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23 Aibreán, 1975.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE GOVERNMENT

NORTHERN IRELAND

Relief of distress

Background

1. The Government decided on 18th July, 1974, that the Inter-Departmental Unit on Northern Ireland should undertake a number of further studies on the implications of negotiated independence, negotiated re-partition and other matters. These studies have been completed so far as possible and submissions will be made to the Government on them shortly.
2. The studies indicated that any population movement from Northern Ireland that might occur as a result of an adverse evolution of the political situation there could be substantial and accordingly that it was desirable to review existing plans for the reception of refugees, including arrangements for the treatment of casualties. Detailed analyses were undertaken by the Departments of Defence and Health. These formed the basis for a report on these matters by the Inter-Departmental Unit. By arrangement with the Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Taoiseach has incorporated this report, as Appendix 1, to this memorandum. The report reveals some problems requiring early decisions by the Government.
3. Arrangements for reception of refugees from Northern Ireland
The Unit recommend that advance purchases should be made, as discreetly as possible, of sufficient supplies and equipment to cater for up to 20,000 refugees, at an estimated cost of £240,000. An early decision is required on this recommendation because of possible delays in securing delivery of the supplies and equipment in question. It might well, for example, take up to six months to obtain from manufacturers full stocks of blankets necessary to cater for even this number of refugees. Obviously this sort of delay could not be contemplated in an emergency.

4. Speculation and publicity could arise from advance orders of stocks and equipment. However, this danger is outweighed in importance by the consideration that if a large influx of refugees from Northern Ireland were to occur and find us manifestly unprepared, the Government would be subjected to considerable criticism, at a time when maintenance of its authority and of support for its policies was of the highest importance, while the refugees could suffer great hardship. The money required might be made available from savings in the Defence Estimate for 1975. However, this is not certain and a Supplementary Estimate might be necessary. This could be introduced without indicating specifically the contingency for which the money was required.
5. The stocks purchased would not be wasted if an influx of refugees did not occur as they could be used eventually by the Army, local authorities and health boards. Orders for the quantity of blankets involved would represent a significant amount of business for the woollen mills which would help to mitigate current employment difficulties. The Taoiseach recommends that the Government decide as recommended by the Inter-Departmental Unit.
6. A related matter requiring an early decision is the extent of participation in detailed planning for the reception of refugees. The Department of Defence had pointed out that detailed planning for the reception of up to, say, 100,000 refugees (which could become necessary if the situation in the North deteriorated seriously) would require the involvement of many more people than have been engaged in planning undertaken to date. Nevertheless, having regard to the need to preserve confidentiality and to avoid
 - (1) public disquiet about possible developments in Northern Ireland, particularly now during the run up to and convening of the Constitutional Convention,
 - (2) misconceived interpretation of the preparations being made,

the Taoiseach suggests that the Department of Defence should continue to plan for the reception of up to 100,000 refugees but the numbers involved in the planning should be restricted.

7. Preparation of plans for treatment of casualties from Northern Ireland

The report by the Inter-Departmental Unit summarises outline plans for the treatment of casualties from Northern Ireland which have been made by the Department of Health on the basis of very restricted consultations. Before any detailed plans can be made ready, discussions with such key interests as representatives of hospitals, health boards, doctors and pharmacists would be necessary. The Department of Health estimate that to prepare a fully detailed contingency plan would take up to a month but that preparations which would ensure a reasonable service could be made within two weeks or less. In relation to this matter also, the Unit adverted to the conflicting requirements of preparedness and confidentiality and recommend that the Department of Health might consult, at their discretion, a strictly limited number of Chief Executive Officers of health boards (say, two or three) on the preparation, in strictest confidence, of model plans for their areas, to identify particularly the various tasks that would have to be undertaken, with particular reference to administrative aspects, in the event of a large influx of casualties. The Taoiseach recommends that the Government approve this suggestion. He would not favour wider consultation in relation to a matter so sensitive and susceptible of misinterpretation.

Views of other Departments

8. The Departments of Finance, Foreign Affairs, Defence, Justice and Health have been consulted. The Department of Justice had no observations. Amendments have been made in the Memorandum as a result of observations made by the Departments

of Finance, Foreign Affairs and Defence. The Department of Finance also point out that according to the Government decision of 20th March, 1975 it will be necessary for their Minister to give his prior written personal approval to any excess expenditure that may arise. The Department of Defence state that

- (1) it is considered impracticable to plan effectively for the reception of a very large number of refugees without involving County Managers, Chief Executives of health boards and others who would have key roles to play;
 - (2) little advantage is seen in a proposal to cater for 20,000 refugees if it is conceded that there is a possibility that up to 100,000 persons might seek sanctuary in the State. For this reason the Minister for Defence is concerned at the limitation on the extent of the preparations to be made. He would be in favour, instead, of asking for a Government direction whether blankets, mattresses and food for 100,000 or 50,000 or 20,000 refugees should be procured at costs respectively of £1,220,000 or £610,000 or £244,000.
9. The Taoiseach appreciates the concern of the Minister for Defence on the scale of advance purchase of stocks and equipment. However, he considers that apart from the financial aspects, any larger scale of purchases would be likely to give rise to undesirable speculation and, if it became known publicly, as would be all too likely, might be misconstrued in Northern Ireland, with serious consequences on the political plane and in violence. He therefore adheres to his recommendation that orders should be placed at this stage for supplies to cater for 20,000 refugees. However, he would propose to keep the scale of approved purchases under continuous review.

