




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*Meeting between the Taoiseach,
the Tánaiste and Minister for Foreign Affairs,
the SDLP Leader and the Sinn Fein President,
Dublin Castle, 14 July, 1995.*

1. Following is a summary report of this meeting, which was held en marge of a meeting of the Forum for Peace and Reconciliation. A list of those present is attached.
2. The terms of a joint statement, which had been discussed bilaterally beforehand, were agreed as attached.
3. Opening the meeting, the Taoiseach said that the Government were working very hard to try and find a way of shifting the British side on the third Washington principle (the "gesture") and creating the conditions for all-party talks. They were also working very hard on prisoners and the wider security issues. They were focusing in particular on the how of talks with a view to ensuring that all parties would participate, rather than just some and that the talks were given a sense of direction, rather than being allowed to drift. In return, the Government would very much value if Sinn Fein could find a way of publicly recommencing dialogue with Mr. Ancram. They felt that if Sinn Fein could do this, they (the Government) could press the British side to widen the focus of this dialogue. The Government also believed that the more there was activity involving Sinn Fein, the greater would be the pressure on other parties, viz. the Unionists, to get in on the act. There was also the advantage (in developing the Ancram dialogue) that Unionists would not be able to say that they were walking out of it (i.e. they could only walk in).
4. Mr. Adams announced that, following Mr. Martin McGuinness's recent private meeting with Mr. Ancram, a meeting had been arranged for next week between Mr. Adams and Mr. McGuinness and Sir Patrick Mayhew and Mr. Ancram. Mr. Adams did not have any further detail as he had just heard about it from Mr McGuinness. However, he saw the meeting as quite significant in terms of offering an opportunity to break the current impasse and move on.

5. The Taoiseach said that this was excellent news.
6. Mr. Hume also welcomed this as "very good news, Gerry", adding that it was essential to keep all doors open at all times. He went on to say that in the light of the release of Private Clegg and the continued British focus on decommissioning, there was a strong feeling on the ground that the British Government did not want peace. We should be bringing very strong pressure on Prime Minister Major to start moving swiftly to all-inclusive dialogue. Referring to the decommissioning issue, Mr. Hume said that before the ceasefire, the only precondition set by the British Government to dialogue with Sinn Féin had been the cessation of violence: the handing over of arms had only emerged as an issue after the ceasefire. Mr. Hume concluded by saying that a meeting between the Taoiseach and the British Prime Minister would be very useful.
7. Mr. Adams referred at length to the events of the previous week in Northern Ireland (to the Garvaghy Road siege etc.). Larne had been put under siege for 18 hours. Orangemen including Mr. Roy Beggs, M.P., had threatened to go back to 1974 and the Ulster Workers Strike. The people on the Garvaghy Road had been terrified: women had swept up children and tried to hide them. The Orangemen had chased the media away. 200 residents had assembled with hurley sticks in the belief that they would have to defend themselves from attack. Mr. Adams had welcomed the accommodation which had been brokered on the Garvaghy Road march. By contrast Messrs. Paisley and Trimble had been uncompromising - they had been seen dancing jubilantly hand in hand. Mr. Trimble had said that no agreement had been reached with the Garvaghy Road residents and had referred to them as the "so-called" residents. This attitude had spoiled the prospects for a deal on marching in the Lower Ormeau Road on the 12th July and in August.
8. Continuing, Mr. Adams said that the RUC had put the Lower Ormeau Road under curfew from 10.00 a.m. to 6.00 p.m.: people were left without bread or milk. They had excluded the media from the area. Mr. Adams also complained that while the RUC had arrested 5 young people following what he said were probably minor offences on the Strand Road, no-one had been arrested over the events on Garvaghy Road, Drumcree or Larne. The only arrests had been on the Nationalist side.

9. Mr. Adams complained further about Mr. Trimble's attitude in saying that the peace process was not worth anything if Orangemen couldn't march down Garvaghy Road. He himself had said publicly that he upheld the right of Orangemen to march provided they did not do so in areas where they were not wanted. The events on Garvaghy Road were about domination - the message was that the Croppies, the Taigs would have to lie down. Mr. Adams also referred to a recent article by Fr. Curran where the latter had noted that when marchers had passed Graham's bookie shop (on the Ormeau Road) where five people had been murdered by the UDA, they had (deliberately) turned up the volume.
10. Mr. Adams went on to refer to the negative impact of the release of Private Clegg and the British Prime Minister's statement in the Commons the day before that the time was not right to change remission rates for prisoners. The Taoiseach commented that Mr. Adams was aware of the background to the Prime Minister's remark: it was in effect a "cock-up". Mr. Adams continued that people said that the British Government were operating to their own time-table and that they did not want peace.
11. Mr. Hume said that every time we seemed to be getting somewhere in Northern Ireland, the Orange Card was played, leading to an ever worsening response on the other side. What was currently an offer to the Unionists could not be improved on. They had up to now been living under constant fear of being "sold-out" by the British Government. What they were now being offered was the opportunity of making an agreement that would protect them forever.
12. On the question of marches, Mr. Hume said that he had been considering organising a "Welcome Home" New Orleans style, Mardi Gras in Derry on 12 August. If everything settled down, he hoped that Orange marches could become happy, non-confrontational occasions, on the lines of the Rosnowlagh march in Donegal.
13. Moving the discussion on, the Taoiseach said that the problem with the Unionists was that ultimately they had no responsibility: they could just sit there, buttressed by their powerful position of influence at Westminster. Unionist voters were complacent: they were neither for nor against the Framework Document. In effect, they were disconnected from politics. Their politicians enjoyed the comfort of life at

