NORTHERN TEACHER

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The Sources of Conflict

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(1) Fieldwork

The first part of fieldwork for this study was conducted in August, 1970, when three hundred boys and girls and young people were interviewed in small groups using open-ended techniques. The purpose of such interviews was to establish what sort of questions about civic learning could best be asked. In the light of their answers, and questions which arose from more formal testing among two hundred schoolboys, the questionnaires were revised five times. Out of some 200 questions tested, 80 were selected for the secondary school survey, and 60 for the primary school survey. The major secondary school investigation commenced early in 1971 and continued until after the Easter vacation. The primary school survey began in November 1971 (when questions were tested among different age groups to discover when a child could handle the concept of "Government" and a paper-and-pencil questionnaire) and ended on the day the prorogation of Stormont was announced as imminent. The major surveys (upon which this article is based) involved formal questionnaire interviews with over three thousand schoolboys (almost equal numbers of Protestants and Catholics). A total of 972 were in Grammar schools, 946 in Secondary Intermediate schools (Secondary Moderns), and 1,116 in Primary schools. The secondary school sample was later weighted to take account of the larger number of boys in Intermediate over Grammar schools. The sample was purposively designed so that respondents should be drawn from areas experiencing different disorder levels; changing religious proportions in school-catchment zones; town size should vary quite considerably; and boys should reside East and West of the River Bann (the prosperous and less developed areas of Ulster); near to and far from the Border between Eire and Northern Ireland.

In all, schoolboys, from approximately forty schools, between the ages of eight and fifteen years of age, completed a questionnaire. Whilst this is not a scientifically random survey it is much more representative of schoolboys in Ulster than American political socialization samples have been of children there. Not only is the sample size proportionately much larger, but an effort was made to include middle and working class boys from districts which had experienced different levels of disorder and economic development.

(2) Findings

Much of the literature of political socialization and of social reform in Northern Ireland has shared two assumptions: that it is of prime importance to understand how children learn about politics and that the schools are the chief socializing agents. This study

shows the prime importance of content rather than the process of childhood and youthful political learning, and also emphasises the importance of community, rather than school, influence. For example, how white American children learn to support their government is similar to the way in which Ulster boys learn how to support or oppose their government. But what they learn is vastly different. Also, how Protestants and Catholics within Northern Ireland learn about national identity and regime assumptions is similar: what they learn is discordant. In Northern Ireland, there has been a renewed questioning of the liberal assumption that separate schooling is largely to blame for community tensions and disorders. For example, segregated housing estates, the formation of large gangs, para-military groups and discordant adult-created youth groups, have been seen as being much more effective in socializing conflicting cultural types, within Northern Ireland, than have the schools.

The first variable investigated in this study was affect towards Government which is an emotional disposition. (See Table I) In particular, it is the feeling one has, or thinks one should have, when considering the likely reactions of Government towards people like oneself. Such affect may be positive or negative. One may love or hate a Government long before one has an accurate perception of how it works.

There is now little doubt that children of seven and eight years of age learn about the politics of emotional support or opposition to a regime's authorities, and that such support or opposition is not simply a generalization of obedience or disobedience learned within the family. Children learn distinctive political responses whilst they are still very firmly embedded within the family.

Politicization refers to the process by which children learn to accept or reject the presence, power, and legitimacy of authority, external, and superior to the family. By primary four, Ulster schoolboys can quite clearly distinguish between the private and public sectors of life. Children in primary three (ages six to seven years) found this more difficult, with only half being quite clear about such differences. Most boys of all ages above primary three also ascribed different priorities in qualities thought necessary for familial and political figures. This suggests that political learning had begun either very early in school life or before. In Northern Ireland children are particularly open to political learning at a very early age due to the incursions of the British Army into civilian life. Whether or not a child enjoys seeing his family deferring frequently to a power external and superior to it, does not diminish the prospect for early political learning.

