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Conversation with Rod Lyne.Paris, Friday, 9th June, 1995

1. De-commissioning: R. Lyne said that this was a critical political problem for his Prime Minister. The Prime Minister needed to be able to say in Parliament that "a de-commissioning process has been agreed and has started". R. Lyne said that the issue is not "a gesture" What was needed was a process with a time-table for specific steps.

2. In response to questions from me on the timing issue and the relationship to an equivalent process and time-table for a political settlement, R. Lyne said that timing could be used but that he did not want to mislead and the "material" start to the de-commissioning process was critical in their terms. He referred to the Dalton/Chilcot Group and said that they should work intensively in preparation for a meeting between the Taoiseach and Prime Minister in Cannes.

[What I was attempting to get across was the possibility of two parallel processes with time-tables for political progress and de-commissioning progress that would have the same settlement date. What R. Lyne kept coming back to was that after the time-tables had been agreed the de-commissioning processes had to start before the final political talks.]

3. R. Lyne asked that I tell Sinn Fein that it was important that they talk to Minister Ancram and not get into a stand off because of the refusal of a further meeting between the Secretary of State Mayhew and Gerry

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Adams. He pointed to the significant difference in tone and to a lesser extent in substance between the two recent letters from Minister Ancram and Secretary of State Mayhew to Sinn Fein when compared to previous letters.

4. **Private Clegg:** R. Lyne indicated that the decision in the Clegg case has been taken but because it is a judicial process [carried out by J. Chilcot and Secretary of State Mayhew!] they were legally barred from saying what the decision is. Notwithstanding that he went on to say that they were considering a form of action for both Loyalists and Republican prisoners. This will not be substantial. Certainly not a move on 50% remission [he said this is a key card in their hand] but will be clearly evident. He asked that we not press them publicly and he thought some action on our part would be useful in addition to theirs.

[I made clear that we had difficulty with their view of a judicial process. I said the Taoiseach would in my view have little option but to deal publicly with the issue.]

[Subsequent to our conversation on Friday night R. Lyne called me at 6.30 a.m. on Saturday to express concern at the Taoiseach's public statements on the matter. I reiterated the Taoiseach's position that there should be one clearly understood process of treatment for all prisoners be they British Army, Loyalists or Republican prisoners. R. Lyne agreed to contact me again this week.

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Taoiseach's Conversation with Prime Minister Major

Paris, Friday 9 June, 1995

The Taoiseach indicated the conversation was a brief one and dealt with two issues:

- **Private Clegg:** where the Taoiseach stressed the danger of a wrong signal [in the Taoiseach's view Prime Minister Major appeared to accept his position by nodding but did not respond beyond that];
- **de-commissioning:** on which the Taoiseach said that while we would wish the situation were otherwise he had doubts on whether there would be a gesture. Prime Minister Major said there had to be a gesture.