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NOTE OF THE QUADRIPARTITE MEETING HELD IN STORMONT HOUSE
ON 31 AUGUST 1989

Present:

British side

Mr Stephens
Deputy Chief Constable McAtamney
Chief Superintendent Fitzsimons
Mr Masefield
Mr McKervill

Irish side

Mr Brosnan
Commissioner Crowley
Deputy Commissioner Culligan
Mr Magner
Mr Ryan

SUMMARY

The first meeting since March of the Quadripartite Group (which the British side had tried unsuccessfully to arrange before the holiday period), focussed primarily on the British paper on security cooperation which had been passed to the Irish side in July. With relatively few amendments, the thrust of which was discussed at the meeting, the Irish agreed to its revision and submission before the next Conference as a joint report. Both in the context of the discussion on that paper, and later, a number of individual aspects of security cooperation were discussed. At the end of the meeting the Irish side raised their concerns about alleged UFF access to security forces information, the salient points of which have already been recorded by Mr Stephens in his note of 1 September.

INTRODUCTORY REMARKS

2. Mr Stephens began the meeting by saying that it was important to have held the Quadripartite in good time before the Conference. Ministers on both sides attached importance to the work of the Group, and a joint report would be a helpful platform for the security discussion at the Conference. He hoped that the Irish side would agree that the British paper passed in July could, subject to some amendment, serve as the basis for that report. Mr Brosnan agreed. The paper had provided no great difficulties for the Irish at the time when it had been presented, though it clearly now needed some up-dating, given that the twentieth anniversary of the Army's commitment in Northern Ireland had intervened. Fears about the level of PIRA violence prior to that period had fortunately not been fully realised. It had proved to be a relatively successful period for the security forces on both sides of the border, though he accepted that the scale of the threat from PIRA had not diminished.

ASSESSMENT OF THE SECURITY SITUATION

3. Mr Stephens agreed that what had inevitably been going to be a relatively fraught period had passed off a good deal better than it might. Indeed on a number of indices, there had been less disturbances in August than in previous years. While this had inevitably been overshadowed by the death of Seamus Duffy, that incident was not to be seen as representative of the picture.

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The British side's assessment was that since about November of the previous year PIRA had tried to increase the level of activity; the security forces had been stretched in thwarting PIRA's designs and their successes had been the result of much hard work. PIRA was seen by some at a threshold in terms of where they would next go; there had been suggestions that the leadership was divided, with some wishing to escalate the violence further. Others in the leadership were said to be possibly poised to consider a cease-fire, though he personally did not give much credence to those stories, adding that the movement had not reached that stage of self-doubt.

4. The Deputy Chief Constable said that there was some evidence suggesting that there had been a drop in popular support for PIRA, including the Local Government results where fewer transfers from the SDLP had been seen. The RUC had been closely watching the level of street support during the anniversary period. Even after Seamus Duffy's death, there had been no major protests. This drop in support, allied to the successes of the security forces had led to internal dissension and return to a policy of taking any target which might present itself. The previous PIRA objective of a major thrust had been prevented by the interception of supplies by the security forces and the terrorists' inability to get their units out simultaneously. As a result targetting was now being spread more widely into previously safe areas; there was also an emphasis being placed on communications. The Deputy Chief Constable added that the security forces would be unable to maintain for much longer the current high levels of overt presence, given the need, for example, for police officers to have training on the new PACE provisions. PIRA would be watching closely to detect any scaling down of the security forces' effort. Mr Stephens commented that it was arguable that the next weeks would be particularly dangerous as they would still credibly fall within the span of the anniversary season. There was no room for complacency, and the threat could not be regarded as having gone away.

5. Mr Brosnan accepted that there was probably still pressure on PIRA to mount a major effort. It was clear that the Omeath bomb had been such an attempt, and they had made other preparations for attacks on the Continent. He then said that the Irish side also wished to discuss their concern about the activities of Loyalist paramilitary groups, and the apparent increase in the level of sectarian attacks. Mr Stephens pointed to the recent successes of the RUC against Loyalist paramilitaries in East Antrim; around the same time there had been Loyalist attacks in other areas. The Deputy Chief Constable added that paramilitaries, based in Rathcoole, had been mounting random attacks on Catholics in adjacent areas. As well as in East Antrim, the RUC had had success against other Loyalist gangs. Generally they were able to acquire information on Loyalist groups.

