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DRAFT STATEMENT TO STEVENS
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Draft Statement (by the Minister for Foreign Affairs)

Mr Stevens has made a large ^{number} volume of recommendations which are designed to address the widespread concerns that exist regarding collusion which was the subject of a series of meetings of the AI Intergovernmental Conference last Autumn. The Government have closely monitored the progress of the Inquiry and they note that the Report and its recommendations have confirmed the basis for the Government's profound concern.

It is absolutely vital that the recommendations that he has made - of which there are some 83 listed in the summary - to deal with this deeply disturbing situation should now be speedily implemented.

The Government will be concerned to learn from the British Government the progress being made in the implementation of these recommendations.

The Government have carefully noted the recognition contained in the report of serious shortcomings relating to the recruitment and retention of members of the UDR. This has been a source of longstanding concern to the Government and the nationalist community in Northern Ireland. The report also confirms the involvement of members of the UDR in collusion. The specific recommendations that Mr Stevens makes in this area must be promptly implemented.

The Government will be studying Mr Stevens Report and recommendations in their detail. There will be a full exchange of views with the British authorities on this matter at the next meeting of the Anglo Irish Conference.

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Summary of Stevens Report - Essential Points

Terms of Reference:

Investigation of disappearance of material from Dunmurray Police Station, and subsequently from Ballykinlar Army Camp;

Alleged leak of information associated with the murder of Loughlin Maginn;

Following consultation with the Chief Constable - any matters which came to light during the course of the Enquiry; I was also asked to make relevant recommendations regarding these matters".

Conduct of the Enquiry:

Described by Stevens as "the largest external investigation in Northern Ireland and the most extensive of its type ever undertaken in the United Kingdom".

Enquiry computerised with a linkage between a Major Incident Room in Britain and a similar room in Northern Ireland - advantages of this were clear "following the severe accidental fire at the Enquiry's original offices in January".

Written statements taken from over 1,900 witnesses and suspects; 2,000 investigative enquiries undertaken; 2,000 man-hours of interviews with detained persons;

Over 2,600 documents of all types recovered from loyalist paramilitaries, though only 100 actual security force documents were recovered dating from the mid 1970's up to 1988.

94 people arrested and a total of 59 of these charged or reported for offences;

213 members of the RUC were interviewed;

Findings/Conclusions:

Because of reasons of State Security and Sub-Judice rules, "some aspects of the report, which is a substantial document, must remain confidential. However, I believe that the public interest demands that as much as is possible of the substance of my report is disclosed".

"It is clear that official information, originally produced by the RUC, the Army and the Prison Service, has passed illicitly into the hands of loyalist paramilitary groups. Documents and information from documents, have been traced to the possession of these paramilitaries. They have been used by them to enhance their own intelligence systems and

as an aid to the targeting of persons suspected of being republican terrorists".

The passing of information is restricted to a small number of individuals within the Security Forces "and is neither widespread nor institutionalised". The number of documents which have been obtained by the paramilitaries is small compared with the total number of such documents produced.

"In the difficult situation that exists within Northern Ireland, it must be accepted that any system will be vulnerable to some extent either to terrorist infiltration or to pressures that may be applied to individuals. However, at the time of the report no evidence of any recent leak of contemporary information has come to light. The latest date of any document traced to the possession of loyalist paramilitaries by the Enquiry is June 1988".

"Photo-montages are classified under the lowest security rating. During the Enquiry, no documents of any higher security classification have been recovered, or indeed come to notice as having been in the hands of any terrorist organisation".

Until 1988, it was not the practice of the Army (who produce photo-montages in co-operation with the RUC) to keep any records of their production or distribution.

Certain members of the UDR have been involved in collusion with loyalist paramilitaries. It would be wrong to conclude that there is a significant number of UDR soldiers who are involved with paramilitaries. This is not the case.

Improvements can be made in procedures for reporting and recording of allegations of crime against army personnel. "The vetting/screening system in relation to recruitment to the UDR was deficient in a number of areas. Individuals who had been adversely vetted by the RUC Vetting Section had nevertheless been recruited. A small number of these went on to commit terrorist related and criminal offences whilst serving with the regiment."

Need for improvements in the RUC Fingerprint Bureau and the Forensic Science Laboratory - Introduce a serious Crime Unit to give an effective co-ordinated approach.

Allegations in the Irish News of an Inner Circle in the RUC investigated but in the absence of any corroborative evidence, allegations could not be substantiated.

"A large number of montages and similar documents have been produced over the years without there being full recognition of their value to terrorist groups and there were inadequate security procedures. Thus the ingredients were present to allow a small number of persons to abuse positions of trust with little possibility of discovery.... The ease with which these small number of individuals have been able to avoid discovery is perhaps the most significant factor in the

illegal trafficking of security force documents. It is important that a firm and unequivocal stance, such as that made by the chief Constable in his public statement of the 21st September 1989, be taken, demonstrating the true security significance of such information".

"A complex network of intelligence of all types was uncovered, involving the supply and exchange of information between loyalist paramilitary groups, with the Ulster Defence Association at the centre."

Clear need for accounting systems providing comprehensive records of the production and distribution of every document in the terrorist information system. Such a system must ensure that those responsible for passing restricted information can be traced and held criminally responsible.

A reassessment of security classification of intelligence material is required, as is a common approach to the subject by all sections of the security forces"

"Formation of a specialist Police Unit to concentrate upon terrorist investigation".

"It must be acknowledged, that in the present climate, leakages of information from the security forces may never be completely eliminated. However, if the measures recommended are introduced, there is every hope that any future collusion between the security forces and paramilitary terrorist groups will be eradicated.

The Report then gives a summary of its recommendations - totalling 83 in all:

Information and Intelligence Systems:

(a) Review criteria guidelines for issue of recognition information; suspects inclusion in such material; the security classification of such material.

(b) Research methods to uniquely identify documents; make them traceable; restrict circulation to operational needs; ensure accountability - a nominated person to be responsible; prevent unauthorised photocopying.

(c) Similar criteria to apply to computer systems.

(d) Ensure information is weeded regularly.

RUC:

(a) Form an Anti-Terrorist Branch; Central reporting of documents finds - a senior officer to have an overview of finds; identify user access to computer records; identification features for

photocopied material; improved physical security for documents.

(b) Notify Army of all incidents involving Army personnel;
Involve RUC in UDR vetting procedures.

(c) Various technical improvements in finger-printing and
forensics.

Army:

(a) Much tighter vetting of applicants and existing members of
the UDR -viz- RUC to be closely involved in vetting; an inter-
organisation appeal process on disagreements between the Army and
RUC; agree on definition of paramilitary organisations; interview
UDR applicant's referees;

(b) A series of measures to ensure tighter control of security
material, including soldier's notebooks etc.

Anglo/Irish Division
Department of Foreign Affairs
17 May 1990

cc PST
PSM
PSS
Mr Nally
Mr Matthews
Mr Brosnan

by Confidential telex to Embassy London and Embassy Washington