Decision sought

10. The Taoiseach recommends that the Government decide that:-
- (1) the Department of Defence should continue to plan, on a confidential basis, for the reception of up to 100,000 refugees and that the number of personnel involved in this planning should be ^{as} restricted as possible;

- (2) advance orders for sufficient supplies and equipment should be placed to cater for up to 20,000 refugees in such a way as to minimise knowledge of the orders - the stocks to be reviewed annually by the Department of Defence. in consultation with the Inter-Departmental Unit, to ascertain if the situation in Northern Ireland permits of their use for other purposes;
- (3) the Department of Health be authorised to consult, at their discretion, a strictly limited number of Chief Executive Officers of health boards on the preparation, in the strictest confidence, of model plans for their areas, to identify particularly the various tasks that would have to be undertaken, with particular reference to administrative aspects, in the event of a large influx of casualties from Northern Ireland.

INTER-DEPARTMENTAL UNIT ON NORTHERN IRELANDReport on relief of distress.Background.

1. The Government decided, on 18th July 1974, that the Unit should undertake a number of further studies on Northern Ireland. These studies are now substantially completed and will be submitted shortly. These studies indicated that any population movement that might occur as a result of an adverse evolution of the political situation in Northern Ireland, could be substantial. Accordingly, it was considered necessary to review existing plans for the reception of refugees and to initiate plans for the treatment of casualties who might enter this part of the country from Northern Ireland. Detailed studies were undertaken by the Departments of Defence and Health. These are attached as Annexes 1 and 2.

Arrangements for reception of refugees from Northern Ireland.

2. In suggesting planning assumptions for Annex 1, we were aware of the attitude now taken by members of the minority community that, in the event of an emergency situation, they would "stay put". Nevertheless, we felt that it would be prudent to make plans for two situations:-

- (1) where 10,000 refugees came
- (2) where 100,000 refugees came.

The first of these assumptions is based on peak numbers which have come in the past. The second assumes the existence of a much graver situation than anything previously experienced. (It has been suggested elsewhere that, in a doomsday situation, the number of refugees could reach 250,000.) There are about 200,000 Catholics in the Belfast area alone - surrounded in their immediate vicinity, by more than twice that number of Protestants - who could be at risk, on this assumption. Plans are required to deal, in relation to refugees, with

- | | |
|---------------------------------|--------------------------|
| (1) shelter, | (2) food, bedding, etc., |
| (3) legislative provisions, and | (4) health care. |

Shelter, Food, Bedding, etc.

3. Annex 1 indicates that

- (1) properties have been identified throughout the country which could provide accommodation for 99,000 persons, 13,850 immediately and the balance on succeeding days;
- (2) plans have been made or are in hands for transit and reception arrangements, including the use of the holiday camp at Mosney, Co. Meath (capacity 6,000 at a time), as a major reception and transit centre;
- (3) 100,000 refugees could be carried by train from Belfast in four days (of summer daylight), if the trains could run safely;

- (4) at least 10,000 currently active Civil Defence volunteers would be available for reception; in addition Red Cross and local authority personnel would be available, as well as probably, currently inactive Civil Defence personnel and members of voluntary organisations; a large number of people have been trained in refugee handling.

4. The Annex also indicates that a preliminary outlay on stocks of various necessities has to be considered if the State is to be ready to deal with up to 100,000 refugees. This is because it could, for example, take many months to obtain from manufacturers the stocks of blankets needed to cater for substantial numbers of refugees. Obviously this sort of delay could not be contemplated in an emergency. The Annex indicates that -

- (1) to bring existing/^{very limited}stocks of bedding to levels necessary to cater for 50,000 refugees in the ratio 2 children to every adult would require purchases which if made now through local authorities would cost about £600,000;
- (2) food stocks would be required to be ready for use in transit centres; advance purchase of the necessary quantities now would cost over £8,000;
- (3) advance expenditure on other supplies and equipment would not be necessary, except possibly to a very limited extent;
- (4) enquiries are continuing discreetly in regard to the likely availability from merchant stocks, of additional bedding and food which could be called on if it became necessary to cater for 100,000 rather than 50,000 refugees;
- (5) while it is not possible to quantify the cost of the personnel needed to conduct an operation of the necessary magnitude - this would include such items as compensation of Civil Defence volunteers for loss of wages - this cost could be substantial.

It may also be necessary to secure the use of additional premises for the storage of advance stocks purchased if these were on the scale referred to above.

5. The Department of Defence considers that advance purchases of stocks and equipment sufficient to cater for up to 10,000 refugees could be made without giving rise to speculation about the purpose of the purchases. It also points out that detailed planning for the reception of up to 100,000 refugees would require the involvement of many more people than have been engaged in planning undertaken to date. Finally, it stresses that its preparations for the provision of accommodation, bedding, food, etc., are sufficient only to cope with the first weeks of a refugee situation and that much more would then require to be done, by other agencies, for the longer-term handling of the problem.

6. We are concerned about the possible speculation and publicity that might arise from advance orders of stocks and equipment and from the initiation of more detailed plans for the reception of refugees. On the other hand, we wish to point out that if a large influx were in fact to occur and find the authorities here manifestly unprepared, the Government would be subjected to considerable criticism while the refugees could suffer great hardship. Existing stocks of bedding are sufficient for only about 500 refugees. We therefore recommend that advance purchases should be made, as discreetly as possible, of sufficient supplies and equipment to cater, with existing stocks, for up to 20,000 refugees, at an estimated cost of £240,000. We consider that the placing of orders on this scale would not lead to any significant degree of speculation. The position could be kept under review in the light of the evolution of the situation in Northern Ireland. The money required could be made available without any need to introduce a special Supplementary Estimate solely for the purchase of these stocks and even without a separate subhead for the purpose. It may be possible to find part of it through savings on the Defence Estimate for 1975 and even if a Supplementary Estimate is required, the amount needed can be sought under such subheads as "provisions", "clothing and equipment", "general stores", "barrack services", and "civil defence". The stocks purchased would not be wasted if, in the event, an influx of refugees does not occur in that they could be used eventually by the army, local authorities and health boards.