PREPARATION OF THE JOINT REPORT

(a) The Paper

6. The discussion then turned to the British paper as a basis for a joint report. A propos of the reference in the second paragraph in that paper to contacts between the RUC and the Garda, Mr Stephens

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enquired about the arrangements for cross-border meetings which had been reviewed in the wake of the tragic deaths of two senior RUC officers at Jonesborough. The Commissioner said that guidelines had been drawn up, initially between Mr Culligan and his opposite number, and subsequently approved by both the former and the present Chief Constable. These guidelines would be subject to review from time to time. They were already working well, and the need was to impress upon officers the importance of following them was accepted. It was agreed that a reference should be made to this development in the paper.

7. Mr Stephens then enquired about the development of secure communications. The Commissioner said that the Voicelok units had been installed on the basis of the original plan, and were operational. This too should be made clear in the paper.

8. Mr Brosnan took issue with the British side's statement that the IED procedure had been working well. It was an example of security cooperation, but there had been a few difficulties, caused by infringements on the British side, to which the DFA had drawn attention through the Secretariat. It was most important that the agreed procedures should be operated in all cases, as it was a delicate subject. He cited one incident when an overflight had been made notwithstanding the refusal of permission by the Garda since the request did not come within the agreement. Such an attitude would cause serious repercussions if it were repeated. Mr Stephens said that it was fully appreciated on the British side that it was not helpful if the rules were not followed. The point had been registered firmly in appropriate quarters. He trusted however that occasional infringements would not call into question the desirability of the agreement itself; such a response would be out of all proportion. The British side would however do their best to ensure that the letter as well as the spirit of the agreement was followed precisely. He noted that the agreement was coming up for renewal early in September.

9. Mr Brosnan said that the Irish side shared the view that the agreement was necessary, but it must be realised that individual overflights attracted unwelcome attention. The best guarantee that it should continue to work was that each flight should be within the guidelines. The emphasis which had been placed on the agreement in the British paper needed amendment as, in the Irish view, it had not been "working well". It was agreed to substitute a reference to its having "continued to demonstrate the value of cooperation". Mr McKervill pointed out that revised instructions on the procedures were to be issued very shortly, and thereafter they would be re-issued every six months to ensure that new units were fully in the picture. The particular occasion to which Mr Brosnan had referred had been caused by an error in communications for which we apologised.

10. With reference to the same paragraph in the paper, Mr Brosnan noted that it referred to "a shared appreciation of the value of pre-emptive intelligence". He said that while the Irish side was *ad idem* on this, they were concerned about the passage of information, and the UFF claims had raised this issue to the fore.

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11. Mr Brosnan said that the reference in the third paragraph of the paper to the Governments developing together new and effective operational approaches was acceptable, so long as it was understood that the Irish side was not thereby committed to joint operations. It was agreed that an amended reference might make the point more clearly.

b) The statement of aims annexed to the paper

12. The discussion then moved to the list of propositions annexed to the original British note. It was noted that the seizure of the 1500 lbs bomb at Omeath was a good example of the effective use of pre-emptive intelligence. The Commissioner added that it demonstrated the resilience of PIRA following the set back to them of the arrests of their members in the south and in the USA. Mr Stephens said that the British Government had been grateful for the rapidity of the follow up action taken by the Irish after the arrests at Rosslare.

13. Both sides reaffirmed the need to update the joint threat assessment regularly. Chief Supt Fitzsimons said that it was discussed at monthly meetings between the forces. Mr Brosnan suggested that the threat posed by the UFF and the UVF had increased or at least changed since the last assessment. He asked whether an amendment to the assessment was appropriate. Chief Supt Fitzsimons said that certainly there would be no difficulty in now reviewing the threat from the paramilitary organisations, although he personally believed that the assessment would not differ greatly from the previous one; if anything fewer weapons were currently available to Loyalist paramilitaries. The current increase in activity should not be seen out of proportion over time. He was confident that the RUC would have further successes against the Loyalists sooner rather than later. Mr Brosnan said that he did not wish to overstate its significance, but at the time the present assessment had been prepared, the threat appeared to be lower. The Deputy Chief Constable said that while the attacks carried out by Loyalists covered a wider geographical area, it was believed that they were undertaken by people from the same urban bases. Both Mr Brosnan and Mr Magner stressed that a short supplementary assessment of the Loyalist paramilitary threat would be of particular value to Irish Ministers, by way of providing reassurance.