Westminster. There was accordingly a need to find a way of forcing them to opt in. The Government was trying to think of ways of creating some event that Unionists could not boycott. The Taoiseach was concerned that if all-party talks were convened, one of either two things would follow - either loyalist violence would resume or the Unionists would not participate, meaning that the talks would not go far. Even if Unionists did come in at a later stage, the fact that they were doing so at a later stage would not be conducive to the necessary positive attitude on their part. Against this background, the Taoiseach asked what could be done to ensure that Unionists would come into from Day One.

14. In response, Mr. Adams said that Unionists - the electorate rather than the leadership - had to be put through a crisis. They were enjoying the peace dividend. They would have to make a choice. Mr. Adams added that the Taoiseach's argument about using the Ancram dialogue as a way of pressurising the Unionists into talks was a better argument for the two Governments moving to all-party talks.

15. On the specific question posed by the Taoiseach, Mr. Adams said that he could not say if it would be possible to bring about a situation where Unionists would participate in talks from Day One. What he could say, however, was that they had in the event talked to Mr. Bruce Morrison, despite saying previously that they wouldn't talk to him if he talked to Sinn Féin. Again, they had talked to Mr. Hume, despite saying that they would never talk to anyone who had dealings with Sinn Féin. And they had participated in the Washington Investment Conference, again notwithstanding earlier protestations. Unionist politicians would only engage if it was in their interest or if they couldn't avoid it or if their supporters told them to catch themselves on. They would not be influenced by Dublin. Unionists needed to go through a crisis - and so, probably, did "we" (Sinn Féin?). The Anglo-Irish Agreement empowered both Governments to take steps to move the situation on and there were similar provisions in the Framework Document. Prior to the ceasefire, Sinn Féin had raised this whole issue (of talks) with the British Government and they had been assured that there would be no vetoes democracy. The British Government needed now to say: "Here are the talks". They had to be made to move. The dogs in the street were asking: "Why can't there be talks?" The alternative was that the whole thing would go down the tubes.

16. The Taoiseach indicated that no-one wanted this to happen and said that the examples which Mr. Adams had given of Unionists rowing back from initial hardline positions were very good. There was still a risk, however, that the approach suggested by Mr. Adams - of calling all-party talks in the expectation that Unionists would participate - would not work. The Taoiseach speculated as to the validity of the approach adopted by successive Irish Governments in focusing on the British Government and in assuming that the Unionists would be brought along.
17. On this, Mr. Adams said that the British had to bring the Unionists to the table and that it would then be up to Nationalists to bring them on.
18. The Tánaiste said that the British were under no pressure. He welcomed the news of the forthcoming meeting involving Sir Patrick Mayhew. We needed to put pressure on the British to remove the decommissioning roadblock and then to press them to move the Ancram dialogue on to talks.
19. The Taoiseach suggested that the approach should be to get Mr. Ancram to agree to set up a series of working groups on individual topics, including political development. If an intensive dialogue were to be developed involving Sinn Féin, Unionists might feel obliged to become involved.
20. Mr. Adams objected that Unionists would be reassured by the British side that nothing was really happening in these talks. He described the situation in Northern Ireland as most volatile, adding "We have to keep the republicans on board". Mr. Adams emphasised that what he had said in his Irish Times article on 14 July had actually happened - viz that the British Government had assured Sinn Fein in advance of the ceasefire that if the violence stopped, there would be all-party talks. There appeared to be no sense of urgency on the part of the British Government. The last thing Sinn Fein wanted was a series of meaningless talks.
21. The Taoiseach suggested that Sinn Féin could talk (in the resumed Ancram dialogue) about all the matters which would feature in all-party talks. They could go through each part of the Framework Document and cover all three Strands.

