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CONFIDENTIAL

Paper 2B

The Cost of Violence arising from the Northern Ireland Situation

since 1969



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1. Introduction

- 1.1 There have been periods of violence in the Northern part of the island for many years, both before and after partition in 1920. The people of the North, and to a lesser extent, of the South and Britain have, during these periods, suffered death, maiming and bombing. The violence has also destroyed jobs and economic opportunities. But the most sustained and atrocious period of violence has been that of the past 14 years since 1969. This paper outlines the terrible effects of that violence and estimates its costs in human and economic terms for the people of Ireland, North and South, and for the people of Britain. *Ref to Summary Table at back.*

2. Deaths and Injuries in the North

- 2.1 The most tragic cost of violence since 1969 is that of the deaths of over 2,300 men and women and children in the North. In addition, over 24,000 people have been injured ~~and maimed~~. During the past 14 years there have been over 43,000 separate incidents of shootings, bombings and incendiaries. The effect on society has been appalling and there is hardly a family that has not been touched to some degree by death, injury or intimidation. The killing of over 2,300 people in the North, with a population of one and a half million, is equivalent in proportionate terms to the killing of approximately 81,000 people in Britain, 80,000 in France or 325,000 in the United States.

*1 January*  
Table 1 gives a classification of the 2,304 fatal casualties from 1969 to 30 June, 1983 under the general categories of civilians, security forces and paramilitary groups. The category 'civilian' specifies those persons killed who do not belong to the following categories: a) members of the security forces; b) prison officers; c) acknowledged members of paramilitary groups; d) individuals engaged in criminal activity (e.g. robbery); e) individuals whose role at time of death was uncertain (e.g. riot situations). As the more detailed table in Appendix I illustrates, 44 persons in this category were former members of the security forces and 20 were elected representatives or political activists. Additional details for this table are given in Appendix I.



Table 1: Loss of life arising from political violence in the North  
1 January, 1969 to 30 June, 1983\*

CLASSIFICATION	YEAR															
	'69	'70	'71	'72	'73	'74	'75	'76	'77	'78	'79	'80	'81	'82	'83*	Total
Civilian	13	17	96	242	130	149	177	221	55	31	31	42	42	39	12	1297
Security Forces	1	2	59	149	79	51	31	54	46	31	68	31	44	41	15	702
Paramilitaries	1	5	17	75	40	21	35	19	12	7	5	5	19	13	4	278
Unclassified		1	1	8	3		1	2	1	1	2		3	2	2	27
Total	15	25	173	474	252	221	244	296	114	70	106	78	108	95	33	2304

2.2 Of the total 2,304 fatalities 1,907 were born in the North; Table 2 gives a breakdown of their religious affiliation. It can be seen that both communities have suffered from the violence.

XX Table 2: Religious affiliation of 1,907 fatalities who were born in the North,  
1~~st~~ January 1969 to 30~~th~~ June, 1983

Religious Affiliation	'69	'70	'71	'72	'73	'74	'75	'76	'77	'78	'79	'80	'81	'82	'83*	Total
Catholic	8	15	85	243	106	114	126	142	43	17	26	28	48	32	10	1043
Protestant	7	9	48	124	81	75	101	139	53	39	42	36	49	41	20	864



Table 3 provides a further breakdown of the religious affiliation of 1,297 fatalities designated as <sup>Civilians</sup> ~~citizens~~ in table 1. *(native of the North)*

Table 3: Religious affiliation of 1,297 civilians <sup>who were killed</sup>

Religion	'69	'70	'71	'72	'73	'74	'75	'76	'77	'78	'79	'80	'81	'82	'83	Total
Catholic	7	8	62	166	75	95	104	124	33	9	17	20	27	20	6	773
Protestant	6	8	31	74	50	50	69	95	19	21	14	19	15	18	6	495
Civilians not native of the North		1	3	2	5	4	4	2	3	1		3		1		29

2.4 Table 4 provides a classification of all the fatal casualties on the basis of the agencies responsible for the ~~total~~ loss of life under the categories republican paramilitary groups, loyalist paramilitary groups and security forces. 163 cases are included under a non-classified heading\*. Additional details for this table are given in Appendix I.

Table 4: Agency responsible for loss of life <sup>1st Jan 1969 to 30 June 1983</sup>

Agency	'69	'70	'71	'72	'73	'74	'75	'76	'77	'78	'79	'80	'81	'82	'83	Total
Republican Paramilitary Groups	4	18	96	255	128	98	102	142	70	52	88	49	67	72	23	1264
Loyalist Paramilitary Groups	2	2	21	103	80	94	115	111	24	6	14	14	11	11	5	613
Security Forces	9	5	41	74	32	17	7	16	9	10	1	9	18	11	5	264
Non classified*			15	42	12	12	20	27	11	2	3	6	12	1		163
Total	15	25	173	474	252	221	244	296	114	70	106	78	108	95	33	2304

\*Note: The non-classified total embraces three distinct groups:

- (1) Those incidents where it is not possible to attribute responsibility.
- (2) Those incidents where there is no direct line of responsibility e.g. certain affrays or riot situations.
- (3) The deaths of the ten hunger strikers. However, accidentally self-inflicted deaths (e.g. premature explosions) have been attributed to the agency initiating the action.



### 3. Spillover of Violence from the North to the South and to Britain

3.1 Since 1972 some 45 people have been killed in terrorist explosions in the South and 8 members of the Garda Siochana have been murdered by terrorist activity. Terrorist organisations have been responsible for a substantial share of the armed robberies which increased from 11 in 1970 to 306 in 1981 but fell to 158 in 1982. Because of tighter and costly bank security measures the number of armed bank robberies has fallen in recent years <sup>from a peak of 20</sup> with 20 recorded in 1982. This fall has however coincided with an increase in the number of armed robberies of post offices and private dwellings. *any numbers?*

3.2 The people of Britain, while they are physically more remote from the violence <sup>the people</sup> than those ~~living on the island of Ireland~~, have also suffered in human and financial terms. Over 370 members of the British army have been killed in the North and additional members of the <sup>army and police</sup> security forces have been killed in Britain. British citizens have died in sporadic terrorist bombing campaigns in major cities. There have also been murders of leading political and official figures.