14. Mr Stephens said that the British side continued to be impressed with the efforts of the Garda to trace and seize terrorist weapons. Both sides recognised that major arms finds were less likely given that PIRA were responding to security forces successes by scattering their material more widely in smaller caches. He referred to the message of thanks which had been passed on Mr Cope's behalf to the Minister for Justice and the Commissioner following the seizure of the Omeath bomb. Mr Brosnan confirmed that this had been appreciated. The Irish side agreed on the importance of continued effort in this area and of cutting off supplies to the terrorists as far as possible. A change to paragraph six in the annex was agreed to reflect this discussion. The Commissioner added that arrangements had been made between the two forces for a regular monthly exchange of information about arms and other finds on the 20th of each month.

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15. The Commissioner picked up the reference to training. He reported that the Garda had a special unit whose members had attended courses in Britain on surveillance techniques, and later on instruction, and they were now providing training in the south. Officers had also attended courses in Denmark. The FBI had been favourably impressed by the Garda's efforts. The Garda would continue to place high emphasis on training in specialist skills, making use of appropriate courses in liaison with the British.

ASSESSMENT OF PIRA TECHNOLOGICAL RESOURCES

16. Mr Stephens expressed appreciation of the augmented report produced by the two police forces on the technological threat posed by PIRA. This was an informative document which well met the Ministers' remit and would be of considerable value. The Commissioner said that since the document was prepared, there had been a find in County Monaghan of a sequential timing device used to detonate mortars. It was the first time this kind of device had been found which enabled the terrorists either to set off all the mortars simultaneously or to detonate them at three second intervals. Chief Supt Fitzsimons paid tribute to the regularly helpful and prompt response of the Garda in this area of cooperation. Mr Stephens stressed that it was vital that both forces must be in close touch, given the realisation by Ministers of PIRA's ability to tap into the most sophisticated technological progress, as had been demonstrated in the arrest of Richard Johnson in the USA. Chief Supt Fitzsimons commented that, although the draft report had subsequently been amended to take account of that arrest, much of the information contained in the draft had accurately anticipated that which had then emerged.

ACTION AGAINST TERRORIST FUNDING

17. Mr Brosnan asked for information on how the new legislation designed to help tackle terrorist funding was operating in practice. Mr Stephens pointed out that the legislation had not long been in operation, and it would inevitably, as the Deputy Chief Constable confirmed, take time to produce results. The latter pointed out however that action was already in hand, for example, as reported in the papers, to tackle drinking clubs associated with paramilitary groups. It had been possible to target them and to start taking action since the legislation permitted access to their accounts. In the case of a contractor in Magherafelt, the books had been seized to see if money was being passed to terrorists. The Anti-Rackets Unit had been set up, and close attention was being paid to black taxis. Mr Stephens made the point that while the PTA provisions had a high public profile, more positive action was also now possible against clubs under the revised registration regulations and the amended liquor licensing laws. The Deputy Chief Constable added that paramilitary clubs were under particular threat. They had to satisfy the RUC about their accounts in order to qualify for the renewal of their licence, in which case they were then subject to tax inspection. In the past the breweries, who had been competing for business, had financially assisted the clubs, but they were not now doing so. Mr Stephens pointed out that the financial initiatives of PIRA were not always successful. The

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British side would be happy to brief the Irish in another context in more technical detail on the legal powers available to tackle terrorist funding, and to update their own knowledge of the Irish legislation to see what scope there might be for greater cooperation. Mr Brosnan appreciated that the discussions in the Quadripartite Group overlapped with the interest of other groups as far as harmonisation of the criminal law was concerned, and it was noted that Working Group II might wish to pay particular attention to this subject.

REFURBISHMENT OF SECURITY FORCE FACILITIES

18. The discussion then turned to consideration of the passage on the general security situation. A propos of the reference to Operation Tantalus, Mr Brosnan said that the Irish side had been unhappy at the short notice given to them about the Operation. In particular, they would have wished to have had more chance to make representations about the timing of the exercise. Mr Stephens took the opportunity to express appreciation again to the Irish security forces for their assistance during the Operation.

19. The British side then referred to the forthcoming programme of work to improve the living conditions and security protection of a number of permanent vehicle check points along the border. It was emphasised that while some inconvenience would inevitably be caused to local residents every effort would be made by the security forces to keep this to a minimum. In reponse to an Irish plea for information about the potential closure of roads in connection with this operation, Mr Stephens undertook that the Secretariat would be updated when future moves were made.