Table I   Attitudes to Government

	Protestants			Catholics		
	Primary School	Intermediate School	Grammar School	Primary School	Intermediate School	Grammar School
	%	%	%	%	%	%
Positive Affect The Government *always* wants to help people like me	64	30	37	33	18	16
Positive Affect The Government *sometimes* wants to help people like me	30	49	55	34	45	49
Negative Affect The Government *never* wants to help people like me	2	15	6	17	23	25
Negative Affect The Government wants to *hurt* people like me	1	5	2	12	11	8
No answer	3	1	0	4	3	2
Number	561	478	477	548	474	503

Younger children in Northern Ireland and elsewhere approach the political system through the medium of personal authority figures.[1] Perceiving political power personally, however, is no guarantee that the authority will be liked by the child. As earlier research revealed, younger children are more extreme in views of political authority.[2] As children age and mature they pass from seeing Government in personal terms, such as the Queen and the Prime Minister, to perceiving it as an institution, such as Parliament or the Cabinet. The hostile or ideal feelings that went with the personal figures, are then switched to the institutions. This may provide an important clue as to why older boys are less extreme in their views of political authority: it may be easier to hate or love a political figure than an informal political institution. Although one may never move from seeing government malevolently, to perceiving it as a benevolent power, between the ages of eight and sixteen, there is some reason to believe that extreme negative and positive views of Government are modified between these ages.

The lesson here is that schoolboys in Northern Ireland have begun to learn political responses whilst they are still firmly anchored to the family by deeply affective ties. The process by which Protestant and Catholic schoolboys learn about Government is similar—the content of such learning discordant. It is the community derived content of politics that lies at the root of Ulster disorders.

The second variable investigated in this study concerned assumptions about the nature of the regime and how such assumptions should be achieved. (See Table II). The content of the most general assumptions about Northern Ireland are divisive. In the first instance only two-fifths of boys in different religions share what looks like similar national identities. Learning the assumptions associated with a nation include, among other things, the nature and boundaries of the regime. Such assumptions are learned early in life, within the family, through references to nationality and its implications for political life. The story of Ulster may be told and retold to children by parents who regard themselves as Irish or British/Ulster. The stories will differ dramatically according to the parents placement within the British-Irish view of the Province. The child will unselfconsciously adjust to Union Jack, Red Hand, or Tricolour assumptions about Northern Ireland.

National differences are quickly picked up by children regarding the way the family feels about people in different nations. For instance, Protestant schoolboys felt more like people in England than did Catholic boys who felt closer to the inhabitants of the

Republic of Ireland. Also about half the boys felt they were different from other Ulster boys who belonged to the other religion. Thus nationality is personalized: national spirit becomes a matter of feeling like or unlike other people who live across land and sea boundaries. Protestant British/Ulsterness and Catholic Ulster/Irishness, where it exists, is reflected within a land boundary in how boys in different religions feel about one another. The mechanics of learning a national identity are similar for Protestants and Catholics: the content discordant.

About half of the boys in Ulster say that those in the other religion are not only different, but hostile also. Thus we are confronted with a picture of more than half the boys in each religious community possessing different national priorities; feeling differently from persons associated with other nations making claims upon the territory the regime claims to rule; expressing differences between religions within that territory, and living with the image of total hostility directed towards them from the other religion. Such a picture supports a two-nations theory of Ulster. No matter how well mixed the Scots, English and Irish in Ulster may have been in the past there are substantial proportions of them today who are very far removed from any "melting-pot" conception of political life. Such feelings suggest that those identifying with separate nations within the regime's territory desire distinctive political counterparts for their nation/community.

Table II Attitudes to Discord

"Do you think that people have a right to fight in order to keep Ulster Protestant?"

	Protestants		
	Primary School %	Intermediate School %	Grammar School %
Yes	51	77	54
No	47	19	43
No answer	2	4	3
Number	561	478	477

"Do you think that people have a right to fight in order to bring about a United Ireland?"