*Relevant here* [Finally, the cost of the violence represents a considerable financial burden as Table 20 illustrates.]  
*- no conclusion reached?*

### 4. Psychological and Social Impact of the Violence

4.1 The violence in the North has undoubtedly had a psychological impact on its population, particularly in Belfast and Derry and in some border areas. Those directly exposed to the campaign of violence understandably suffer much anguish. Some psychiatrists argue that it has been in those areas bordering on the scenes of greatest violence <sup>that</sup> one will find the most significant increase in tension and anxiety. One psychiatrist, Dr. Fraser, suggests "anxiety, not experience (of violence), as the outstanding stressor". The violence has often succeeded in its aim of alienating sections of the community from each other and in fostering misunderstanding, fear and hatred. During the seventies, sectarian rioting and terrorist violence from the extremists of both traditions resulted in the largest single displacement of civilian population in Western Europe in peacetime. In Belfast alone over 60,000 people moved residence, largely because of violence and intimidation. There were also extensive security <sup>police</sup> operations involving widespread arrests and house searches. In 1971 there were 17,262 house searches in the North; by 1973 this had risen to 75,000, one fifth of all houses in the North. The violence has also resulted in the introduction of special legislation to cope with the intimidation of witnesses and jurors.



4.2 Between 1971 and 1981 the North, by contrast with the South (which experienced an annual net immigration of 10,000 annually), had a net <sup>e</sup>outward migration of about 8,000 per annum. One estimate suggests that as many as one third of the emigrants from the North during the 1970's settled in the South. From Labour Force Surveys carried out in the South it is estimated that between 20,000 and 25,000 persons migrated from the North to the South between 1971 and 1981. Furthermore, a study from the New University of Ulster in 1982 showed that between 2000 and 3000 young people who leave the North each year for further education never return. While the North's population increased by 0.8 per cent annually from 1961 to 1971, from 1971 to 1981 the growth rate fell to 0.2 per cent compared with a growth figure of 1.5 per cent in the South.

*from  
initial  
period  
- Authority*

## 5. The Demography of Violence

5.1. Various studies to determine which areas of the North have suffered most from the violence conclude that the worst affected areas are urban areas, particularly in Belfast and <sup>Derry</sup>~~Newry~~. Dr. Michael Poole of the New University of Ulster analysed the total of 2,161 deaths that occurred between 1969 and 1981 in 1,715 separate fatal incidents. Of these, 1,260 (73.5 per cent) were urban in the sense of occurring within the 27 towns in the North.  $1,260 / 2,161 = 73.5\%$

*x*

5.2. Table 5 shows that there is a tremendous concentration of urban violence in Belfast and Derry and that there is a variation among other towns ranging from 28 incidents in Lurgan to none in as many as four towns. It is notable that there is a large gap between the 8 towns which have suffered the most violence and the remaining 19. In the earlier period of violence from 1969-74 Strabane actually experienced the highest level of violence and in the later period from 1975-81 Portadown moved from eighth place to fourth. If recent fatal incidents up to 1983 are included Armagh experienced the highest level of violence overall.

*x*

*Why not  
"20th  
cent  
1066*



Table 5: Fatal Incidents (1969-1981) and fatal incidents per 1,000 people in towns with over 5,000 people in 1971

Town	Fatal incidents	Fatal incidents per 1,000 people	Town	Fatal incidents	Fatal incidents per 1,000 people
Derry	127	1.91	Larne	3	0.16
Belfast	980	1.77	Cookstown	1	0.14
Armagh	21	1.54	Bangor	5	0.14
Strabane	14	1.49	Ballymena	3	0.13
Portadown	25	1.13	Lisburn	4	0.13
Dungannon	9	1.10	Banbridge	1	0.13
Lurgan	28	1.00	Coleraine	2	0.12
Newry	20	0.99	Antrim	1	0.07
Limavady	2	0.33	Newtownards	1	0.06
Carrickfergus	5	0.30	Ballyclare	-	-
Omagh	4	0.27	Downpatrick	-	-
Enniskillen	2	0.21	Portrush	-	-
Comber	1	0.18	Portstewart	-	-
Ballymoney	1	0.18			

5.3 Table 21 in Appendix I complements Table 5 by illustrating the recent industrial and commercial sector damage in 4 of the 8 towns with high-level violence. (A comprehensive picture of compensation paid for damage to property is given in Table 8). It can be noted that areas such as Derry, Strabane and Newry, already suffering from regional disadvantages, have been further set back by the campaign of bombing and destruction. Since 1978/79 alone the amounts paid for damage to these four cities and towns comes to IRE92 million in current prices.

5.4 In addition Table 22 in Appendix I shows the pattern of killings in the North from 1980 to 1982 in four areas: Belfast and adjacent towns, rural towns, and non-border areas, border towns and rural border areas. It can be seen from this table that the number of killings in rural towns/villages and in border towns has increased recently.

*Drafting changes*



6. Direct Cost of Security Operations in the North and South

6.1 The violence in the North has resulted in a major extra financial burden to the Irish and British economies. For the South it is estimated by the relevant <sup>Government</sup> Departments that the extra security costs <sup>arising from</sup> to cope with the violence amounted in current prices to IRE724 million between 1969 and 1982 or IRE1,050 million in 1982 prices. These extra costs were incurred by the Defence Forces, the Gardai and the Prison Services. Table 6 illustrates the additional expenditure in current prices since the violence began in 1969. It will be noted, for example, that the extra costs in 1982 were IRE125 million or 26% of the total security budget costs in the South.

Table 6  
Security Costs in the South

	Total expenditure on security in South*	Extra security costs due to violence	Extra costs as percentage of total expenditure	Extra costs per head of population in the South
	IREm	IREm	%	IRE/head
1969/70	31	2	6.5	1
1970/71	39	3	7.7	1
1971/72	46	7	15.2	2
1972/73	63	11	17.4	4
1973/74	76	15	19.7	5
1974 (9 months)	70	15	21.4	5
1975	131	33	25.2	10
1976	149	40	26.8	12
1977	168	47	28.0	14
1978	195	55	28.2	17
1979	241	60	24.9	18
1980	325	79	24.3	24
1981	424	98	23.1	29
1982	488	125	25.6	36
1983	506	134	26.5	38

\*Figures from 1969 to 1981 are from the Appropriation Accounts. The estimated outturn for 1982 and expenditure plans for 1983 are taken from the Book of Estimates for 1983.

*to describe, if time allows.*



6.2 In the North there are no separate figures available for the extra expenditure on law enforcement and the courts arising from the violence but on the basis of an officially estimated IRE308 million (Stg.£250m) for extra law enforcement costs in 1982-83, which amounted to about 68 per cent of total expenditure under this item, and using this proportion for previous years, one might infer, as an order of magnitude, that additional expenditure of some IRE2,808 million (Stg.£2,644m) in 1982 prices may have been incurred. In addition, the extra costs of maintaining the British army in the North may in 1982 prices have amounted to some IRE1,634 million (Stg.£1,541m).

1,650

Add them here to give & of with Table 20.