THE NORTH SOUTH RAIL LINK

20. Mr Stephens said that the continuing attacks on the line were depressing, though PIRA were doing themselves little public good. The report should flag this subject for Ministers to consider at the Conference, and he believed that it would be right to put a hard-hitting reference in the Joint Communique about the disruption caused to the socio-economic life of the island in particular. Apart from the risk caused to members of the security forces, there was the political futility, the inconvenience to passengers and the potential loss of jobs (as had been appreciated in a previous Irish Times article). Mr Magner added that the preservation of the link was an important political symbol. Mr Brosnan said that it was important to deprive PIRA of a propaganda success. They had effectively prevented the interconnection of electricity supplies, and played a part in the absence of a gas link; it would be the last straw if they cut the rail link too. Mr Magner said that he was fairly that the end of the following week should see the lack of radio confident communication with CIE locomotives in Northern Ireland resolved. Although CIE used many more locomotives on the route than NIR, they were arranging to install portable radio equipment in the cabs. Preliminary discussions had already been held with the unions, and while possible problems had been anticipated, particularly with the freight drivers based in Dundalk,

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none had so far materialised. The CIE radios would be on the same frequency as those used by NIR. It had unfortunately been necessary to push CIE to introduce them - they had finally realised however that if no action had been taken and an accident had ensued that their position would have been indefensible. Mr Stephens said that the British side had appreciated the efforts which had been made by the Department of Justice, and they were grateful for this progress.

SECURE COMMUNICATIONS

21. Mr Stephens said that the steps taken to install secure communications between headquarters and border divisional stations represented a further step within the guidelines of the two forces' current plans. Neither police force had at present a facility for secure communications between their own patrols, though in the longer term, there probably was a case for that, enabling further secure cross-border communications. The Deputy Chief Constable confirmed that communications at this level were not secure, apart from specialist branches, though upgrading the system was a long-term goal. It was likely to be very expensive, though there was such a system being used in B Division at present. The Commissioner confirmed that the same long-term objective was shared by the Garda. Mr Stephens said that Ministers should be aware that there could be little basis for seeking secure cross-border communications when those on either side were not themselves secure. When plans were devised by each side, it was of course important that they should be compatible. The Commissioner added that there was a secure facsimile system operating between the two intelligence units in the respective headquarters. There had however been a delay caused by the suppliers of secure encryption equipment which had postponed the introduction of the system in other areas on the intended timescale.

CONTACTS BETWEEN THE POLICE FORCES

22. It was noted that the Chief Constable and the Commissioner had met on 15 August in addition to their first meeting in June. There had also been a discussion between the Garda Chief Superintendent responsible for tackling terrorist funding and his opposite number in the RUC. This had enabled the Garda to be aware of areas to which they should also be alert; further contacts would continue.

SMUGGLING AND RELATED ACTIVITIES

23. Mr Stephens said that the British side remained concerned at the extent to which smuggling might contribute to terrorist funding, although the two were not coterminous. It was probably also the case that PIRA allowed smuggling operations in their area of influence, at a price.

24. The British side said that they were still looking at the question of how a marker might best be put in petrol in the north. Mortrace MP had been identified as one possible marker. There remained a divergence between the various estimates for the amount of petrol which was smuggled across the border. Some Irish sources suggested this might be as high as IRE45 million, while those in the know on the British side believed the figure was very much less.

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Mr. Magner said that the figure of IRE45 million was one produced by the industry in the south, which had raised some eyebrows at Government level. Unfortunately there was at present no Government figure available. He recalled that the previous Secretary of State had agreed in principle to meet the Irish request. The British side said that before action could be agreed upon, they would need to be satisfied on a number of criteria including the effectiveness of introducing a marker, that it should not be detrimental to car engines, and that it should be reasonably economical.

25. The Deputy Chief Constable referred to recent action taken in the north against grain smugglers. Some 15 premises had been searched, and one estimate of the level of fraud had been £4-5 million. There had been good liaison between the RUC and the Garda and the Customs Services on both sides. The Commissioner referred to five seizures of illegal hormones; in two cases there appeared to be some involvement of PIRA members, though there was no evidence to suggest that this had been for other than their personal gain. Mr. Magner also referred to publicity concerning a video scam. It had been a large scale operation and there had been some evidence of PIRA involvement. Mr. Masefield asked if it would be possible for the police forces to provide statistical information to the Secretariat on operations in this general area when they had been completed. He recalled that with Ministers' agreement a small committee had been established to provide a source of coordination if it was required. Mr. Brosnan supported this proposal, instancing the analogous provision of information about arms finds. While much of the smuggling operations seemed to be done on a freelance basis, there was clearly some link with paramilitary funding. Mr. Stephens commented that lawlessness in any particular area created a climate where terrorism could prevail. Against this background it was useful for both sides to keep each other informed of developments.