7. Two international bodies have functions in relation to refugee situations viz. the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) which is a non-governmental organisation and the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) which is an integral part of the United Nations. Informal enquiries are being made with regard to the possible role of the ICRC in a refugee situation here but in advance of more detailed information it is thought possible that the ICRC would respond favourably to a request for assistance from the Government in a situation where our own resources were inadequate. The UNHCR, at the request of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, could also provide assistance in the situation envisaged. However, the UNHCR could take several weeks to become fully operational and even then its main role would be one of co-ordination. In the Cyprus operation, the UNHCR held co-ordination meetings of all the relief organisations on a weekly basis in Geneva and on the ground in Nicosia so that there was no overlapping. Within four to five weeks of the crisis in Cyprus UNHCR supplied 54,000 blankets through UNICEF and put on order 2,500 tents and 40,000 camp beds. The initial brunt of any

crisis would however have to be taken by the ICRC with UNHCR providing the co-ordination and eventually, as in Cyprus, the ICRC would be phased out and UNHCR would take over the ongoing problems. UNHCR has limited financial resources at its disposal but generally raises money through appeals. Its total budget for 1974 was approximately 8 million dollars, a large proportion of which was already committed to various ongoing projects. Again taking Cyprus as an example (226,000 refugees were involved) the UNHCR launched a 22 million dollar Humanitarian Assistance Scheme and was able, within the first four weeks, to channel 10 million dollars in aid through the ICRC. Assistance could therefore be obtained from UNHCR but the level and value of such assistance would depend on the magnitude of the problem facing us.

Legislative provisions

8. On 15th June, 1973, the Government gave the Minister for Defence authority to have the Defence (Care of Displaced Persons) Bill drafted on the lines of a general scheme submitted to the Government at that time. This Bill deals with measures considered necessary to cater for Northern refugees. Specifically, it provides for

- (a) the imposition on local authorities of the duty of providing for the accommodation, maintenance and welfare of Northern refugees (and on health boards of assisting local authorities in this matter) and
- (b) powers for the temporary, compulsory acquisition of all types of property to accommodate such refugees.

The Bill has been white printed.

9. The National Security Order 19-- is also relevant. If made, this Order would give the Government all the powers they are likely to require in the early stages of an emergency. These include powers to requisition goods and vehicles, to direct any person who is not a member of the Defence Forces to perform non-military duties, and to take possession of land and buildings. However, the Order could not be made in advance of enactment of the National Security Bill 19 --. This Bill, which has been white printed, was approved by the Government in 1962 as part of the preparations then being made for a national emergency arising from international events. The draft legislation is at present being reviewed in the Department of the Taoiseach to ensure its full suitability for situations which could arise from developments in Northern Ireland.

Health care.

10. As indicated in Annex 2, about 1,000 seriously injured persons requiring surgical intervention within four weeks was adopted as a planning guide and it was assumed that their treatment might be divided as follows:-

Northern Ireland hospitals	400
5 Border area hospitals	200
5 Dublin hospitals	400

These figures do not include the dying, persons with minor injuries, psychiatric, medical or obstetric cases, or persons with broken arms or legs who would be referred for treatment in other hospitals. The Annex indicates that the ten selected hospitals could cope with this workload subject to prior arrangements being made. It is not considered that any special steps need be taken now to build up stocks of medical requisities. The estimated expenditure involved in providing hospital services for 600 surgical casualties is about £185,000.

11. These outline plans have been made on the basis of very restricted consultations. Before any detailed plan can be made ready, discussions with such key interests as representatives of hospitals, health boards, doctors and pharmacists would be necessary. The Department of Health estimate that to prepare a fully detailed contingency plan would take up to a month but that preparations which would ensure a reasonable service could be made within two weeks or less. We consider that while there would probably be reasonable notice of the contingency in question, the Government would be subject to criticism, if there were a large influx of casualties from Northern Ireland, and they were found to be without detailed plans. On the other hand, we are conscious that the involvement of a larger number of people in planning, especially personnel in Border hospitals, as would be required, could give rise to leaks of information which would be misconstrued and ^{have} serious adverse consequences on the political plane and in provoking sectarian violence.

12. Faced with these conflicting considerations, we recommend that the Department of Health should be authorised to consult, at their discretion, a strictly limited number of Chief Executive Officers of Health Boards on the preparation, in the strictest confidence, of model plans for their areas, to identify particularly the various tasks that would have to be undertaken, with particular reference to administrative aspects, in the event of a large influx of casualties.

13. Health care for an additional 10,000 persons would not present any problem provided they were not all concentrated in one limited area outside Dublin. Existing services could also provide for the normal health needs of an additional 100,000 persons if they were dispersed throughout the country. The cost of providing health services for an additional 10,000 persons would, pro rata to the cost of providing these services for our existing population, be approximately £600,000.

Supplies to distressed Catholic communities in breakdown situation.

14. The Government also decided, on 18th October, 1974, that the Unit should investigate and report on the planning arrangements that might be made for the furnishing of supplies to isolated Catholic communities in the event of a total breakdown and failure by the British authorities to provide essential services. Since this decision, contact has been maintained, through the Department of Foreign Affairs, with the Director of the Down and Connor Relief Advisory Service (DACRAS). As in the initial contacts, no indication has been given that material assistance in the North or finance will be available from the Government here in the event of an emergency situation. The understanding has been that the relief organisations will fulfil their own requirements but that the authorities here have plans made to deal with any large influx of refugees into the State and will also advise the relief organisations on equipment that may be useful in an emergency situation and on where supplies can be obtained.