	Catholics		
	Primary School %	Intermediate School %	Grammar School %
Yes	60	64	52
No	37	34	45
No answer	3	2	3
Number	548	474	503

The content of national identities within Ulster are divisive and produce hostility. The most general assumptions about the nature and boundaries of the regime often lead to the approval of disorder in realizing such assumptions. Schoolboys may learn the means towards their assumptions about the regime through identification with, and imitation of, important others in their community, or they may anticipate themselves in older political roles and conform to what they would expect themselves to be doing in later life. This may be casting a vote or throwing a petrol bomb. In Northern Ireland two-thirds of schoolboys endorse the rightness of disorder in politics either for upholding a Protestant Ulster or for achieving a United Ireland.

The boys who approve of political violence are not necessarily those who would take part in actual disorders, nor are they hooligans, and many of them dislike the civil disturbances. When Secondary schoolboys were asked what, if anything, they disliked about Northern Ireland approximately half cited the riots. Yet even among those who disliked the civil disturbances three-fifths were prepared to endorse the rightness of disorders over basic political issues within the regime's territory. Only 35 per cent of boys said they would join a riot if one broke out near their homes. Another 45 per cent said they would move away from the riot whilst the others either replied that they would watch from where they were or go closer to see what was happening. Yet of those who would move away, 45 per cent still approved of political disorder over the nature and boundaries of the regime. But, as one might expect, there is a steady increase in disorder approval as attitudes to riots change from simply watching, to going closer, until approximately 80 to 90 per cent of rioters approve of political disorder. This may indicate that a tiny proportion of rioters are hooligans, uninterested in the political aspects of their actions. Exponents of the hooligan theory of violence in Ulster generally argue that boys who throw bricks and petrol bombs in what appears to be political disorders do so because they are predisposed to violence in non-political contexts too. The Strathclyde Loyalty survey found that Northern Ireland people generally respect laws, and, political grievances aside, Catholics are as law abiding as Protestants.[3] When questions about non-political violence (with a political/religious option built in to possible responses) such as breaking windows in empty buildings, were put to boys, only 15 per cent gave a firm and clear indication that they regarded such activities as justifiable in a non-political or within-religion context. Thus no large hooligan element appeared. Within the number of boys who approve of political violence in certain contexts are those who

would probably join such disorders, some social vandals or hooligans, and boys who, whilst disliking civil disturbances, and not prepared to join them, approve of disorders and thus form a sympathetic environment in which the actual fighters can operate.

The lesson here is that boys learn about national identity and regime assumptions whilst they are affectively bound to their families. By age eight, one-third of Protestant and one-half of Catholic boys approved of disorder for the realization of such assumptions. By age ten, approximately 70 per cent in both religions accepted disorder for certain political purposes. This suggests that boys learn basic political assumptions within their families, but that the propensity to express them violently increases as they become attached to gangs and other organizations operating within the community. Also, there is a similarity of progression to disorder approval among both Protestants and Catholics, but the assumptions upon which such violence breeds are mutually exclusive.

The fault lines of the political life of Northern Ireland run deeply into the schoolboy generation. At the most inclusive political level of nationality less than half the schoolboys in the Protestant and Catholic communities share a similar national identity priority with someone across the religious division. A question about the Link with Britain revealed that this was accepted by approximately 90 per cent of Protestant, but only by 40 per cent of Catholic, boys. The unwritten constitutions—as a Protestant Ulster or a United Ireland—were approved by a majority in both religions who were also prepared to accept violence as justified in the pursuit of such discordant political goals. At a less inclusive political level—the Government—there appears to be more agreement between religions. Two-thirds of Primary and four-fifths of Secondary schoolboys in different religions share what appears to be similar feelings about Government. And the similarity of feeling about Government between religions does not disappear when one subtracts negative orientations out of the sum of affect. Among both Primary and Secondary schoolboys three-fifths in different religions share similar and positive feelings about Government. Protestant affect is everywhere more benevolent, but Catholic feeling is, nevertheless, positive among the majority of boys.