HANDOVER POINT FOR EXTRADITION

26. Mr. Stephens said that he wished to raise again with the Irish side the question of the handover point in extradition cases, though he was aware that this had been raised in other fora. He understood that there was concern shared by the security forces on both sides that something should be done to vary the handover point, preferably using one which was not susceptible to potentially violent demonstrations. He was aware of the legal requirements of the 1965 Act, but he hoped that it would still be possible ideally to fly an extradited person out, or if that was not possible, to agree some alternative land crossing. The issue could be raised in court as early as 19 September in the case of R J Campbell.

27. Mr. Brosnan said that the Irish side were aware of British concerns and that the present situation created difficulties on their side as well. The legislative requirement was however mandatory, and the point of departure was inevitably public knowledge. This could not be changed without legislative amendment. All that could be done at this stage was to see what might be possible physically in terms of different points of departure. He was aware that there were difficulties associated with Carrickarnon, but some recent extraditions there had gone

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smoothly. Deputy Commissioner Culligan had looked at other possibilities but none have been devoid of difficulties. That said, the Irish side would certainly look at the possibility of air transport, though this could raise problems too. He accepted that this was a proper matter for discussion within the Quadripartite Group. Mr Stephens then handed over a brief note summarising the British concerns (copy at annex); Mr Brosnan confirmed that the Irish side were aware of the forthcoming hearing in the case of Campbell.

POTENTIAL AIR SUPPORT FOR THE POLICE FORCES

28. Mr Brosnan asked whether the joint report should contain a reference to Eurobeacon. It was agreed to omit such a reference. Mr Stephens referred to the remark at a previous Conference of Mr Collins which suggested that the political difficulties associated with overflights would be diminished if they were by police rather than Army planes. The British side were still not clear on the best way forward, either operationally or in terms of the expense of procurement. The issue remained under consideration, though it was important that both sides should in the meantime make the fullest possible use of Eurobeacon.

3 BRIGADE

29. Mr Brosnan asked for an up-date on 3 Brigade. Mr Stephens confirmed that it continued to operate on the same basis about which the Irish had already been briefed. While no major operational breakthrough could yet be claimed for it, things might well have been worse without the development. It was important to acknowledge that the great majority of residents in the border zone were oblivious of the different structure. The Deputy Chief Constable stressed that the police continued to be responsible for authorising house searches, and that arrests had to be cleared with them as well. Contact with the local community remained via the police. The new structure had however enabled more fruitful contact between the police and the Army. Mr Brosnan recalled that the impact on the community and the effect on the principle of the primacy of police had been the Irish concerns; it appeared that these had been largely avoided. Mr Stephens agreed, and added that there was no immediate prospect of Ministers seeking to change the Brigade's role or ambit.

30. Concluding this section of the discussion, Mr Stephens and Mr Brosnan stressed that while the Quadripartite Group had an important role to play, particularly in the context of briefing Ministers for their discussions in the Conference, it had never been the intention to supplant the bilateral exchanges between the two police forces which remained the bedrock of security cooperation.

ALLEGED UFF ACCESS TO SECURITY FORCES' INFORMATION

31. The Irish side then raised their concerns about the UFF claims to have access to security forces information and the murder of Loughlin Maginn. Mr Stephens referred to the Minister's statement of 30 August and to his subsequent interviews with the media. A rigorous investigation was underway; there could be no possible

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question of condoning the possible leaking of information. The Deputy Chief Constable then said that there was no doubt that the document which had been shown had originated with the RUC in Downpatrick. The only information on the document in addition to Maginn's photograph had been his name, date of birth, address and the registration number of 2 cars which he used (one of which was no longer owned by him). It should moreover be noted that the address on the RUC document was his mother's, which he had consistently cited to the authorities, fraudulently claiming to be separated from his wife, with whom he had in fact been living all the time. It was a low level piece of information issued by the Criminal Intelligence Office and made available as standard practice to security force patrols as part of the information which they required to enable them to report on movements of individuals of interest.