Table 7: Security Costs in the North (current prices)

	Expenditure on law, order and protective services and NI courts. A separate breakdown of the extra costs of violence not available		Extra costs of British Army in Northern Ireland arising from violence	
	Stg.£m.	IREm.	Stg.£m.	IREm.
1969/70	15	15	2	2
1970/71	21	21	6	6
1971/72	29	29	14	14
1972/73	60	60	29	29
1973/74	73	73	33	33
1974/75	109	109	45	45
1975/76	150	150	60	60
1976/77	168	168	65	65
1977/78	178	178	69	69
1978/79	206	206	81	81
1979/80	250	259	96	100
1980/81	312	352	111	125
1981/82	344	430	149*	185
1982/83	369 (£250m extra costs)	454	<del>134</del> 143	<del>165</del> 176

\*new basis for calculation introduced in 1981/82



6.3 It should be noted that although the absolute security cost to the British Government of the violence in 1982/83 is estimated as three and a half times that of the Irish Government in 1982 the proportionate expenditure on a per capita basis was equivalent to IRE9 in the UK compared to IRE36 in the South.

7. *x* <sup>*criminal*</sup> Compensation for *criminal* injuries to persons (including deaths)  
and damage to property in the North and South

7.1 Very considerable payments have been paid in the North and the South as official compensation for <sup>*criminal*</sup> injuries to persons or for <sup>*criminal*</sup> damage to property. Up to the end of March 1982, over IRE86 <sup>*23*</sup> million (Stg.£70m) was paid in compensation for <sup>*criminal*</sup> injuries (including deaths) to persons in the North. The Northern authorities do not provide separate statistics for compensation arising out of the violence alone but the dramatic increase in payments in the early 1970's strongly suggests that most of the payments made related to the violence of that period, & later period.

*drafting change*

*x* 7.2 Table 8 ~~also~~ gives an annual breakdown of payments in the North for <sup>*criminal*</sup> injuries to persons and for <sup>*criminal*</sup> damage to property since 1968. The total comes to Stg.£498 million or, in present-day values, IRE1,040 million (Stg.1008m) in 1982 prices. The figures for criminal damage to property are conservative as they do not include the cost of damage to Government owned property in the North which has been considerable.



7.4

It was decided by the Government in the South in 1974 that the cost to local authorities of damage to property that could be attributed to the violence in the North could be recouped from the Exchequer. In addition, where malicious damage claims put a burden on the rates of more than 20p in the £ the Exchequer would pay the excess. If one includes the amounts paid by the local authorities up to 1974 and the Exchequer payments under the heading of Northern violence from 1975 the total amount comes to over IRE10 million or about IRE13 million in 1982 prices. Table 10 gives an annual breakdown since 1967.

Table 10 : Compensation paid by the South for damage to property

	Exchequer payments attributed to disturbances in the North	Exchequer payments not attributed to disturbances in the North	Local authority payments <del>include up to 1974</del> payments attributed to disturbances in the North
	IRE (million)	IRE (million)	IRE (million)
1967/68			0.2
1968/69			0.1
1969/70			0.1
1970/71			0.3
1971/72			0.6
1972/73			0.6
1973/74			0.7
1974 (9 months)			1.3
1975	1.3	0.3	
1976	1.2	1.2	
1977	1.0	0.1	
1978	0.6	0.1	
1979	0.3	0.5	
1980	0.6	2.6	
1981	0.4	4.1	
1982	0.7	4.9	

7.5

An additional security cost in the North not included in Table 7 is the official grant given to hotels and other commercial undertakings towards the cost of maintaining security staff. These costs are given below in Table 11. (This premium has since 1982 been added to the NIO vote).

Table 11: The Security Staff Premium Scheme in the North

	stg.£m	IREm
1975/76	3.15	3.15
1976/77	3.97	3.97
1977/78	4.63	4.63
1978/79	5.40	5.40
1979/80	5.36	5.55
1980/81	6.83	7.7
1981/82	2.63	3.29


The total comes to IRE34 million or in 1982 prices IRE54 million.



8. The Growing Costs of Prisons, North and South

- 8.1 The violence in the North has resulted in a much greater number of people, especially young males, serving prison sentences than would be the case in normal conditions. The prison population in the North has risen from 686 in 1967, held in ~~Crumlin Road and Armagh jails~~, to about 2,500 to-day - 500 less than at its peak. This represents the highest prison population, per 100,000 population, in Western Europe. Graph sets out the comparison with other countries showing the North with 164 prisoners per 100,000 of the population and the South with 35.

Graph 1 : Prisoners per 100,000 of total population



- 8.2 In the North there are no separate figures for prisoners who in the South would be classified as "subversive prisoners" but a large proportion of the 75 per cent of prisoners classified as 'high risk' were convicted of crimes connected with terrorism. In 1981, 567 or 24 per cent of 2,387 persons committed under sentence had been convicted of offences connected with terrorism, including murder and other crimes of violence against the person, explosives and firearms offences and robbery. There are 423 prisoners serving life sentences, including 66 who were under age, when sentenced, and are held at the Secretary of State's pleasure. Of this total the Maze H-Blocks contain 230, the <sup>Maze</sup> compounds 160, Crumlin Road 30 and Armagh 3. Table 12 gives the numbers in prison from 1970 to 1981. Given that over 24,000 persons have been committed under sentence between 1970 and 1981 and, applying the 1981 estimate that 24 per cent of all those convicted were connected with terrorism offences, there could have been over 6,000 persons in prison in the North as a result of the violence. If one also includes those persons who were interned and those given mandatory sentences for rioting (who would not be included in the percentage for terrorism) this figure could be as high as 10,000.



Table 12: Numbers in Prison, Borstal, and Young Offenders' Centres at 31 December in each year


	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981
In Prison:												
Men	766	806	1092	1593	2005	2501	2374	2656	2593	2295	2168	2187
Women	18	13	25	56	82	87	67	84	78	66	55	50
In Borstal:												
Boys	124	112	91	89	89	116	140	138	140	148	-	-
Girls	2	5	4	1	2	2	-	-	-	-	-	-
In YOCs:												
Males	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	135	210	207
Females	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10	1	-

8.3 In the Maze prison Catholics outnumber Protestants in the H-Block by 530 to 300. 730 of these prisoners are serving sentences of four years or more. In Magilligan prison out of a total of 380 prisoners, 210 are Catholic and 170 Protestant. In Crumlin Road there are 230 convicted and 370 prisoners on remand, including 220 Catholics and 150 Protestants. In Armagh there are 50 women prisoners and in the Young Offenders Centre, Hydebank, there are 271 prisoners, 259 of them convicted and 12 on remand.

*Ground on the ground in the remand etc. religion*

8.4 Graph 2 illustrates the fluctuation in the average daily population in prisons in the North from 1971 to 1981. This Graph does not include those persons interned from 1971 to 1975.