The Government towards which such seemingly common feelings emerge may not be, however, Government as adults understand it. Schoolboys often see Government as the Queen, the Prime Minister, or Parliament according to their age and political sophistication. When boys record their feelings about

the Queen they may be recording their affect to Government as they understand it. But the sharing of emotional feeling about all sorts of political authority never falls below half in each religion recording positive affect towards such an authority. Perhaps it is at this level of political life—the Government and its authorities—that common allegiance in Ulster may most easily be confirmed and extended into the higher political regions of regime assumptions and nationality. Alternatively, schoolboys may have been socialized into accepting the minimum of political life while more ideal solutions are sought. Survey evidence tends to support this view. Although Protestants lend greater weight to emotional reasons for supporting the Government, the reason for favouring Government which involves the greatest sharing between schoolboys in both religions is—"We've got to accept it whatever we think". Whatever we think—Protestant Ulster or United Ireland—we've got to accept the Government in the meantime to have the distributions and/or regulations that make social life possible. Governments in Ulster may thus act as the temporary caretakers of a war over mutually exclusive political goals. Alternatively, the Government may be viewed as one side of the civil war by being both "to lenient with Catholics" and "discriminating against Catholics".

If the content of political socialization divides Northern Ireland—is the population one social community divided by politics, or two social communities? At first sight it appears, among schoolboys at least, to be two political communities co-operating, for certain purposes, with a common Government. But in what other areas of life does what looks like co-operation exist? Looking at many of the social questions in the study would give, at first sight, an ambiguous answer. For instance, respect to social authorities—parental, educational, economic and religious—looks similar for both religious communities, as does social trust, attitudes about the future, and those to social vandalism. Likes and dislikes, too, seem very similar across religious divides with the major things pleasing to Secondary boys being the scenic beauty, the people, and the way of life. Among "dislikes" the riots take first place with half the boys of both religions expressing this view. There are a number of points however where what appears to be social agreement at first sight, reveals divisions. For instance, although Protestants and Catholics have similar attitudes to social trust, the majority say one has to watch out before trusting someone, or that it "depends" on who they are. This obviously conceals distrust of one another on religious and/or political grounds as anyone who has lived in Ulster for any length of time discovers. Again, high respect for religious leaders conceals divisions since such respect is

directed towards either priests or ministers and does not necessarily flow across religious boundaries. Pessimism or optimism about the future—although revealing similarities in both religions—may be hope or despair about divisive aspects of live such as a United Ireland or a Protestant Ulster. And respect for educators, although similarly high in both religions, is respect for Catholic and Protestant teachers.

Perhaps the simplest way to examine the question of social community, within the confines of these surveys of schoolboys, is to select a number of measures of social distance such as willingness to have friends and neighbours in the other religion, and whether or not one would be willing to see a brother or sister marry or convert into the other religion. By applying the rule that good community relations exist where more than 50 per cent of schoolboys accept such cross-religious situations one is driven to the conclusion that Ulster is a divided social community as far as most schoolboys are concerned. Only in the Catholic Secondary schools, by this rule, is there evidence of a willingness to have one social community. Although conversions and marriages are rejected by the majority of Catholic Secondary schoolboys, friendship, integrated schooling, neighbours, and similarity is positively accepted whilst the expulsion of Protestants from Ireland is rejected by the majority. Although 60 per cent of Protestant Secondary boys say they have Catholic friends, and positively accept Catholic friendship, only 52 per cent respond that they are similar to Catholics. They divide evenly on expelling Catholics from Ulster, the majority reject Catholic neighbours and integrated schooling, and clearly reject conversion and marriage across religious lines. Community relations in the Primary schools is at a still lower ebb. Catholic Primary boys are, in response to all social distance questions, readier to mix socially across religious lines than Protestant Primary boys who reveal the greatest social splits of all.

A great deal has been written about building the political community from the social community. There is, in fact, more sharing between religions at the political level of Government, and its agencies, than there is in the social life of the Ulster schoolboy. Much has also been written about the good relations in Ulster at the social level and that people generally get on well together except for a few weeks every year when politics and religion are brought out to be displayed in public. Neither of these surveys was carried out during the Marching Season. But they were certainly conducted when the very air was thick with politics (1971–72). This suggests that it is political dissimilarity rather than social differences that divides communities in Ulster.