32. Chief Supt Fitzsimons said that the UFF video, which was clearly home-made and not produced by the security forces, had been of what appeared to be a wall display and included a number of other names and photographs. Mr Moore had been able to pass on some of those names. It was understood that they included suspected PIRA members from Castlewellan, Hilltown, Rathfriland and elsewhere in South Down. He added that the security forces had had numerous reports associating Maginn with PIRA. He had been shot at the house where he had lived with his wife for the last 10 years - not his mother's address. He had been arrested on 7 August 1988 in the company of Donagh O'Kane who had subsequently been arrested in Paris. A UDR patrol had found the latter with a parcel which included a radio transmitter, balaclavas and certain other suspicious items. Later a quantity of explosives had been found. Maginn had subsequently been found driving a Hiace van in the company of another known PIRA man. Maginn was well known locally to have been involved in a unit including O'Kane and another man who had been recently charged with murder.

33. In response to a question, Chief Supt Fitzsimons said that other documents shown on the wall in the video were the same type as that on Maginn. The video might have been filmed in an RUC or UDR camp, but it was quite likely that it had been taken at someone's home. He accepted that other documents had been taken previously. The video might be of assistance to the RUC in their investigation, although they had no access to the original copy. Mr Moore deduced that he had been taken to a house in mid-Down. The reason for the UFF's action was presumably the recent criticism of them for carrying out apparently random sectarian assassinations and the absence of any recognition of Maginn's paramilitary contacts. He added that Maginn's wife was a Protestant. Pressure on the family to have a paramilitary funeral had been resisted, though the police considered that there had been a Provisional presence there.

34. Mr Ryan asked whether the indications were that the UDR rather than the RUC had been involved in the leak. Chief Supt Fitzsimons said that this was not clear at this stage, though it was a fact that the UDR would have had that type of documentation, as indeed would members from all the security forces operating in that area.

35. Mr Stephens said that the authorities would clearly want at an appropriate stage to look carefully at the procedure for briefing

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members of the security forces who were going on patrol or about to operate checkpoints. While some briefing was obviously essential, this was not necessarily the best way of doing it. Chief Supt Fitzsimons added that Special Branch was keenly aware of the risk which led in fact to them often being accused of withholding valuable information.

36. Mr Stephens pointed out that the enquiry was not merely following up a leak. It was an integral part of the investigation of Maginn's murder. If anyone in the security forces had been instrumental in pointing the UFF in his direction, then they would be implicated in a murder enquiry and would potentially face a serious criminal charge. The Commissioner added that the management of the respective Garda and RUC forces had to be very conscious of the need for care in handling intelligence and that abuse could affect the further supply of information. Classified information should only be used as strictly appropriate.

37. Mr Brosnan said that the British side would be aware of the Irish Government's great concern about this whole area. Representations had been made previously via the Secretariat, particularly about allegations of the involvement of Loyalist paramilitaries in the UDR. This was clear instance, and the Irish Government were seriously concerned about the effect it could have on confidence in the security forces. The possibility that the leak could have been from the RUC made it worse. There appeared to be 2 possibilities: either there were paramilitary members of the security forces, or the paramilitaries had sources of information in the security forces. A further source of worry to the Irish was, as the Commissioner had suggested, the potential effect on the flow of information - something on which both sides were vitally dependent. Both sides would naturally be concerned about what happened to information passed from one to the other. An incident such as this did nothing to help.

38. Mr Ryan asked whether targetting of previous victims by Loyalists might have been assisted by the leaks from the security forces. Chief Supt Fitzsimons referred to newspaper story suggestions that the UDR had passed on some information in respect of J J Davey. However in general terms, individuals' affiliations were well known in small communities, a point which Mr Brosnan accepted. Mr Stephens recalled that both sides had in the past targetted individuals who had appeared in supergrass trials, though it was certainly also true that a significant proportion of murders were random killings of Roman Catholics, for example the tragic case of Niall Davies, in respect of which some of the recent charges had been made. He drew attention to the high proportion of Loyalist prisoners amongst those serving long sentences in Northern Ireland prisons.

39. Mr Stephens said that Irish concerns were fully understood by NIO Ministers. As and when further information, even if it had to be kept confidential, was available, he would make sure that it was passed to the Irish.

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40. Mr Brosnan said that this discussion had been very useful, particularly in bringing home the fact that the document in question had been low level information. Irish Ministers would undoubtedly raise the subject at the Conference, and would be hoping to receive reassurance.

R C Masefield

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