Graph 2: Average Daily Prison Population in Custody 1971-81



*checked*



8.5 The current cost in 1983 of running the prisons in the North comes to IRE69.8 million (stg. 55.8 million). With an average prison population of 2,500 that works out at approximately IRE27,500 (stg. £22,000) <sup>per head</sup> which is higher than the cost per <sup>head</sup> inmate in Britain. This expenditure covers running costs <sup>but</sup> and not the investment in capital costs for new prisons such as Maghaberry. This jail, on which work began in 1978, will have 447 cells for male and 56 cells for female prisoners. It will cost an estimated IRE37.5 million (stg. £30 million) in 1982 prices. (These capital and running costs are already included in the total cost of law and order in Table 6).

7

8.6 The total number of persons employed in the prison staff in the North as of June 1983 was 2,983. The bulk of this total, 2,009, are male and female staff at basic grade.

8.7 In the South it is difficult to cost exactly the extra expenditure that has been necessary in the prison service because of terrorist-related crime but the extra costs in terms of capital expenditure and staffing set out below give an overall indication of the increased expenditure. (These figures are included in the total cost of security in Table 6). In May 1972 there was a serious riot in Mountjoy prison involving subversive prisoners and the cost of reconstruction came to IRE650,000 in 1982 prices. In 1973 most subversive prisoners were transferred to Portlaoise prison and, therefore, most of the cost of operating Portlaoise since 1973 and Limerick prison since 1981 (when it was <sup>converted</sup> into a prison for male subversive prisoners) is attributable to terrorist-related crime. Table 13 shows the capital expenditure on these two prisons during these periods. The total cost to date in 1982 prices comes to IRE1.3 million which is included in the figures for total security expenditure given in Table 6.



Table 13: Capital Expenditure at Portlaoise Prison from 1972 to 1982 and also at Limerick Prison in 1982

Year	Approximate Expenditure
	£ '000
1972/73	15,000
1973/74	25,000
1974(9 months)	55,000
1975	42,000
1976	54,000
1977	43,000
1978	13,000
1979	53,000
1980	116,000
1981	17,000
1982	331,000

Note: The Table covers all the capital expenditure related to prison security needs e.g. accommodation for army and garda contingents, special lighting, defensive barriers, etc.

It does not include such items as the upgrading of ablutionary or catering facilities or reconstruction work that would arise in normal course.

8.8 The number of prison officers in the South has increased very much in recent years, from 149 in 1974 to 1,576 in 1983. No doubt if there had been no subversive crime the number would not have increased so much or so rapidly. Table 14.16 shows the number of prison officers and their approximate staff costs concerned with subversive prisoners since 1974. The extra staffing cost comes to IRE34 million in 1982 prices.

Table 14: This table gives the number of prison officers in Portlaoise prison, and their annual cost from the time the subversive prisoners were moved to Portlaoise at the end of 1973 up to 1981. For 1982 the number of officers in Limerick Prison and their cost is added to the Portlaoise figures.

Year		Approximate Cost	
		IRE	(million)
1974	149	0.5	
1975	166	0.7	
1976	172	0.9	
1977	217	1.1	
1978	267	1.5	
1979	269	2.2	
1980	366	4.6	
1981	356	5.0	
1982	519	7.5	

Note: It is not possible to give the cost of prison officers dealing with subversive prisoners prior to 1974 as up to that the same prison officers were dealing with subversive and ordinary prisoners.



8.9 The approximate annual costs of maintaining a subversive prisoner in Portlaoise prison from 1974 and in Portlaoise and Limerick prisons for 1982 are included in Table 15. Staff and prisoner maintenance costs are included but capital costs are not. If the additional cost of Garda security is included in 1982 the per capita cost of an inmate in that year comes to IRE61,400. X

Table 15: The approximate annual cost of maintaining a subversive prisoner in Portlaoise Prison from 1974 on and in Portlaoise and Limerick Prisons for 1982. Staff and Prisoner maintenance costs are included. Capital costs are not included.

<u>Year</u>	<u>Approximate annual cost</u>
	X IR £
1974	5,370
1975	9,280
1976	9,385
1977	10,950
1978	12,775
1979	18,355
1980	35,975
1981	42,805
1982	48,700

Note: The main reasons for the big jump in costs from 1979 to 1980 were the considerable increase in the number of prison officers and a big increase in pay.

The above costs do not include the Garda or Army costs involved in providing security at Portlaoise and Limerick Prison.

X The Garda cost in 1982, the only year for which figures were readily available to the Garda Commissioner, was £2.473m, which, added to the prison costs, would increase the per capita cost in that year to £61,400.

8.10 X Table 16, 17 and 18 give a breakdown of the age groups of subversive prisoners in 1982, of all prisoners since 1973 and of the length of sentences for subversive prisoners in 1982. The number of subversive prisoners in 1982 was 238 which means they represent nearly 20 per cent of the total of 1,200 prisoners in the South.



Table 16: Breakdown of subversive prisoners into following age groups in 1982

	Less than 18 years	18 years but less than 25 years	25 years but less than 30 years	30 years but less than 40 years	over 40 years
<u>Portlaoise</u> (199)	1	38	81	60	19
<u>Limerick</u> (31 Male) (2 Female)	-	4 males	14 males 1 female	12 males 1 female	1

Table 17: Committals to all prisons by age since 1973

Age Groups	1973	1974	1975	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	1982
15 to 17 years	24	33	13	26	29	25	25	25	10	12
17 to 21 years	625	486	499	591	458	451	427	523	498	513
21 to 25 years	641	603	583	633	551	557	553	564	560	751
25 to 30 years	401	439	451	488	419	457	386	435	415	549
30 to 40 years	404	473	422	425	370	416	354	461	419	476
40 to 50 years	232	203	236	216	161	189	186	226	149	183
50 to 60 years	114	102	102	69	66	85	65	62	38	44
60 to 70 years	30	14	24	29	31	26	23	19	26	25
70 and over	1	4	-	-	3	1	6	5	5	4
Total	2472	2357	2330	2480	2088	2207	2025	2320	2120	2557

Table 18: Percentage breakdown of subversive prisoners serving sentences of following lengths in 1982

	Less than 1 year	1 year but less than 5 years	5 years but less than 10 years	10 years but less than 20 years	over 20 years
<u>Portlaoise</u>	1%	14%	48%	28%	9%
<u>Limerick</u>	-	9%	43%	36%	12%

Note on Table 16, 17 and 18

The breakdown of committals for all prisoners is only readily available in the age groupings given in Table 17 as this is the way they are compiled for the annual report.



9. General Economic Impact of the Violence

Decline in Output

9.1 Although it is certain that violence has damaged the North's economic performance, it is difficult to quantify precisely the exact extent to which the violence, as distinct from the following factors, is responsible. First, there has been the reduced level of economic activity in the UK generally, the effects of the recession since the 1973 oil crisis and the particular structural adjustments faced by industry in the North because of its traditional dependence on shipbuilding and textiles. In addition, the decline in the North's industrial output and higher unit wage costs, created a growing loss of competitiveness in the Northern economy relative to the UK and to the South.