15. Only in the diocese of Down and Connor have worthwhile preparations been made for an emergency situation and these are largely confined to greater Belfast. Within this area, quantities of food and supplies ^{of} /bottled gas, bedding and other materials have been stockpiled by parochial committees, controlled by the parish priests under the overall direction of DACRAS. Negotiations have taken place with the Northern Ireland Department of Health and Social Services, as a result of which the Department has transferred some of its stores into DACRAS custody. It is understood that the Department has made preparations to deal with an emergency for up to five days after which, in its view, it would be a national problem. Meetings have been held between the organisation, the Chief Constable of the R.U.C. and the General Officer Commanding the British Army in Northern Ireland. Plans are being made for movement of Catholics likely to be at risk into safer areas and the security forces are aware that such plans are in hands. To date, the relief service has not suffered interference from the IRA or others although it is

known that the IRA is aware of the transfer of official stores to the service. Attempts are being made by the diocesan authorities to initiate contingency preparations in the rural areas of Down and Connor. Little or nothing appears to have been done up to the present in other Northern dioceses.

16. Generally, the position is that the Catholic community in Belfast is now in a better position than in the past to face up to pressure whether of a violent or an "industrial" character. Nevertheless, it remains vulnerable to industrial action or blockade by the majority community. In some areas outside Belfast where feelings have run high in the past and again during the recent "Troubles" and where little preparation has been done Catholic communities are also vulnerable.

17. The Unit considered the question of furnishing supplies to distressed Catholics against the above background. The preparations being made by the Catholic Church authorities in the North indicate that the members of the minority community in the North seem willing to act in accordance with their expressed intention to "stay put" in an emergency. For obvious reasons, this attitude should be encouraged.


18. We also considered whether if a total breakdown occurred in the North and the British failed, despite pressure by the Government here, to discharge their responsibilities, relief could be furnished through the conveyance of supplies to areas deep in the North or to points on the border where they could be collected by members of the minority community. We believe that in this situation it is virtually certain that minority areas would come under the control of the IRA - Provisional or Official or maybe both - and that any supplies from here to the North would almost certainly come under IRA control, or fall into the hands of Protestant para-military groups. In these circumstances, it would be the para-military groups who would organise and operate relief and the reality of the situation would be that Government action here to provide supplies would in effect mean supplying these groups - unless the supplies were protected by the Irish army. The implications of trying to provide this type of protection inside Northern Ireland would be extremely serious. Any Government action to provide relief supplies for the minority would be regarded by the loyalists as intervention in the affairs of the North (even if it were possible to channel the relief through an agency like the Red Cross), and if accompanied by or associated with military action, would certainly be regarded as an act of war.

19. No obvious strategy suggests itself to get around the problem of providing relief to minority areas in Northern Ireland, short of outright military intervention to ensure protection of supplies and supply routes. (Areas near the border do not require any special provision - they have comparatively easy access to the South.)


Conclusion

20. This report is concerned with preparations for an eventuality that may never arise and, indeed, which Government policy aims to avoid. It is recognised that if it became known publicly that such preparations were being made, adverse consequences could follow. However, we consider that this danger is outweighed in importance by the consideration that if a large influx of refugees from Northern Ireland were to occur and find us manifestly unprepared, the Government would be subjected to considerable criticism, at a time when the maintenance of its authority and of support for its policies was of the highest importance, while the refugees themselves could suffer great hardship. We believe that implementation of the recommendations we have made as to action which should be taken now would constitute an appropriate, balanced response to the needs of the situation. We propose to keep under continuous review the extent of preparations to be made, in the light of developments in Northern Ireland.


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
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
S. Donlon



P. O'Murchú



for M. Donnelly



F. O'Donohue

NORTHERN IRELAND REFUGEES.I INTRODUCTION

1. This memorandum is an attempt to identify the problems which could arise in dealing with an influx of refugees into the Republic from Northern Ireland on a substantially larger scale than anything which has been experienced in the 1969 - 1973 period. The numbers who might be involved are necessarily conjectural and the best (but perhaps optimistic) estimate which can be attempted is that the total is unlikely to exceed 100,000. The information available from Northern Ireland sources is that the Catholic authorities there are seeking to deal with minority community distress from their own resources of material and manpower rather than to plan for evacuation to the Republic but it is recognised that a situation of such gravity could arise that large numbers might feel that flight to the South was their only hope of salvation.
2. It is to be expected that the movement of up to 100,000 people would necessarily be spread over some days and that this would give time, after the first impact had been absorbed, to build up the availability of accommodation, bedding, food etc to the level needed to provide for the full exodus. The measures planned in 1972 and 1973 (to cater for numbers in the 9,000 to 50,000 range) provide a basis on which to plan the more extensive arrangements required for any larger movement of displaced persons.
3. Sources of information have been sought in regard to the experience of other countries in dealing with refugee problems but little of value has emerged. There is some documentation about Palestine refugee camps but the main lesson to be drawn from the distressing conditions existing there is that such arrange-

ments are a totally unsuitable headline. Neither does there appear to be anything of value to be learned from a consideration of the unhappy plight of the refugees made homeless after the Pakistan - Bangladesh war. Information is being sought about the handling of the refugee problem in Cyprus and any helpful material forthcoming will be studied to see how far it can be of assistance in dealing with the difficulties which might arise in this country. Reference has also been made to published material about Civil Defence plans in other countries to accommodate large numbers of the civilian population who might have to be evacuated from their homes in a war situation and this information has been taken into account in so far as it has any validity of application to a refugee problem here.