22. Mr. Adams, in what he qualified as not a considered reply, said that the forthcoming meeting with Sir Patrick Mayhew was being held on Sinn Féin's initiative and that they wanted it to work. The fact that the British had agreed to it showed that they understood that they were under pressure. Sinn Fein felt that they now had a substantial window and they wanted to use it to get the British Government to join with the Irish Government in moving forward on "the principle and the objective". They did not want to become involved in any fishing exercise.
23. The Taoiseach said that if Sinn Féin went to the meeting and sought all-party talks they might risk a rebuff. Mr. Adams responded that they "mightn't say that". The Taoiseach suggested that Sinn Féin could press for all-party talks and pending such talks, develop a wide - ranging dialogue with the British side, which would take into account the kind of points which Unionists might want to make in the event that they entered into dialogue. Mr. Adams responded that Sinn Féin did not want nonsensical meetings - if we asked the Loyalists, they would tell us that their meetings with Mr. Ancram were "nonsense".
24. The Taoiseach said that it should be possible to ensure that such meetings were not nonsensical. Mr. Adams responded that there was a crisis trundling towards us and the British were not taking advantage of the current opportunity.
25. The Tánaiste said that we believed that Prime Minister Major had an opportunity to deal with the situation over the next few days and that we would be pressing him to do this. Sinn Féin could use the opportunity of renewed dialogue to review developments over the last 11 months, to express their concerns and difficulties and to get some form of assurance from the British that they wanted all-party talks. The presentational aspects of next week's meeting involving Sir Patrick Mayhew would be easy to handle. The fact that the meeting was taking place at this level could be represented as significant progress. Sinn Féin might like to keep aspects of the meeting private.
26. Mr. Adams noted that Mr. Ancram had been fairly open with Mr. McGuinness at their recent meeting - he had asked Mr. McGuinness if he had any ideas on decommissioning. Mr. Ancram had been even more open with Mr. McGuinness on the phone.

27. The Taoiseach said that he had the impression that during the earlier Ancram dialogue, both sides had stuck rigidly to their scripts. Mr. Hume interjected that the British Government wanted to meet with the SDLP, as well but he expressed a reluctance to do so. Mr. Donlon said that if everybody - SDLP, Sinn Féin, the Irish and US Governments - used every opportunity in public and private to impress on the British Government the uniqueness of the current opportunity, a wide-ranging dialogue could be ensured.
28. Mr. Adams said that it was not a question of telling the British what they should do: they had to be told that now was the time for them to shift. He agreed that what was said in public about next week's meeting and what was said at the meeting would not necessarily have to be the same thing. However, the British had to face up to their responsibilities.
29. The Taoiseach said that the British had erected a hurdle to all-party talks with their distinction between exploratory talks and talks proper and their insistence on a decommissioning gesture: he believed that his proposal for intensified dialogue with Mr. Ancram would help get over this.
30. Mr. Adams said that his instinct would be against further exploratory - type talks, although obviously there was a need to keep in contact with people. It was important that everybody should have a clear sense as to what was required - inclusive, all-party talks. The Taoiseach asked if Sinn Féin envisaged the summoning of an all-party meeting, at which both he and the British Prime Minister would be present. Mr. Hume said that this would be the beginning. Mr. Adams suggested that the Taoiseach might consider talking to the British Prime Minister.
31. The Taoiseach said that he had not realised that Sinn Féin were seeking an all-party meeting at the outset but rather the development of a process leading to all-party talks. He speculated that there might be organisational/logistical problems in arranging/maintaining an all-party talks mechanism and that it might be too big (to be accommodated at Stormont), and too unwieldy. The Tánaiste thought that these kind of problems could be overcome.
32. Mr. Adams asked: "Why not do it (the all-party meeting) in London"? He added that whatever form the meeting might take (bilaterals or

whatever), the key thing was that the Irish Government should be involved.

33. The Taoiseach asked if Unionists would not object to Irish Government participation in an all-party meeting dealing with Strand One (as well as the other two Strands). Mr. Adams referred to the formula that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. Mr. Hume said that Unionists had agreed that all the relationships would be on the table. Once the big meeting had been held, it could break-up to deal with the different Strands.
34. Mr. Adams mentioned in strictest confidence that Sinn Féin had recently taken the initiative and had arranged a meeting with two (named) Unionist politicians. The Unionists had agreed to the meeting on condition that it was held in absolute confidence and that it would not take place before the 31 August anniversary of the IRA ceasefire. Mr. Adams took the Unionist agreement to a meeting as indicating that they appreciated that negotiations were inevitable. He said that he believed that Unionists could change. The ordinary, grass-roots Unionists might not want a United Ireland but at the same time they did not want to move backwards.
35. The Taoiseach thanked Mr. Adams for outlining his views. He believed that it was open to question as to whether Sinn Féin's proposal (for the summoning of all-party talks) was achievable. It was important to have a view as to what else we could look for, if it was not. Mr. Adams said that we should look for the maximum.
36. The Taoiseach returned to the question of decommissioning. We had to solve this problem. We needed to find something which the British could sell as representing substantial progress, with a view to bringing Sinn Féin into talks proper. Mr. Hume said: "Do your best" on this.
37. The meeting concluded at this point to allow participants to attend the Forum.

Attendance at meeting in Dublin Castle on 14 July, 1995

Mr. John Bruton, T.D., Taoiseach

Mr. Dick Spring, T.D., Tánaiste and Minister for Foreign Affairs

Mr. John Major, MP, MEP, Leader, SDLP

Mr. Gerry Adams, President, Sinn Féin

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Mr. Seán Donlon, Special Adviser to the Taoiseach

Mr. Seán Ó hÚiginn, Second Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs

Mr. Simon Hare, Acting Principal Officer, Department of the Taoiseach