(3) *Discussion*

The content of socialization is everywhere more important than the process. What an Ulster boy learns about politics has greater significance than how he acquires his orientations. In Northern Ireland, a history of partially-accepted government makes the process emphasize both support for, and opposition to authority, as well as stressing discordant political assumptions about the nature and boundaries of the regime. Thus, Protestant and Catholic schoolboys know little other than taking opposite sides in conflicts about the most basic aspects of political life.

The community, rather than the school, is the chief socializer of divisive political content. Divisions between Protestants and Catholics in the North of Ireland existed prior to the introduction of compulsory education and the setting up of the Stormont regime. Furthermore, since one's religion is acquired prior to schooling (ascribed at birth) religious schools only reinforce what is already there and do not create community differences. Also, many of the disputes over education in Ulster began during a time of political discord and disorder over Home Rule and the Partition of Ireland. Thus political differences between educators, and those interested in education, created discordant attitudes to the Stormont regime rather than education creating loyalists and republicans.

Outside of the school-family, social class, national community, religion, local political influences, peer groups, adult-created youth movements, para-military organisations, and violent events continue to shape the civic character of Ulster schoolboys. Some educationalists maintain that teachers should start knowing the social experience of the pupils, recognise this as something vital and significant, and reflect it back to the pupils.[4] From this view one should expect schools to reinforce discordant views of national community. Thus, it is unrealistic to expect schools to create attitudes in pupils which are conducive to common allegiance in Northern Ireland in the absence of support from the adult community and the existence of a political institution which is generally accepted as fair and impartial.

These generalizations would appear to fit with American and British political socialization literature also. They certainly stress the importance of agreement on basic political norms between parents and children rather than between school teachers and pupils. The schools teach best what they have a monopoly upon: Greek, physics etc. They certainly have no monopoly on political or religious education in Ulster. For instance, this study confirms findings in Scotland that school "civics" has little effect upon basic political attitudes.[5]

The structure of the school system in Ulster further confirms the importance of extra-school determinants. The Catholic Church in Northern Ireland, as elsewhere, demands separate schools. Only Catholic schools, staffed by Catholic teachers, can provide the necessary "religious atmosphere" from which "good Catholics" emerge. Furthermore, the Catholic Church demands that Catholics, who are taxpayers, should have their schools subsidised by the State. Until such times as conditions acceptable to the Catholic Church can be negotiated with the State in Northern Ireland, Catholic schools remain voluntary schools finding part of their finances from the direct contributions of the Catholic community. Also, priests would take a harsh attitude if parents wished to opt out of the Catholic school system. Catholic parents, for their part, often fear to send their children to County schools through fear of physical attack upon their offspring.

State schools become, by default, virtually Protestant schools with a sprinkling of Catholics in some Protestant Grammar schools. Catholics were slow to recognise the Northern Ireland ministry of Education at the beginning of the Stormont regime thus leaving educational initiatives in the hands of Protestants. The Protestant clergy in particular made certain that County (State) schools would be interdenominational Protestant schools rather than non-denominational schools. Thus, Protestants found the fully underwritten State schools acceptable, rendering free compulsory education suitable for Protestants only. Catholics, by standing aside from an unacceptable state school system had to pay for their objections by funding much school enterprise from the collections of the Catholic Church. The position in Ulster contrasts starkly with that in Scotland, the home of many Ulster-Scotsmen, where a 100 per cent grant accepts parity between schools attended predominantly by Protestants or Catholics.

If within-school differences are created by the communities in Northern Ireland what implications does this suggest for the future? There is little evidence in the schoolboy surveys to suggest inertia reducing conflict. Evidence suggests that aggression is a learned behaviour. Thus, there is some reason to suggest that the disorders from 1968 onwards will burn for half a century or more. On the other hand, para-military organizations in Ireland have a well-tried tradition of "hanging up the Guns" for a season. That is, whilst political violence is not renounced, it is discontinued on the tactical grounds that it will not work at present.