II PREVIOUS EXPERIENCE

4. Continuing tension and the recurring pattern of events in Northern Ireland from 1969 onwards showed that a refugee crisis could develop with little or no warning, the most likely time being the months of July and August or on an occasion coinciding with the announcement of measures unacceptable to the extremists of either community in the area. It was felt that if provision could be made to cope with a sudden influx during the first 24 - hour critical period it would provide an opportunity in which to assess the likely magnitude of the problem and to activate, on a country-wide basis, additional measures for the provision of such accommodation as might be required.
5. Having regard to population distribution on religious lines it was believed that the majority of refugees would come

from east of the Bann, especially from Belfast, and that fewer numbers would attempt to travel from Belfast by road, the safer means of exit being by rail. CIE pointed out that the railway line from Belfast to the Border runs through predominantly nationalist areas with the exception of a twelve mile stretch near Portadown and they suggested that approaches might be made through diplomatic channels to have the vulnerable portion of the line protected by the Northern security forces during the period of a refugee emergency. The necessity for such action did not in fact arise in the 1969 to 1973 period when numbers of people made their way south as the following figures show:-

	<u>Peak holding figure for any one day.</u>
1969	720
1970	1,558
1971	5,409
1972	5,400
1973	400
1974	nil

(Note: In 1972 the total over the period from 11 July to 22 September was 9,800)

The great majority of the refugees in this period did in fact come from Belfast.

6. Plans made in 1972 provided for the accommodation of up to 50,000 refugees (see Appendix A) and the problem of transport for such numbers had been examined in detail with CIE Operations Section. They were asked how long it would take to convey, by rail, up to 50,000 people out of Belfast alone. They estimated that on the first day of the crisis some six to seven thousand refugees could be moved. By

redeploying rolling stock and curtailing the various commuter rail services in the Dundalk to Greystones sector they reckoned that it would be possible to convey 25,000 on each of the second and subsequent days; this would involve running the first morning train at daylight and ensuring that the last train from Belfast was safely across the border before dark. (This related to daylight hours during July/August).

7. The border counties of Donegal, Leitrim, Cavan, Monaghan and Louth were each required to provide immediate transit accommodation for a minimum of 200 refugees who would be moved to holding accommodation as quickly as possible. County Meath was allotted a quota of 750 refugees - also for transit accommodation only. (These allocations were related to an overall figure of 9,050 refugees and were subject to proportionate increases up to the maximum overall provision for 50,000 refugees. See appendix A) Refugees would not be held longer than 24 hours in transit centres; it was intended that their stay in these centres during the daytime would be for a period of a few hours only while evening arrivals would be held overnight. The transit centres would continue to fill this role until all available holding accommodation in other local authority areas would have been filled, at which stage they would be required to provide holding accommodation in addition to operating their transit functions. It was considered desirable, to the greatest degree possible to keep the border counties clear of refugees thus easing the problem of identifying subversive elements who might operate in these areas.
8. Local authorities, other than those in Meath and the border counties, were required to provide immediate

holding accommodation, in accordance with the allocations set out in Appendix A; for an overall number of 9,050 refugees and further accommodation, as required, to fill their quotas in respect of a total of 50,000. The necessary arrangements at local level were handled for the local authorities by Civil Defence volunteers in their Services, of whom about 10,000, out of a total nominal registered membership of some 23,000 are active. Civil Defence volunteers who were required to attend for full time work in connection with the reception of refugees and the staffing of accommodation centres, were recompensed for loss of wages in their ordinary employment and, where necessary, additional staffs were recruited and paid for necessary work at the refugee centres. In addition the civil service staff of the Department's Civil Defence Branch took an active part in controlling the reception, registration, allocation and transference of the refugees. Overall control of movements and allocations was exercised by the Central Control at Parkgate through the eight Regional Civil Defence Officers (one for each of the regions listed in Appendix A). A rail-head party at Connolly Station Dublin which was supplied by Dublin Civil Defence volunteers operated under the direction of the Central Control.

9. At the Civil Defence School in Dublin, the Department trained 73 Civil Defence instructors in the techniques of refugee handling and courses were also held at the School for 225 selected Civil Defence volunteers and local authority officials: on return to their areas these in turn conducted local courses and exercises. Studies were also set up by the School at which 132 participants were afforded the opportunity of establishing certain working principles for dealing with problems of refugee handling: the personnel taking part were Regional and County Civil Defence Officers

and Assistant County Civil Defence Officers and the Operations Managers and Area Managers of CIE Rail and Road Services.

10. Members of the Irish Red Cross Society were, under local authority control, employed on casualty service duties at each refugee centre and provided their own first aid medical supplies. Medical service by doctors and nurses and the provision of drugs etc were arranged by the local authorities. Where the Irish Red Cross Society was unable to provide a full casualty service at any particular centre arrangements were made for the deficiency to be met by the utilisation of Civil Defence Casualty Service personnel. The Irish Red Cross Society also provided, for the refugees, comforts and services of various kinds which they would miss away from home; it supplied washing requisites, personal toilet necessities, babies' bottles, baby food and disinfectants and its personnel rendered first aid, cared for the sick and elderly, washed and dressed children and provided children's toys and games.
11. All the arrangements by local authorities for the provision of accommodation and the procurement of supplies of bedding, food and cooking etc. equipment were made on the basis that the expenditure involved would be subject to recoupment in full from State funds. There are of course no powers under existing legislation to compel local authorities to carry out such services for refugees and it was considered that ~~any services for refugees and it was considered that any~~ special legislation to deal with the matter should provide not only for the imposition on local authorities of the duty to see to the accommodation, maintenance and welfare of refugees (and on health boards of the obligation to assist local authorities in the discharge of these duties) but should also include power to acquire accommodation for refugees

by way of lodging or by way of food or both. A Bill on these lines has been drafted and prepared for introduction, whenever required.

III FUTURE PLANS

12.1 Studies have been made - and are continuing - of the measures which would be required to deal with the reception, accommodation and maintenance of refugees in the future in a situation which might differ from previous experience in that -

- (a) the number of refugees could be up to 100,000,
- (b) they might arrive during a period when schools colleges etc. were not free to accommodate them and
- (c) they might remain for a substantially longer time than hitherto (which was, generally, no more than a matter of several weeks).