9.2 ~~To what extent is loss of output attributable to these factors and to what extent is it attributable to the violence?~~ An examination of the variation in performance of the North's economy in relation to that of Britain and some of its regions helps to distinguish between the influence of violence and other negative factors on the decline in output. Since 1950 the general trend of economic performance in the North followed the trend in Britain closely. *But whereas in* the 10 years prior to when the violence began in 19, real GDP growth in the North averaged one third above that in Britain. *However,* between 1969 and 1982, despite substantial growth in transfers from Britain, real GDP growth in the North *was* less than in Britain. This decline in growth cannot be simply explained by the poorer performance of peripheral regions in a recession because the North's performance was also worse than that of other *peripheral* regions of the United Kingdom. Comparing nominal GDP in the different regions over the period 1971-81, (in the absence of figures for real GDP) the North grew on average 14.7 per cent per year compared to 15.1 per cent for the UK (excluding the Continental Shelf), 15.1 per cent for England, 15.2 for Wales and 15.5 for Scotland. This relatively poorer performance by the North in the post-1970 period occurred in spite of increasing public expenditure in the North compared to the other UK regions.



9.4 If one assumes that but for indigenous adverse factors the North's GDP growth would have continued in the same relationship to British GDP growth during 1970-82 as it did in the 1960's one would thus determine an approximate average loss of real GDP growth of 1.3 per cent per annum since the violence began. This would represent a net loss to the North's economy for it already reflects benefits to the North's GDP of increased British expenditure on extra security costs and on more extensive public services. Had such expenditure not occurred the gross loss of output would have been even greater. However, while some of this loss in output can be attributed to a number of factors other than violence, it is a reasonable conclusion that violence was the dominant factor in the North's poorer performance in comparison to UK regions such as Scotland and Wales. If one assumes that 75 per cent of the North's relative lost output compared to that of Britain from 1970 to 1983 can be attributed to the violence the cumulative cost of violence over the 14 year period would amount to IRE3,500 million (stg.£3,100m) in 1982 prices.

## 10. Lost Jobs and Investment

10.1 ~~There seems little doubt that~~ Violence has severely affected employment opportunities in the North; one [widely quoted] estimate puts the gross loss of jobs at 39,000 over the decade 1970-80. (R. Rowthorn in Cambridge Journal of Economics No.5, 1981). Professor Norman Gibson of the New University of Ulster has suggested that the cost in 1982 alone of this might be approximately IRE435 million (stg.£350m). However, this cost and that for previous years can be taken as reflected in the cumulative cost of lost output above.

10.2 In 1982 the British Government estimated that the extra costs on security within the North (not including extra British army costs) were IRE454 million (stg.£250m). This figure is consistent with the growth since 1969 of 12,000 new jobs directly attributed to the extra security costs. Looked at exclusively in a Northern context some commentators may be inclined to include this job creation as a benefit. However, it is a resource cost to the UK economy and even for the North itself <sup>it</sup> and represents the diversion of resources to meeting "needs" that people would not voluntarily desire. In addition, one must also consider the long-term implications to the North's economy of distortions of costs and price structures due to the high level of resources devoted to this public sector and the resultant unfavourable economic climate for private sector investment.

an expanded security establishment  
and indeed to expansion of  
the public sector generally  
which is a result of violence



10.3 Investment levels and job creation in the North have been at a very low level in recent years. It is clear that violence and its <sup>adverse</sup> ~~negative~~ impact on the North's image with potential investors are a principal cause of <sup>the</sup> ~~this~~ decline. In March, <sup>as was pointed out with results year</sup> 1983 the Northern Ireland <sup>Industrial</sup> Development Board revealed that 60 per cent of British, German and American businessmen questioned by market research consultants for the <sup>Board</sup> ~~NIDB~~ said <sup>that</sup> they considered the risks of investing in the North too great. The study, based on interviews with 460 leading businessmen, found that respondents put political stability, government attitudes on nationalisation and market size as the three most important factors in plant location decisions. The North was placed 19th on a list of 20 western European countries assessed as to their attractiveness as locations for <sup>industrial plants</sup> ~~[investment.]~~

10.4 In the South, there has not been the same problem with potential investors. Queries about the violence sometimes arise at an early stage in discussions with company executives who are not familiar with the <sup>complex situation</sup> ~~different levels of violence~~, North and South but the <sup>Industrial Development Authority (IDA)</sup> ~~IDA~~ have invariably been able to satisfy them that there is no ground for concern in this regard. This was reflected in the continuing success of the IDA throughout the 1970's in attracting overseas investment to the South. For example, from 1960<sup>to</sup> 1969 the figure for overseas investment by the IDA was IRE131 million (in current prices) and from 1970<sup>to</sup> 1979 it was IRE1,823 million. Since 1979, however, both parts of Ireland as well as the UK have been hit sharply by international recessionary conditions. The relative deterioration in economic performance both North and South was considerable over the 1979-83 period but in the North a substantial decline was recorded.

## 11. Damage to Tourist Industry

11.1 This section of the paper <sup>is based largely on</sup> ~~owes a great deal to~~ the analysis in the Co-operation North research paper "Tourism in the Republic of Ireland and Northern Ireland" (W. Clark and B. O Cinneide, Belfast and Dublin, September, 1981) and to advice received from the staff of Bord Failte Eireann.

11.2 The world-wide adverse publicity arising from the continuing violence and loss of life in Northern Ireland since 1969 has proved extremely damaging to the tourist industry in both North and South. The scenes of violence on television screens in Britain, Continental Europe and <sup>the United States and North America</sup> ~~the U.S.~~ and reports of the toll of deaths and injuries in the North suggested general unrest and danger to personal safety and, since Ireland was generally perceived by the rest of the world as a single holiday



- whether because of where they ~~set out~~ happened, then horrendous nature or the number ~~and~~ or eminence of the victims -

the images of both North and South were damaged destination, there was a negative impact on both parts of the country. Efforts to produce a more balanced image and to reassure potential holiday-makers about the geographical limits of the violence have <sup>had</sup> enjoyed some success, especially in relation to the South. However, the continuing media coverage of violence and instability, especially the intensive coverage of particularly significant atrocities and the simplistic generalisations that often accompany <sup>such coverage.</sup> it <sup>been</sup> have offset by these such efforts, to a greater or lesser degree at different times. Consequently, even though the level of violence has declined substantially, the residual effect is that the earlier impressions of a violent land remain a significant deterrent to many of those abroad who might consider holidaying in Ireland.

