioning can be made.
- 6.2 The Government also believes that, in relation to action by the two Governments themselves, the prospects for progress on the arms issue could be enhanced by further elaboration of a range of the responsive measure referred to in paragraph 9 of the Joint Communiqué of 28 November 1995. Both Governments agree in their joint "New Framework for Agreement" that issues of law and order in Northern Ireland are closely intertwined with the issues of political consensus. The goal of normal, civilian policing, enjoying support and representative membership from both communities and reflecting equally the ethos of each, is a key issue which must be addressed. The extent and level of licenced gun holding in Northern Ireland is also a matter which reflects the violence of the past and measures in this area can also contribute to creating a climate in which progress can be made on the arms issue generally.
- 6.3 The Government equally believes that the paramilitary organisations could seek to build confidence and trust and improve the climate in which all party negotiations take place by taking the initiative to act in areas other than decommissioning. This could include addressing issues such as any

continued recruitment and training, alleged targeting of individuals, assisting in the tracing of missing bodies, the brutal practice of so-called "punishment beatings" and the banishing of individuals from their communities.

6.4 The Government would expect that the Body's consultations would show that the two Governments are in broad agreement on a number of important related concerns. They are agreed

- to work for the earliest possible launch of substantive negotiations;
- that such negotiations must take place on the basis of a commitment in good faith to exclusively democratic values, and that no attempt to influence negotiations by the threat or use of violence will be tolerated;
- that the decommissioning of unauthorised weapons is an important objective for both Governments;
- to reject any equivalence between weapons held by the security forces and those held by paramilitary organisations;
- that diminished threat has consequences for the deployment of the security forces and opens the way for a range of constructive responses;
- not to seek arrangements which would have connotations of surrender, or of one-sided blame, for the paramilitaries.

6.5 It will also be clear that the key difference between the two Governments centres on whether at least the partial achievement of their joint goal of securing decommissioning of arms should be made a precondition for the inclusion of Sinn Fein, and the loyalist parties in substantive negotiations, or,

whether, as the Irish Government believes, to seek to do so at this stage would imperil the Peace Process.

"Washington Three" requirement

- 6.6 As already indicated, the Irish Government has reluctantly come to the conclusion that actual decommissioning of arms is not attainable at this stage. That view is based on the most up-to-date security advice and on information otherwise available to it. The fact remains that the voluntary decommissioning of arms requires the cooperation of hardline elements within the organisations concerned and there is no basis for believing that that consent will be forthcoming at this time.
- 6.7 The Government also believes that attempting to force decommissioning issue to the point where a practical demonstration of intent - in the form of a first instalment - has to be made as a precondition for advancement from preparatory talks (the "Washington Three" requirement) has the potential to create an indefinite deadlock in the peace process. That holds considerable danger for the process itself. There would be a real risk that the Sinn Fein and PUP/UDP leadership would very soon lose credibility within their own constituencies and that those who continue to be in favour of a violent campaign would return to violence. The process of decommissioning, particularly if it met internal resistance, is potentially fraught for both sets of paramilitary leaderships.
- 6.8 Much as the Irish Government would wish to see arms decommissioned, therefore, it would not see any advantage in the International Body recommending the initiation of the process of decommissioning in advance of all-party talks.
- 6.9 Given -
- (1) that the most important requirement is that arms remain silent,

- (2) that this can only be secured in the longer term by political means,
- (3) that decommissioning, in itself, would, for reasons outlined earlier, provide no guarantee of peace,
- (4) that demands for arms decommissioning must not be allowed to remain an impediment to political progress, but also
- (5) that progress on the decommissioning issue would have undoubted value as a means of providing reassurance to parties — that the paramilitary organisations are committed to peaceful and democratic means,

it seems to the Irish Government that the most valuable role which the International Body could fulfil would be to identify a basis on which the decommissioning issue could be progressed in a way that would enable all parties to progress simultaneously towards and through all-party political negotiations.

6.10 The Irish Government believes that progress on the decommissioning issue will only be achieved in stages. While recognising that the work of the International Body will be capable of creating its own dynamic, the Government would, at this stage, put forward the following as ideas which the Body may wish to consider for achieving worthwhile progress.

6.11 The Body might put to the parties a series of principles to which they could be asked to subscribe as a basis for encouraging other parties to enter and progress through political negotiations leading to a settlement. These principles could be along the following lines -

- (1) recognition that the sustained observance of the ceasefire makes, of itself, an important point in relation to the commitment to peace made by former paramilitaries, which should not be undervalued now, and increases in time;
- (2) a commitment to *exclusively peaceful and democratic means* of influencing the body politic and resolving differences in the search for a political settlement;
- (3) a commitment that they will combine in negotiations to dismiss any attempt to use the threat or use of force to influence the outcome of such negotiations;
- (4) confirmation that a lasting peace and a secure political accommodation *requires* the decommissioning of arms;
- (5) acceptance of the need to *abide by the terms of any outcome* to political negotiations to which a majority of people in the North and South give their assent and to resort to *exclusively peaceful and democratic means, only*, as a means of altering any aspects of that outcome with which they disagree.

6.12 At a practical level - assuming that some or all of the foregoing principles are acceptable - some of the following elements might be envisaged:

- (6) acceptance of the *need for agreement on modalities* to secure progress on decommissioning in the specific context of *illegally-held* arms;
- (7) agreement either on precise arrangements (or to consider arrangements to be suggested by the Body as a basis on which to enter discussions) for the decommissioning of illegally held arms;

- (8) acceptance of the need to advance the actual decommissioning of arms, in the course of the all-party negotiations, as a means of promoting the search for a political settlement.

6.13 The Government wishes to emphasise that the foregoing are no more than a set of ideas which could be explored with the relevant parties. They are not intended as a series of hurdles or tests to be passed by any party as a precondition for entry to all party negotiations. While saying that, of course, the Government would be quite concerned about the prospects of transcending the "Washington Three" problem if the paramilitary organisations could not signal their assent to the principles indicated (or some variation of them) and the need for practical action. The Government also recognises that the Body itself, on the basis of its consultations with the parties will, at the conclusion of that process, be especially well placed to assess how the decommissioning issue can best be advanced so as to facilitate progress towards all-party talks. It may be that an approach other than that proposed in Paragraph 6.11 and 6.12 would be considered by the Body to be equally or more effective.

Annexes

Annex A      Agreed Dalton/Chilcot Report on Decommissioning - February '95

Annex B      Joint Communique