As a first step surveys have been conducted (on a confidential basis), in each of the eight Civil Defence regions, of the availability of premises to accommodate refugees and returns have been received identifying properties which could provide accommodation for 99,000 persons, of which total 13,850 could be housed immediately and the balance on succeeding days (see Appendix B). The premises to be used would be hotels (mainly those closed in the winter months) holiday camps, the Royal Dublin Society's Ballsbridge property, guest houses, farm houses, dance halls, community halls, one or two vacant office blocks etc. It is to be expected that the owners of some hotels, guest houses and

dance halls would be reluctant to make their premises available because of the loss of bookings, engagements etc. and it would be necessary therefore initially to use premises which would be willingly given thereafter, if the situation so required, it might become necessary to avail of compulsory powers of occupying but this would be done only as a last resort. Indeed the possibility exists that the situation might be such as to require the closing of schools, colleges etc. if the accommodation problem could not otherwise be solved.

12.2 As on previous occasions, the border counties of Donegal, Leitrim, Cavan, Monaghan and Louth, as well as County Meath, would be transit areas which would not be required to provide holding accommodation until the quotas of the other local authority areas had been filled. In addition, the Dublin area would be treated as a reception and transit centre for as long as possible as it is felt that the fulfilment of its quota for holding a substantial number of refugees could pose considerable sociological and law-and-order problems. In the latter connection discussions are going on which it is hoped will lead to permission for the holiday camp at Mosney to be used as a major reception and transit centre. This envisages the de-training of refugees from Belfast at Mosney Halt and their registration, feeding and despatch to holding accommodation in other counties. Up to 6,000 people can be handled at a time in the camp and this would be a more expeditious operation -- for a large influx -- than that, hitherto employed in lesser situations of receiving them at Connolly Station in Dublin.

13.1 Advance expenditure in relation to premises does not arise but a preliminary outlay on stocks of certain necessities would have to be considered as an urgent matter. The first requirement in this respect would be bedding. The purchase of small stocks of blankets and mattresses was sanctioned in previous years to help to meet requirements for the smaller numbers of refugees hitherto handled and there are, therefore, at present available 2,040 blankets and 500 mattresses which are held in various local authority stores. Allowing for 3 blankets per adult refugee and for the possibility that in some cases 3 blankets would suffice for two children sleeping together it is reckoned that 100,000 blankets would be enough for up to 50,000 adult and child refugees (This assumes that the number of children capable of being accommodated two to a "bed" would be in the ratio of two to every one adult). Any blankets purchased would be bought and stored by the local authorities (in proportion to their refugee quotas) and the cost would be recouped in full from the Defence Vote. This arrangement has the advantage that any items not needed for refugees would be available for the normal requirements of local authorities and health boards (subject to appropriate financial re-adjustment). It involves, however, the constraint that the grade of blanket to be acquired would have to be in accord with the standard purchases of local authorities. The cheapest type of grey blanket on the Local Government Combined Purchasing List is priced at £3.10 and, assuming that all of the stock to be procured for refugee use were bought at this figure, the cost of bringing the existing stock of 2,040 blankets up to 100,000 would be £303,676.

- 13.2 On the basis adopted of allotting 3 blankets per "bed", 100,000 blankets would involve the use of 33,333 mattresses; it is therefore considered that not less than 33,000 mattresses should be procured, as a first step, to supplement the present stock of 500. The cheapest type of covered mattress on the local authority list is a polyurethane mattress 75" x 40" priced at £8.60 and the cost of 33,000 of these items would accordingly be £283,800. Again these would be good stock capable of being absorbed into local authority use.
- 13.3 It may be that 3 blankets per "bed" would prove inadequate in winter temperatures but, to offset any such deficiency in the total proposed to be purchased, the likelihood exists that some hotels, guest houses etc. would permit their own blankets to be used. The total cost of bedding for which purchase arrangements might immediately be put in hands would therefore be £587,476 or up to £600,000 if account were taken of possible increases in these prices and of the necessity for including a quantity of pillows. Consideration had been given to the possibility of substituting sleeping bags for blankets (mattresses would be required in either case). However it is estimated that 50,000 sleeping bags with liners would cost almost as much as the blankets and there would be the disadvantage that sleeping bags would not be acceptable for local authority use.
- 13.4 From the Regional surveys conducted the conclusion has emerged that it would be possible, in the holding areas, for local authorities to obtain food supplies by local contract to provide for normal meals for refugees allocated there. In the transit areas, however, this would

not be possible because they would be required to be ready, at the first onset of the crisis, to provide at least one good meal for each of the stream of distressed and frightened people pouring through on their way to the holding areas. Since every one of the 50,000 refugees (to whom the estimates in the preceding subparagraphs relate) will pass through a transit centre it is considered necessary that advance provision for one meal should be made for each of them. This might take the form of soup, a meat and vegetable stew and a portion of potato flake (which can be reconstituted) and it has been ascertained that 50,000 meals of this type could be bought at the following approximate prices:-

28 doz. 5 lb cans of thick soup powder.....	£ 580
365 doz. 5 $\frac{3}{4}$ lb cans of meat stew with vegetables.....	£7,050
160 28lb packs of potato flake.....	£ 670
	<hr/>
TOTAL:	£8,300
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In this case also the purchases would be good stock. It is understood that the shelf life of the foods in these containers is up to 10 years and, if they were not required for refugees, they could be diverted to other uses (possibly in Army posts).

- 13.5 The surveys have shown that advance expenditure on the provision of cooking apparatus would not be required. Many of the premises in which refugees would be accommodated are equipped for cooking and ample supplies of cookers are available commercially, for hire or purchase, wherever required for use in premises not so equipped.