11.3 These perceptions have been particularly adverse in their effects on the tourist industry in the North. <sup>X</sup> These effects are graphically summed up in a comment in the Annual Report of the Northern Ireland Tourist Board (N.I.B.T.) for 1977: "In 1974 Northern Ireland holidays could not be sold through any tour operator or travel agent anywhere in the world". The result was that ten years of continuous and fairly rapid growth up to 1968 were succeeded by a rapid decline. By 1972, compared with the record levels of 1968, tourism revenue in real terms in the North had decreased by 60 per cent and visitor numbers by 63 per cent. Holidaymakers with no family or other personal ties with the North accounted for more than a third of the total number of visitors entering the area from or via Britain in 1967 but this declined to less than 10 per cent of a much smaller total number of visitors in 1972 and to less than 5 per cent by 1976. The years after 1972 saw some fluctuations in results but by 1979 tourist revenue in real terms was only 57 per cent of its 1968 level and the total number of visitors was no more than two-thirds of the number of visitors in 1968.

11.4 In line with the decrease in visitor numbers the number of establishments offering accommodation to visitors was 39 per cent less in 1979 than in 1970; the total number of bedrooms available was down 34 per cent over the same period. The number of permanent staff employed in catering establishments registered with the N.I.T.B. decreased from 13,300 in 1970 to 8,300 in 1978.



- 11.5 More recently, the slight recovery which began in 1978 and 1979 appears to have resumed, as a result of a promotional campaign directed at activity holidays such as angling and cruising.
- 11.6 Nevertheless, the losses incurred over the intervening years have been considerable. Any attempt to quantify the cost of violence to the industry can only be approximate. This is because of the difficulty, firstly in gauging how the industry would have fared in peaceful conditions and secondly, in isolating the impact of violence from other factors which emerged in the 1970's such as the consequences of the 1973 and 1979 oil crises and the subsequent world recessions, inflationary pressures and increased competition from relatively inexpensive package tours to countries such as Spain.
- 11.7 In regard to the first of these difficulties both the study by Clark and O Cinneide and comments by Bord Fáilte Éireann suggest that the rapid growth in revenue in the 1960's could not have been maintained into the 1970's. It has been pointed out that in <sup>Britain</sup> ~~the UK~~ <sup>also</sup> at large there was a decline in domestic tourism over the period 1969-82 as holidays based on "cold water resorts" lost their appeal against the competition of "sunshine destinations", and that the North had a rather heavy dependence on resort-based holidays. On the other hand, it appears likely that in more favourable conditions of peace, the North would have been more vigorous in developing and diversifying its tourism <sup>products</sup> ~~products~~ <sup>attractions</sup>.
- 11.8 Clark and O Cinneide took the view that it was unlikely that substantial further increases in the level of traffic could have been achieved in subsequent years. They considered it reasonable, however, to surmise that if the subsequent period had been free of violence, it would have been possible to earn each year the same real level of revenue as achieved in 1968. On this basis, Clark and O Cinneide estimated that the violence resulted in a shortfall of stg.£280 million at current prices - equivalent to stg.£630 million in 1982 money values. Allowing for losses in the last three years - and it is clear from the data that the hunger strike crisis had a considerable adverse effect - the total for the period 1970-82 calculated by this method would be stg.£900 million or IR£950 million in 1982 money values. It has been suggested by Bord Fáilte that a more satisfactory way to estimate the losses would be to assume that, in the absence of violence, tourism revenue in the North would have followed more closely the trend of spending by British people on long holidays in Britain itself. If one assumes that in peaceful conditions the performance in the North would have been the same as that of British domestic tourism, the loss of revenue would amount to stg.£1,230 million or IR£1,350 million at 1982 values. It may be appropriate, therefore, to take an average of the two estimates as a reasonable measure of the



loss of tourism revenue to the North as a result of violence: on this basis the loss would amount to IR£1,150 million in 1982 money values (stg.£1,065m).

- 11.9 In the South the continuous growth averaging 6.5 per cent per annum for export tourism revenue over the period 1960-68 was halted in 1969 and followed by a continued decline in real terms up to 1976. Indeed, if one focusses on visitors staying more than one day and excludes fares paid to Irish air and shipping companies, it was only in 1978 that receipts in real terms regained their 1969 value.
- 11.10 Clark and O Cinneide concluded that for the period 1970-78, the image of violence was the main contributory factor to the losses experienced. They noted that the performance of the Irish industry was poor in this period, as compared with the growth experienced in Britain, the South's closest competitor, or even <sup>as hemisphere with</sup> the less rapid growth in tourism receipts in the OECD European countries, considered as a group. They suggested that deteriorating competitiveness was scarcely the dominant explanation in that period, as both general consumer price movements and increases in the cost of hotel accommodation in the South were closely in step with corresponding changes in the UK. They consider <sup>ed</sup> that other environmental factors, such as economic recession and international political uncertainties, would affect all European tourism destinations more or less equally during the period in question. The authors of the study therefore concluded that the violence in the North must have been a major contributory factor to tourism losses in the period 1970-78.
- 11.11 Clark and O Cinneide made an initial estimate of the losses from 1970-78 by comparing actual receipts in real terms with the receipts that might have been earned on the basis of extrapolating through the 1970's the trends experienced in the period 1960-69. The loss calculated in this way amounted to IR£530 million in current prices, equivalent to IR£1,480 million in 1982 money values. On the basis of a second approach taking as a yardstick the growth of real tourism revenue in OECD European countries <sup>in</sup> 1970-78 they calculated that their first estimate was, if anything, an understatement of the total loss. If one applies the methodology of Clark and O Cinneide, the further losses in the period 1979-82 amounted to IR£850 million giving a total loss over the period 1970-82 of IR£2,330 million in 1982 prices.
- 11.12 Bord Failte consider that lack of cost competitiveness may have been a significant contributory factor to the decline that has occurred in the real value of tourism since 1979. Inflation in the South <sup>has</sup> considerably <sup>greater than</sup> outstripped that in Britain, <sup>North</sup> the <sup>America</sup> US and the major market countries on the Continent. <sup>While</sup> For some markets, the



*Check*  
divergence was entirely or largely offset by the effects of exchange rate movements: in other markets, currency changes fell short of compensating for the South's higher inflation and Bord Failte surveys of Continental tourists have revealed a marked consumer resistance on price grounds. In addition, the prices of major items in the tourists' spending basket increased considerably more than the general rate of inflation in the South. On the other hand, during this period, there were a number of major atrocities and other events<sup>x</sup> that had very adverse consequences on tourism, especially from Britain and the North.