One possible inertia trend witnessed outside Ulster is the breakdown of authority of the Catholic hierarchy in some Continental countries and the ecumenical movement in many Protestant churches. Some anti-clerical Catholics and ecumenical Protestants are practically indistinguishable in religious outlook and share many values which undercut community strife and separate religious schools. Neither of these movements has gathered sufficient force in Ulster to make it clear whether they will eventually become a power in the land.

If community influences are the main determinants of educational structures does it make sense to talk about total changes in the schooling situation which would make way for integrated schooling across religious lines?

First, how much difference would integrated schooling make to pupils holding discordant attitudes? This study suggests that since community influences are so much stronger than school influences, integrated schooling would make little difference whilst communities are in conflict. The study further shows that even boys who, at present, profess themselves willing to try experiments in integrated schooling, approximately two-fifths of them still accept disorder in politics.

Second, who would teach in integrated schools? Educators are themselves the products of the socializing experiences of their own community and only they can reinforce the diffuse community teachings thought necessary by the community of origin. If integration involves moving pupils it will also require the two-way traffic of teachers. Given the high likelihood that parents and religious leaders will object to their children being taught by Orangemen or Republicans indiscriminately, integration may simply involve the two-way movement of pupils and teachers without pupils being taught by someone of the opposite religion. Such a situation could involve playground battle-scenes that could make street riots appear as minor incidents.

Third, in an integrated system what would teachers actually teach? Content of integrated education centres, first, on either abolishing religious instruction from the schools or the separation of pupils, at certain periods of the day, according to religion, for religious instruction, given by the representatives of the various churches. A second content area focuses upon classes in civics—such as history, geography, modern studies, and literature. Through such classes differences in national outlook, and support and opposition to constituted political authority, can be directly, and

indirectly, taught. Whilst most people who advocate integrated schooling insist that religious differences should be respected there is often an assumption that differences in civic education within the schools should be reduced, or eliminated. If the schools reflect and reinforce community preferences this last assumption flies in the face of reality.

If teachers opt for a neutralizing solution, i.e. avoid conflict subjects, would integrated schooling alone be strong enough to resist what is learned outside the school about the conflict subjects? Moreover, "neutral facts" often cause strong and conflicting reactions. For instance comparative politics or religion may simply provide further proof that the "others" are as ignorant or heathen as was first believed. If, on the other hand, teachers opt for the common campus idea with shared facilities for expensive subjects which offer few opportunities for preaching to the unconverted, and separate classes for conflict subjects, would the common campus and sharing the same cookery or woodwork room be sufficient to offset what was learned in conflict subjects?

The purpose of integrated education depends very largely upon one's view of society in Ulster. If there is one society, education is to be used to prevent it separating. If two communities, then education is to be used to bring them together, or to keep them from drifting further apart. Alternatively, integrated education may not be seen as a device for community harmony. Protestants may see it as a way of getting rid of Catholic schools and inculcating loyalty to Northern Ireland thus ensuring the predominance of their way of life. Catholics, on the other hand, may see integrated education as a good means towards economic advantage, conversions of Protestants through marriage, and eventual absorption of the Protestant community into a United Ireland.

Many of the divisions in education in Ulster over who educates, how, where, and for what purposes rests upon whether Northern Ireland is viewed as one or two communities. Presuming one community divided by religion, integrated education would not prove an unsurmountable barrier provided religious ideals were not exclusive. Whilst Protestants and Catholics share many religious beliefs that could be taught in a combined religious education syllabus there are exclusive doctrinal views which could be overcome by separate classes for religious instruction, or education. But Catholics hold an exclusive view concerning the religious atmosphere of a school which is foreboding to Protestant parents and forbidding to Protestant teachers. To preserve this atmosphere Catholics must be taught by Catholic educators in a Catholic school.