Plentiful supplies of bottled gas are also understood to be available. Some advance purchases of containers (pots, kettles etc.), of disposable cups and plates and of minimal stocks of spoons etc. would be necessary but it is not expected that the cost of these supplies would be great. As far as possible the items would be sought from local authority and hospital authority stocks.

13.6 Coinciding with the planning of provision for 50,000 refugees on the lines indicated in the preceding subparagraphs, enquiries are continuing in regard to the likely availability, from merchant stocks, of additional blankets, mattresses and food which could be called on if ⁱⁿ an actual refugee situation, it became necessary to cater for an influx of 100,000 refugees. If it appears that delivery of the full requirements of blankets and mattresses could not be obtained rapidly from these sources it may be necessary to arrange now for the purchase of the full amounts needed for 100,000 refugees.

14.1 In considering what might be the ultimate cost of accommodating and caring for up to 100,000 refugees even in the short term it has to be borne in mind that a substantial outlay will be involved in the acquisition of premises. Reference has already been made (in paragraph 12) to losses on bookings which would be entailed if hotels, guest houses, dance halls etc. were used to house refugees. It is to be expected that substantial claims for rent and/or compensation for such losses would have to be entertained and this distinguishes the situation examined here from those experienced in the past when schools and religious institutions were generously made available without charge (other than the cost of making good damages).

14.2 The cost of the personnel needed to conduct an operation of the magnitude which would be required would also be much in excess of anything previously experienced. While maximum utilisation would of course be made of the services of local authority officials, Civil Defence volunteers, members of organisations such as the Irish Red Cross Society, the Irish Countrywomen's Association, Macra na Tuaithe, Macra na Feirme, Rotary, the Society of St. Vincent de Paul, the Legion of Mary and indeed of the help of the refugees themselves, it would nevertheless be necessary to provide for compensation to Civil Defence and other volunteers for loss of wages consequent on their attendance for refugee duties during their normal working hours and in addition for payment of wages to persons specially employed for the many tasks involved. A particular case in point is that the eight Regional Civil Defence Officers have no deputies at present and if their work involved round-the-clock attendance at their headquarters in controlling the manifold arrangements for the reception, registration, allocation, maintenance and welfare of refugees throughout their Regions there would have to be at least one competent deputy appointed and trained to help each of them.

15. It will have to be considered, in due course, if refugees to the number of 100,000 were to remain in the Republic for many months, or years, whether and at what stage the responsibility for their continued maintenance and management should cease to be a matter for Civil Defence. In the treatise on Emergency Welfare Services published by the United States Federal Civil Defence Administration it is pointed out that

"..... the phrases 'temporary relief' and 'emergency welfare measures' make it clear that Congress intended civil defence Welfare Services to be provided on a temporary basis. It may be assumed therefore, that other agencies will be responsible for long-term care and permanent rehabilitation of civilian victims of enemy attack".

While this refers to persons evacuated from their homes in a war emergency it is equally applicable as a principle to govern the treatment of refugees from another territory and there appears to be no doubt that the established peace-time agencies are the more appropriate and the more qualified authorities to deal with long term care and permanent rehabilitation than a civil defence organisation set up to cope with war emergency problems.

16. Meanwhile, at this stage, and as a matter of some urgency it becomes necessary to seek a decision whether the local authorities should now be given sanction to cater for 100,000 refugees on the basis set out in paragraph 13, immediate purchases to be made in respect of 50,000 and the balance to be dealt with as in paragraph 13.6. The claims for recoupment would not of course come for payment before 1975.

Appendix A

Overall Accommodation Plan for Refugees (50,000)

<u>Region</u>	<u>L.A. Areas</u>	<u>Immediate Accommodation</u>		<u>Allocation by Regions of 50,000</u>	
			<u>Total</u>		
1.	Cork City	500			
	Cork County (N, S&W)	600			
	Kerry	<u>200</u>	1,300	8,000	
2.	Limerick City & County	400			
	Clare	200			
	Tipperary N.R.	<u>200</u>	800	4,000	
3.	Galway	200			
	Mayo	200			
	Roscommon	<u>200</u>	600	3,000	
4.	Sligo	200			
	Leitrim	* 200			
	Donegal	* <u>200</u>	600	1,000	
5.	Laois	200			
	Offaly	200			
	Longford	200			
	Westmeath	<u>200</u>	800	4,000	
6.	Cavan	* 200			
	Monaghan	* 200			
	Louth	* <u>200</u>	600	-	
7.	Dublin City & County	2,000			
	Wicklow	200			
	Meath	* 750			
	Kildare	<u>200</u>	3,150	24,000	
8.	Wexford	200			
	Kilkenny	200			
	Carlow	200			
	Waterford City & County	400			
	Tipperary, S.R.	<u>200</u>	<u>1,200</u>	<u>6,000</u>	
			<u>9,050</u>	<u>50,000</u>	

* Transit Accommodation

May, 1974.

ACCOMMODATION PLAN FOR UP TO 100,000 REFUGEES.

<u>Region</u>	<u>IA Area</u>	<u>Immediate Acceptance</u>	<u>Eventual Capacity</u>
1.	Cork City Cork County (N.T. + W.) Kerry		
	TOTAL.....	1,000	24,500
2.	Limerick City & County Clare Tipperary N.R.		
	TOTAL.....	2,000	9,000
3.	Galway Mayo Roscommon		
	TOTAL.....	350	3,500
4.	Sligo Leitrim Donegal		
	TOTAL.....	700	15,000
5.	Laois Offaly Longford Westmeath		
	Total.....	1,000	4,000
6.	Cavan Monaghan Louth		
	TOTAL.....	1,800	3,000
7.	Dublin City & County Wicklow Meath Kildare		
	TOTAL.....	5,000	33,000
8.	Wexford Kilkenny Carlow Waterford City & County Tipperary S.R.		
	TOTAL.....	2,000	7,000
		<u>13,850</u>	<u>99,000</u>

CONFIDENTIAL

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Note from Department of Health on (1) the arrangements for hospital treatment of casualties from Northern Ireland and (2) the additional health care provision needed to care for refugees from Northern Ireland.