*What about?*  
11.13 Table 19 provides alternative estimates made by Bord Failte Eireann of losses of potential tourist revenue throughout the period 1969-83 by market. The basis used by Bord Failte was as follows: they assumed that in the absence of adverse factors, revenue from the British market would have followed the trend of spending by British people holidaying in their own country. In the case of visitors to the South from the North the loss of tourism revenue was calculated by comparing actual revenue with revenue that would have been realized if the 1968 level of visits from the North had been maintained. For all other markets the actual revenue was compared with the revenue that would have resulted if the volume of tourist revenue had grown in line with the volume of foreign tourist earnings to Britain over the period 1968-83.

Table 19:

Market	Losses IR£million, 1982 prices
Britain	1,020
The North	194
North America	188
<sup>x</sup> Continent of Europe	93
Other Areas	15
Total	1,510

*Irish Government*  
As indicated previously in relation to the North any attempt to segregate the proportion of tourism losses that is attributable to violence is fraught with difficulty. High travel costs to Ireland may be a significant factor and there was some loss of competitiveness even in tourists' own currencies for the particular basket of goods and services purchased by visitors, especially since 1978. Nevertheless, on the best possible assessment, it appears reasonable to conclude that the greater part of the losses was caused by the violence in the North. The difference between the Bord Failte estimate and <sup>(not 1,510)</sup> the estimate based on the work of Clark and O Cinneide is significant but is based on different assumptions about projected growth in tourism. Even if one takes the lower estimate and if one assumes that 75 per cent of revenue was lost because of

*helly*



violence this would amount to IRE1,130 million. This figure does not include the losses in bomb damage to hotels which are dealt with under compensation payments. Nor is there any evidence from official figures that the decline in cross-border tourism in this period resulted in compensatory increases in "home holidays" in either part of the country.

- 11.14 Combining this figure with that for the North gives an estimated total loss to tourism in the island of IRE2,280 million (stg.£2135m) in 1982 money values.

12. Increase in Electricity Prices

- 12.1 Because of the small and isolated nature of both electricity systems in the North and South of Ireland generating costs are substantially higher than in other European countries. It is accepted that the linking of both electricity systems should confer economic benefits in terms of:-

- (1) capital savings because co-ordinated planning could ensure that surplus reserve generating capacity needs would be lower;
- (2) saving in operating costs because of lower "spinning reserve" requirements (power stations on standby);
- (3) economies resulting from energy trading to mutual advantage.

- 12.2 An inter-connector between both systems was commissioned in 1970. During the 13 years of its existence it has only been operational for 24 per cent of the time owing to bomb damage on six occasions and has not been in service at all since 1975. Intimidation of repair teams has frustrated efforts to restore the inter-connector in South Armagh. Since 1975 it is estimated by the Electricity Supply Board that the benefits lost by not having the inter-connector available amounted to IRE24 million each for the North and for the South. These savings relate to operating costs and trading losses rather than to capital savings. Joint planning and capital programming by both electricity services began in the late 1960's in anticipation of inter-connection and continued up to the mid-1970's. With the loss of interconnection from 1975 onwards both utilities had little choice but to plan on a separate systems basis. Had continued integrated planning been possible up to the present time it is estimated that capital savings of the order of IRE180 million for the North and IRE20 million for the South could have been achieved.



13 Conclusion

- 13.1 The atrocious violence in the North has created staggering costs in human and economic terms since 1969. Nearly every family in the North has been touched either by personal grief or injury. There are many thousands who have lost spouses, parents, <sup>and</sup> children. Amongst the 24,000 injured are many thousands who continue to suffer pain and disadvantage from severed limbs or permanent disability. Thousands more have to endure psychological stress and damage because of the fear and <sup>trauma</sup> intimidation created by murder, bombing and intimidation. While the South and Britain have not suffered in any comparable way they have been affected by the spillover of violence, especially in terms of extra security and judicial measures. *The lives of many of them and have been blighted*
- 13.2 In addition to the appalling human costs, the violence has contributed significantly to the loss of jobs and opportunities for the people of the North. The major expenditure on security measures ~~that is~~ totalled in Table 20 below represents a serious opportunity loss because it diverts scarce public funds away from productive enterprises. There are additional costs to the British exchequer which are not included because of the difficulty in quantifying them. These include the cost to the health services of caring for those who have been physically or mentally injured by the violence and the cost to the social services of providing for the dependents of those killed or maimed. There are also the costs of reduced revenue because of the decline in GDP growth and the extra cost in terms of unemployment benefits because of the violence's negative impact on job-creating investment. *and employment generally.*
- 13.3 Table 20 provides a summary of the <sup>economic</sup> costs of the violence since 1969 in 1982 prices. It includes the direct costs to the British and Irish exchequers as well as the estimated cost to the economies in the North and the South. The figure given for the cost of the cumulative loss in output in the North over the past 14 years has been calculated on the basis set out in paragraph 9.4 above. The total direct cost of the violence to the exchequers comes to IRE1,065 million in the South and IRE5,535 million in the North. In addition it is estimated that the cost to the economies was IRE1,175 million in the South and IRE3,705 million in the North.

*Give total*

*Also refer to but not in the*

*+ break a down into*

*legitimate to add*



Table 20: Summary of Costs of the Violence since 1969 in 1982 Prices

A.	<u>North</u>	<u>IR£ million</u>	<u>Stg.£ million</u>
	British Exchequer Costs:		
	1. Extra Security Costs	4,440 <sup>55</sup>	4,185 <sup>75</sup>
	2. Compensation for deaths, injuries and damage to property	1,040	1,010
	3. Premium scheme for security staff	55	50
	Estimated costs to the North's Economy:		
	1. Cumulative lost output over 14 years*	3,500	3,070
	2. Damage to tourism (IR£1150m or stg£1065m) included in above figure		
	3. Capital and trading costs due to destruction of electricity inter-connector	205	190
	Sub-total	9,230	8,505
	* See basis for calculation in par 9.4.		
B.	<u>South</u>		
	Exchequer Costs:		
	1. Extra Security Costs	1,050	990
	2. Compensation for deaths, injuries and damage to property	15 <sup>30</sup>	14 <sup>29</sup>
	Estimated cost to the Economy:		
	1. Damage to tourism	1,130	1,070
	2. Capital and trading costs due to destruction of electricity inter-connector	45	40
	Sub-total	2,240	2,114
	Overall Total of North and South	11,480 <sup>50</sup>	10,619 <sup>45</sup>

Notes: 1. Loss of output was converted to 1982 prices using GDP deflators.