Thus separate religious instruction within common schools falls short of the educational ideals of the Catholic Church and renders integrated education impossible whilst such ideals prevail. However, provided that Northern Ireland is one social and political community divided only at the religious level integrated education is unnecessary for community co-operation and religious differences can be respected without interfering with other aspects of community life. Alternatively, in a community divided only by religion, Catholics may be more easily persuaded that Catholic education elsewhere has not been shown to be producing better Catholics.

Presuming Northern Ireland is one social community divided by religion and politics, the schools which are clearly separate by their insistence upon different religious values would become even more exclusive through civic education. The impossibility of integrated schooling appears when one considers that in this situation such schools would have to provide a number of mutually exclusive programmes such as a "Catholic atmosphere", an interdenominational Protestant Milieu, and history, geography, civics, and literature reflecting United Ireland and Protestant Ulster traditions.

Presuming that Northern Ireland is two social and religious communities seeking, or trying to maintain, political counterparts, can, or should one, create integrated schools catering for the mutually exclusive goals of a divided population?

If, however, we assume that integrated schooling is to be introduced in Northern Ireland, how would such a change occur? Professor Akenson suggests that if integrated schooling is to have any chance of success in Northern Ireland it must have four characteristics:[5]

1. It must be voluntary in the sense that only children of parents who desire their attendance are admitted.
2. The parents must have some shared beliefs in common.
3. Supportative techniques will be necessary to ensure continued co-operation between parents.
4. The management committees of such schools should steer clear of both local government and religious authorities.

Given that these conditions are necessary for integrated schooling in Ulster it seems unlikely that the forceful integration of schools could succeed. This would include—

1. compulsory education as at present;
2. withdrawal of all state funds from voluntary schools;

3. fines or imprisonment for parents who did not send children to integrated schools;
4. bussing from non-integrated housing estates; or
5. the forced integration of housing estates;
6. nationalization of Church property;
7. making hedge schools illegal.

The problem of this alternative would be finding a Government with the will and power to carry such a policy through and sufficiently subduing the population.

The consequences of successful voluntary integration through improved community relations suggests that a time may be reached when the communities begin to question the need for integrated schooling. As political and social differences are accommodated the need for integrated schooling becomes less necessary since community tensions have been reduced. The consequences of forcibly using integrated schooling in an attempt to unite different communities, without community co-operation, will probably end by driving them further apart. The problems connected with creating mixed housing areas and/or bussing pupils and teachers with different religious complexions may provide confrontations and levels of intimidation as yet unseen in Northern Ireland. Thus, it ill behoves those who have not moved to touch English or Scottish religious schools, or to nationalise public schools, to lecture Ulstermen about integrated education. In the event of integrated schooling this will come after a solution at the community level. Prior to ending the conflict any attempt to integrate may only increase conflict. Seeing integration as a palliative which would ease, if not attack the roots, of community divisions, fails to take account of the community obstacles to common schooling. The suggestion that a sick man does not despise palliatives assumes one man desiring ease. It is less certain that the population of Northern Ireland wish to attain a legal "health" based upon common remedies.

Integrated schooling *after* the causes of conflict between communities have been removed, or differences accommodated, is an entirely different matter to seeing integrated education as a cure, or palliative, for discord. The political parties, in favour of power-sharing, elected to the Northern Ireland Assembly in 1973 all favoured integrated education in some form or another. The Unionist, Alliance, and Labour parties stress integration within Northern Ireland. The Social Democratic and Labour Party emphasised that integration must be between religions in Northern Ireland *and* between schools close to the Irish Border. The success of elected integrationalists in

Northern Ireland depends upon their being able to
agree among themselves; and their being able to carry
any proposal in the face of such opposition as will
doubtless emerge. Governments of Northern Ireland
may agree with the Burges Report on Secondary
Education that "... it would be unrealistic to expect
the introduction of integrated schools in the near
future."[7] They may choose alternative educational
measures as their first concern such as comprehensive
education and curricular reform.

References

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