The arrangements for hospital treatment of casualties from Northern Ireland

1. Proposed arrangements to deal with casualties from Northern Ireland are set out in outline in this part of this memorandum. Confidential consultations were held with the Department of Defence, appropriate Army officers and, with the agreement of the Inter Departmental Unit, with a Dublin surgeon, and provided most valuable help in the formulation of the present proposals. It must be emphasised, however, that advance discussions with key interests and personnel are essential before any detailed plan of campaign can be made ready. These key interests include representatives of hospitals, health boards, doctors, pharmacists and other personnel and suppliers.
2. In order to work out proposed arrangements for treating casualties it is desirable to have (a) an estimate of the number of casualties and the period in which they will occur and (b) the hospitals mainly involved in dealing with the casualties.
3. Taking the hospitals first, it is clear that the general hospitals nearest the border would have an important, and indeed essential, role, i.e. (a) examination, sorting and resuscitation of casualties, (b) referring patients on and (c) surgical treatment of certain patients. These hospitals, each of which has surgical facilities and trained staff to cope with their normal workloads, are located at Letterkenny, Sligo, Cavan, Monaghan and Dundalk.
4. Casualties with serious head or chest injuries could not be dealt with in the hospitals in border areas and would have to be sent on to the national centres in Dublin. Those with abdominal injuries would similarly be transferred for high level consultant care in Dublin. It is believed that these three

/types

types of casualties would represent a very high proportion of the total casualties. Indeed with the sorting and resuscitation role of the border hospitals properly organised, much of the other operative work should preferably be referred on to Dublin where theatre facilities, beds and qualified medical, para-medical and nursing staff are available in quantity. This would serve the interests of the patients best. Dublin hospitals should of course also cater for patients arriving direct from the North (e.g. by train).

5. The Dublin hospitals provisionally selected to participate in the treatment service for Northern casualties are St. Laurence's, St. Vincent's, Jervis Street, Dr. Steevens and the Mater. All are accident hospitals with considerable expertise and experience in treating casualties and also include the national centres for head and chest injuries already mentioned.

6. The border hospitals and the selected Dublin hospitals would cope by reducing or eliminating their non-urgent surgical work, by transferring patients already in hospital elsewhere (home or to other hospitals), and thus reserving beds for Northern casualties. Extra surgical and support staff would be needed and could be supplied in the case of the border hospitals from centres such as Galway, Ennis, Limerick and Cork and, in the case of the selected Dublin hospitals, where the need arises, from neighbouring hospitals. This would involve a cut back of non-urgent surgical work in the supplying centres or hospitals also.

7. Finally on the hospital side, the use of Lourdes Hospital, Drogheda, as an extra centre and the reference of, say, arm and leg injuries to hospitals in Cork, Limerick, etc. could be effected if necessary and would provide a degree of flexibility for expansion of facilities if required.

8. As regards the number of casualties for which provision should be made, this is impossible to establish statistically. An arbitrary figure which has been adopted as a planning guide is 1,000 persons requiring surgical intervention in the first four weeks of a conflict. This is the best conjecture which could be made. It is assumed that 500 would occur in the first week and 500 in the next three weeks. Any casualties thereafter would have to be planned for at the time and in the light of events.

9. The figure of 1,000 does not include the dying, those with minor injuries, psychiatric cases, medical cases or obstetrical cases, who would be absorbed into the general health care service in accordance with pre-arranged plans to be formulated.

10. It is believed that the Northern Ireland hospitals or most of them would still function and treat surgical casualties and that of the figure of 1,000 such casualties, some 400 could be so dealt with. Of the balance, 200 would be treated in the border hospitals and 400 in the selected Dublin hospitals.

11. In summary, therefore, the number to be treated in the first week of the conflict is as follows:-

Northern Ireland hospitals	200
5 Border hospitals	100
5 Dublin hospitals	200
	<hr/>
	500
	<hr/>

A similar number would be treated in the next 3 weeks.

12. It is anticipated that the hospitals in the State could cope with this workload subject to arrangements as mentioned above being made. A well equipped and efficient ambulance service would be needed and special arrangements could be necessary in regard to sterilising instruments, in providing back-up laboratory services and as respects blood supplies, although direct donor services could help here.

13. As regards supplies of drugs, dressings, surgical instruments, gases, splints, etc., it is believed that if existing supplies are conserved (e.g. elective and cold surgery reduced and supplies diverted to the 10 hospitals) the supply position generally is reasonably satisfactory and that no special steps at this point need be considered.

14. Central control over the operation would be exercised by the Department of Health, working through officers of the health boards designated to act as local controllers in each border county. These would maintain the "bed state" of the hospital in their area, direct the flow of casualties to particular hospitals, supervise the use of transport, etc. Good communications between the different areas and between these areas and the central control point would be vital. As the ambulance radiocommunication system has not yet been developed throughout the country to a stage where it could be used for this purpose, telephones would have to be relied on.

15. The estimated expenditure involved in providing hospital services for 600 surgical casualties in round figures is £185,000.

Additional health care needed to care for refugees from Northern Ireland

16. The provision of health care of an additional 10,000 persons would not present a problem provided that they were not all concentrated in one limited area outside Dublin. It is considered that the existing services could also provide for the needs of up to 10 times that figure if they were dispersed throughout the country. The cost of providing health services for an additional 10,000 persons would pro rata to the cost of providing these services for our existing population be approximately £600,000.