2. All other costs were converted to 1982 prices using Consumer Price Indices.



# Appendix I

## Additional detail for Table 1

Table 1: Annual classification of the loss of life arising from political violence in the North, 1969 to 30 June, 1983\*

CLASSIFICATION	YEAR															
	69	70	71	72	73	74	75	76	77	78	79	80	81	82	83	Total
Civilian	13	17	95	238	127	145	171	215	48	30	25	34	33	31	12	1234
Elected Representative/Political Activist			1	2	1		3	3	1			3	4	1		19
Former member of security force including prison service				2	2	4	3	3	6	1	6	5	5	7		44
Sub total	13	17	96	242	130	149	177	221	55	31	31	42	42	39	12	1297

Security	'69	'70	'71	'72	'73	'74	'75	'76	'77	'78	'79	'80	'81	'82	'83*	Total
British Army (including TA)			43	107	58	27	13	14	16	12	38	12	11	20	4	375
RUC and RUCR	1	2	11	17	12	16	11	23	13	8	12	9	20	12	9	176
UDR			5	25	9	8	7	15	14	8	10	8	13	8	2	132
Prison Officer								2	3	3	8	2		1		19
Sub total	1	2	59	149	79	51	31	54	46	31	68	31	44	41	15	702

Provisional IRA		5	15	57	28	14	9	14	5	5	5	3	11	7		178
Official IRA	1		2	8	4	3	7								1	26
INLA							1		1	2		1	5	2	1	13
UDA				8	6	2	7	4	4			1	3	2	1	38
UVF				2	2	2	11	1	2					2	1	23
Sub total	1	5	17	75	40	21	35	19	12	7	5	5	19	13	4	278

Unclassified		1	1	8	3		1	2	1	1	2		3	2	2	27
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Total	15	25	173	474	252	221	244	296	114	70	106	78	108	95	33	2304
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Additional Detail for Table 4

Agency	'69	'70	'71	'72	'73	'74	'75	'76	'77	'78	'79	'80	'81	'82	'83	Total
Non specific Rep Group	4	12	35	43	17	15	45	62	26	19	37	11	20	3	7	356
Provisional IRA		6	58	207	110	80	52	79	44	32	49	36	38	40	13	844
INLA							3	1		1	2	2	8	29	3	49
Official IRA			3	5	1	3	2						1			15
Non specific Loyalist Group	2	2	21	99	65	86	90	104	19	6	13	10	7	10	4	538
UDA (including UFF)				3	14	5	8	5	3		1	4	3		1	47
UVF				1	1	3	17	2	2				1	1		28
British Army	2	5	40	68	29	15	7	13	7	10	1	7	11	4	1	220
Ulster Defence Regiment				1	2								1		2	6
RUC/RUCR/USC	7		1	5	1	2		3	2			2	6	7	2	38
Non classified*			15	42	12	12	20	27	11	2	3	6	12	1		163
Total	15	25	173	474	252	221	244	296	114	70	106	78	108	95	33	2304

\*The non classified total embraces three distinct groups:

- (1) Those incidents where it is not possible to attribute responsibility.
- (2) Those incidents where there is no direct line of responsibility e.g. certain affrays or riot situations.
- (3) The deaths of the ten hunger strikers. However, accidentally self-inflicted deaths (e.g. premature explosions) have been attributed to the agency initiating the action.



Table 21: Industrial and Commercial Sector Damage in selected towns, 1978-83

Belfast:	<u>Year</u>	<u>No. of Awards</u>	<u>Stg.£m.</u>	<u>IR£m.</u>
	1978-79	659	7.8	7.8
	1979-80	454	8.9	9.3
	1980-81	338	11.5	13.0
	1981-82	273	5.4	6.8
	1982-83	407	9.1	11.2
	Interim*	<u>281</u>	<u>21.5</u>	<u>24.1</u>
		2412	64.3	72.2
Derry:	1978-79	89	0.8	0.80
	1979-80	148	1.7	1.78
	1980-81	148	1.7	1.97
	1981-82	219	1.7	2.17
	1982-83	253	1.7	2.10
	Interim	<u>99</u>	<u>3.5</u>	<u>3.87</u>
		956 (claims)	11.2	12.69
Newry:	1978-79	32	0.2	0.20
	1979-80	46	0.7	0.68
	1980-81	54	1.5	1.65
	1981-82	33	0.5	0.66
	1982-83	33	1.0	1.17
	Interim	<u>33</u>	<u>1.4</u>	<u>1.51</u>
		231	5.2	5.87
Strabane:	1978-79	11	0.1	0.10
	1979-80	14	0.1	0.13
	1980-81	5	0.1	0.11
	1981-82	14	0.5	0.60
	1982-83	78	0.2	0.26
	Interim	<u>10</u>	<u>0.1</u>	<u>0.13</u>
		137 (claims)	1.1	1.33

\*Payments made pending final adjudication of award.



Table 22: Pattern of killings in the North from 1980 to 1982

	1980		1981		1982	
	No.	%	No.	%	No.	%
(1) Belfast and adjacent towns (Belfast alone)	40 (35)	56 (49)	56 (46)	53 (43)	39 (30)	41 (32)
(2) Rural Towns/Villages and Country Areas - non-border	6	8.5	12	11	17	18
(3) Border Towns	6	8.5	22	21	18	19
(4) Rural Border Areas - Open Country and Small villages	19	27	16	15	21	22

Notes:

- (1) The category "Belfast and Adjacent Towns" includes the following: Lurgan, Lisburn, Portadown, Holywood, Carrickfergus, Craigavon.
- (2) The category "Rural Towns and Villages and County Areas - non-Border" includes all towns/villages and rural areas not included in Category (1) and which are a good distance from the border. Specifically it includes, Dungannon, Cookstown, Ballymoney, Coalisland, Ballymena, Magherafelt, Lisnaskea etc.
- (3) The category "Border Towns" includes Derry, Newry, Enniskillen, Strabane, Crossmaglen etc.
- (4) The category "Rural Border Areas - open country and small villages" includes for example, Castlereagh, Newtownbutler, Belleek, Middletown, Aughnacloy, Keady etc.



APPENDIX II

List of Sources for Tables and Graphs X

Tables 1,2,3 and 4 (plus details in Appendix I)	Mr. Michael McKeown
Table 5	Dr. Michael Poole
Table 6	Replies to Dail Questions and estimations <sup>e</sup> from Government Departments in the South. X
Table 7	Estimates for law enforcement and protective services are in current prices and are derived from UK Supply Estimates 1974-78 and Government Expenditure plans 1983 for years 1978-84. Estimates for <u>extra</u> costs of British army in the North are derived from Parliamentary answers.
Table 8	Ulster Year Book
Table 9	Department of Justice
Table 10	Department of the Environment
Table 11	Northern Ireland Office
Graph I	<u>Economist</u> magazine
Table 12	Northern Ireland Office Annual Report on Prison Service
Graph 2	Northern Ireland Office Annual Report on Prison Service
Table 13,14,15,16,17 and 18	Department of Justice
Table 19	Bord Failte
Table 20	Summary of previous tables
Table 21	NI Criminal Injury Compensation Claims Tribunal
Table 22	Department of Foreign Affairs